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# Securing the Everyday City: The Emerging Geographies of Counter-Terrorism

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This thesis is submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree  
of Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Geography  
Durham University

2011

# Declaration

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# Abstract

This thesis investigates the presence of counter-terrorist security within the everyday life of cities. It emerges from, and contributes to, ongoing debates concerning the place of security in contemporary urbanism, and discussions regarding the increased saturation of urban spaces with a diverse range of security interventions. Drawing on this work, this thesis argues that in order to better understand the urban geographies of security, instead of exclusively conceiving security as only imposed on urban spaces, we must ask how processes of securing cities are 'lived'. In doing so this study responds to the lack of attention to the complex relations between processes of security and lived everyday urban life. This thesis explores the neglected everyday life of security through a case study of an emerging form of counter-terrorist security apparatus within cities in the UK, examining the broadening of the National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom and the continuing development of CONTEST, the United Kingdom's counter-terrorist strategy. Taking London as a named example, the study concentrates on the security interventions of two research sites, the Southbank and Bankside area of the South Bank, and the Victoria Line of the London Underground, to examine how security addresses the everyday life of the city and how such practices are experienced as part of lived everyday urban life. In sum, this thesis focuses, first, on the processes through which the everyday city is secured and, second, it draws attention to and describes how those processes of securing are encountered and enacted, as they become part of the everyday life of cities.

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# Abbreviations

BTP	British Transport Police
CABE	Commission for Architecture and the Built Environment
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
CPDA	Crime Prevention Design Advisor
CPNI	Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure
CTSA	Counter Terrorism Security Adviser
DfT	Department for Transport
IED	Improved Explosive Device
LU	London Underground
NaCTSO	National Counter Terrorism Security Office
NRA	National Risk Assessment
NRR	National Risk Register
NSS	National Security Strategy
OSCT	Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism
PCSO	Police Community Support Officer
RIBA	Royal Institute of British Architects
RTPI	Royal Town Planning Institute
SBEG	South Bank Employers Group
TfL	Transport for London
VBIED	Vehicle Borne Improved Explosive Device



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# 1. Introduction

Two police officers stroll languidly along the footpath underneath Waterloo Bridge - I have observed their steady progress since they passed the OXO tower: a mixture of the two talking, laughing, pausing to look at the river, exchanging smiles with passers by or an infrequent 'afternoon', and on one occasion providing directions. Now they have stopped. It appears something has attracted one of them. Speaking quietly to his colleague he turns and gestures right, his outstretched arm pointing towards a wooden bench. The officers start for the bench, hurrying their pace as they approach. Stopping and standing near but not next to the bench they stare at a tidily assembled collection of six large, bulky shopping bags. Then, looking intently around, they scan the surrounding area, neither speaking. Close to this, a young woman poses for a photograph. Noticing the now stationary officers her posture straightens and she indicates their presence to her partner, a young man, who lowers his camera and turns swiftly to face them. He smiles as he calls to the officers:

It's okay they're ours.

The young woman is now smiling, still looking in the direction of the officers. The young man eagerly turns back to face her speaking to her as he does, only to be stopped by a loud, exasperated rebuke:

You can't do that. You can't leave them there. They could get stolen or make a security scare. You shouldn't ever leave things like that. Think how it looks.

The officer points firmly at the bags and then gestures toward the couple. As he talks his voice grows louder, it betrays annoyance verging on anger, mirrored in his furrowed, tightening expression and reddening face. The second officer stands silently, frowning as he glances once more at the bags before fixing his eyes on the couple. The young man has turned back to face them once again, both he and the young woman appear as an awkward mix of bemusement and civility. He offers a half smile before, in an apologetic tone, responding:

I'm sorry, we didn't think about that. We can see them and we're ...

The officer interrupts, speaking aggressively over the young man. The attempt to apologise and explain only appears to have added further aggravation:

Well it doesn't matter alright? You can't, you can't do it because it looks suspicious, that's why we're checking it. It doesn't matter if you can see, you don't do that, okay?

What if we thought it was something suspicious, something serious?

The couple no longer smile as they offer further apologies and words of regret, moving to stand with the officers. With all four now stood together, the speaking officer first shakes his head in a somewhat exaggerated manner and then proceeds to address the couple. No longer shouting, but still visibly irked, he gesticulates, raising both hands, directing them along the footpath. Finally he stabs a finger repeatedly toward the bags, his face creased into an awkward glower. After this short but animated exchange the couple repeat exaggerated apologies and assuring that their mistake won't be repeated. To this, both officers react by shaking their heads before final words are exchanged. The officers walk on, muttering to one another as they do. The couple talk quietly as they watch the officers, they pull faces and laugh before stepping away from the bench, once more leaving their shopping bags idle in order to take photographs. All of a sudden the young man grabs his partner, pulling her close to him with feigned antagonism. He scowls theatrically, she laughs as his face breaks into a smile:

You can't take photos now because we're so paranoid about terrorism, okay?

(Observant participation, South Bank, 29.12.08)

## **Introduction**

In this example from my research diary, a form of security becomes momentarily present. This passage describes an encounter, an incident where I witnessed two police officers walking on the South Bank, stopping to investigate what appeared to them as a 'suspicious' collection of items, and the exchange that ensued between the two police officers and a couple who identified themselves as the owners of the offending, 'suspicious' bags. This thesis pays attention to how a specific form of counter-terrorist security apparatus is primed to be part of everyday life in different ways. Attending to the presence

of different counter-terrorist security mechanisms within urban spaces, it discusses how the various interventions of this particular security apparatus are enacted as part of the background of cities and urban life and then to the instantiations through which security interventions change form and become more intensified presences. Through this thesis it is argued that attending to the ways that security is encountered and enacted through the everyday use of urban space extends existing debates concerning urban security towards a fuller appreciation of the where and how of security within the everyday life of cities. It is argued here that in order to better understand the urban geographies of security we must move to witness and describe how security becomes part of urban life in different, often unexpected ways, to attend to security as it is lived.

This research is focused on the presence of security within the everyday life of cities and with the diverse range of security interventions that are now deployed throughout cities in order to, in Dillon's (2007) terms, 'govern terror'. It argues that instead of exclusively conceiving security measures as only imposed on urban spaces in relation to abstract 'principles' of state formation (see Agamben, 2002), we must ask how processes of securing the everyday city are 'lived' and become part of, what de Certeau elegantly terms "a proliferation of aleatory and indeterminable manipulations within an immense framework of socioeconomic constraints and securities" (1984:40). This research thus focuses on the processes through which the everyday city is secured and on how the various materialities that make up those processes of securing are encountered, enacted, experienced and *lived* as they become part of everyday urban life. To this end, I offer a conceptual vocabulary for describing the everyday life of security and how the everyday is secured.

This introductory chapter sets out the context for this research by introducing the background for works that have considered counter-terrorist security responses in urban spaces and the present lack of attention afforded to how security interventions are encountered and lived through the everyday life of cities. After this, I outline the two London based sites that serve as the locations that are combined to provide the case for this research, before presenting the questions and aims around which the research project has been developed. Finally, the chapter explains how the thesis is structured and provides an outline of each of the subsequent chapters.

### **1.1. Research context: securing urban space, securing life**

It has been widely argued in both academic and non-academic domains that cities are increasingly becoming the key strategic sites where terrorism occurs and is countered (see

Davis, 2001; Dudley, 2007; Graham, 2002a, 2004a, 2004b, 2008; Glaeser and Shapiro, 2001; Gray and Wyly, 2007; Gregory and Pred, 2007; Marcuse, 2006; Mitchell, 2003; Savitch, 2003, 2008; Sorkin, 2008a). Commenting on what they describe as the ‘urbanising of the security agenda’, Wekerle and Jackson provide a concise summation of these arguments, contending that “anti-terrorism is such a hegemonic project that it insinuates itself into the interstices of everyday life” (2005:46). In the UK, as elsewhere, the spaces of civil life are progressively becoming saturated with a variety of security and surveillance mechanisms in response to the perceived threat of further terrorist attack and the apparent vulnerabilities of cities to a range of ever changing terrorist threats and tactics<sup>1</sup>. The presence of a variety of counter-terrorist security responses throughout the spaces of civil life are deemed necessary, for it is widely accepted in the UK, as in many other cities throughout the world, that a situation has arisen where it is not only economic and military targets that are under threat of attack. Indeed, as the UK Government concedes, increasingly the spaces of civil life and the “places where people live and work” (HM Government, 2009a:56) are understood to be at high risk from and vulnerable to the threats of terrorism and to the ‘event of terror’ in particular. The threats posed to cities and urban life by contemporary forms of terrorism have established significant new challenges for how we understand security, and the very means by which it can be provided. Integral to these emerging landscapes of security, and to contemporary urbanism, are the various processes of securitisation that aim to reduce the occurrence and impact of a terrorist attack, through which the city and everyday urban life have become a ‘referent object’ of security (see Dillon, 2008; Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2008).

Much has been written regarding security as a key factor in contemporary urbanism. Various now well established discussions have developed that focus on the vulnerabilities of cities to terrorism, and to the various ways that counter-terrorist security is then imbricated with the city through “attempts to ‘design out terrorism’ (or perhaps more correctly to ‘design-in’ counter-terrorism)” (Coaffee, 2009a:6; see also Coaffee, 2000, 2003a, 2004a, 2004b; 2009b; Coaffee and O’Hare, 2008; Coaffee et al, 2008; Dudley, 2007; Flint, 2005; Little, 2004; Nasr, 2003; Vale, 2005). There is a considerable body of work that examines how this takes place, and discussions abound regarding the resources and the constraints that cities have to deal with the threats posed by terrorism, as well as the processes of securitisation through which these mechanisms become present within urban spaces. Research has thus far tended to focus primarily on the processes through which

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<sup>1</sup> It is important to acknowledge that what are categorised as ‘new’ and ‘unconventional’ terrorist threats and tactics in the West are not so in other contexts (see Bishop and Roy, 2009; Coaffee, 2009b; Coaffee et al., 2009; Wills and Moore, 2010).

security measures are imposed on cities, the technical and instrumental dimensions of specific mechanisms of securitisation, and how such processes result from, or exemplify, contemporary changes in governance (see Benton-Short, 2007; Coaffee, 2003a, 2009a, 2010; Coaffee and Murakami Wood, 2006a; Coaffee et al., 2009; Graham, 2004b, 2011; Gregory and Pred, 2007; Light, 2002; Mueller, 2010; Swanstrom, 2002).

Alongside work that has sought to map new urban geographies of security, have been a series of claims that security interventions within everyday urban settings are intrusive and disruptive. It has been the contention of both academic and non-academic sources that counter-terror security practices often constitute dangers to the very life of the cities that they claim to protect. What has emerged are a set of persistent claims within literatures on counter-terrorist security that 'protectionist reflexes', characterised by "regulatory management, fortification and surveillance to categorise, divide and control" (Coaffee and Murakami Wood, 2006:7) are widely adopted and that such security apparatuses are to the detriment of cities and urban life. These processes of security are repeatedly described as enacting a form of counter-terror response that has been characterised as highly obtrusive as well as contentious. There are certainly examples where these claims are true (see for example Graham, 2002a; Marcuse, 2002), in particular in those writings reflecting on the various counter-terrorist responses that were adopted in the immediate aftermath of the attacks on September 11<sup>th</sup> 2001. However, the prevalence of this form of counter-terror security apparatus has been overstated and has been documented at the expense of other urban contexts and examples where security apparatuses and counter-terrorist interventions are perhaps more "considered and considerate" (Vale, 2005:38).

Notwithstanding the persistence of these claims, research focused exclusively on one specific form of counter-terrorist security apparatus does not account for the continued developments in approaches to counter-terrorism, the changing environments of threat and counter threat, nor the complex array of landscapes and security spaces that have emerged and continue to change. Indeed, as this thesis will discuss, it is imperative that we consider the localised and distinctive character of security challenges and counter-terrorist responses. The well established and rehearsed claims that detail and critique styles of 'fortress urbanism' (see Coaffee, 2003a; 2004b, 2009a), practices of 'barricading' (see Marcuse, 2002) the city and the 'citadelisation' (see Marcuse, 2004) of supposed public spaces, although not without substance and certainly of continued importance, neglect other counter-terrorist security apparatuses, failing to recognise the many and varied ways in which security becomes part of cities and which can in many cases demonstrate how security and urban spaces and the life of cities are brought into forms of reconciliation. This

thesis will demonstrate that such general characterisations are naïve and extremely problematic given that counter-terrorist security responses are necessarily spatially contingent. It will also be argued that the rationalities of security are not those of fixity; security is expected and required to change in order to address the evolving terrorist threat and shifting perceptions and calculations of threat and risk. Additionally, and importantly, the security agendas of many western cities now display more rigorous attempts to develop more 'proportionate', 'appropriate' and 'acceptable' security interventions. These have become central tenets in the rationality of the form of counter-terrorist security apparatus that is emerging in the UK and that will be traced through the course of this thesis. It is important, therefore, to acknowledge this variation and to specify these differences through a more nuanced account of the range of security challenges and processes that emerge across cities and in multiple and different urban contexts.

Central to this thesis is the contention that whilst the prevailing focus on the resources that cities have to deal with the threats of terrorism and the imbrications of security with cities are important contributions to the study of urban security, debates concerning the transformations of urban space and urban life have been somewhat circumscribed. The lack of attention to how security measures are encountered once they become part of the everyday life of cities means that too much can come to be assumed about both their efficacy and about the resultant nature of urban life. Where 'life' does feature, in academic and non-academic accounts, it is all too often assumed that what 'life' is or might be is already known. Where it has been considered, it is predominantly figured as 'life as secured', where cities and everyday urban life are conceived exclusively as a 'referent object' of security. This thesis extends these investigations through a more concerned focus on the complex and variegated impacts of security on the spaces of urban life and through a discussion of the relations between security and lived urban life itself. In doing so, this thesis argues that where urban spaces and everyday urban life become a 'referent object' of security, not only is it important to question how specific counter-terror security apparatuses and security practices are adopted, it is also necessary to consider the impacts of security on the everyday city and everyday life more thoroughly. The research will therefore focus on how security measures know and imagine the everyday city, and examine how various counter-terror security measures become part of the everyday city in different ways. In addressing these concerns, this thesis contributes to and develops understandings of the urban geographies of security as it questions more directly how security becomes part of urban spaces, how the measures of security are encountered and how security is experienced and 'lived' through the everyday use of cities.

## **1.2. The everyday life of security**

There are examples of work that has begun to engage with the relations between security and lived everyday experience, however, this thesis contends that an explicit connection has not thus far been made. Where work has signalled the importance of examining the relations between everyday life and the securitisation of cities, there has then been a tendency to be overly reliant on a set of implicit assumptions about how the materialities of security have been, or might be, encountered and experienced as part of everyday life (see Boddy, 2008; Coaffee, 2009a; Davis, 2001; Farish, 2004; Grosskopf, 2006; Katz, 2007; Marcuse, 2008; Mythen and Walklate, 2006; Rice, 2010 Sorkin, 2008a). For many writing on the relations between security and everyday life, the construction of fear and attendant insecurities have become intertwined with and materialised in security interventions that are said to act as “an always already presence of terrorism in our midst” (Katz, 2007:350). Security interventions and counter-terrorist security apparatuses are then paradoxically cited as ‘reminders’ and ‘reinforcers’ of terror and terrorism (see Katz, 2007). It has become an awkward yet established convention that different forms of security and the ubiquity of counter-terrorist security practices within urban spaces articulate, contribute to and even sustain the widespread insecurity and ‘culture of fear’ that is said to have become symptomatic within cities, as well as reproducing the conditions that have given rise to the common claim that western societies live in an ‘age of anxiety’ plague (see Graham 2006; Robin 2002; Bauman 2006). Swanstrom’s claim that the main threat to cities “comes not from terrorism but from the policy responses to terrorism” (2002:135), has proved enduring and widespread in both academic and non-academic debates.

In this thesis I seek to develop existing debates concerning the everyday life of security, and in particular I will examine the ways that security is encountered and enacted through daily practices in order to provide a more nuanced account of the everyday landscapes and everyday experiences of the form of counter-terror security apparatus which serves as the case study for this thesis. I maintain that within works that have begun to engage with the relations between everyday life and security, ‘everyday life’ and the ‘everyday’ have remained under theorised. Too often the conclusions that have been drawn from these debates are reliant on a set of implicit assumptions of how security is enacted as it becomes part of lived everyday urban life, even when it is claimed that it is a central. Through a focus on examining practices of everyday encounters with security in urban settings, this thesis provides an account which is more attentive to how security addresses the everyday life of the city and how it becomes present in lived everyday urban life. This



then enables this study to consider both the presence of the materialities of security within urban spaces and in the lived everyday life of cities. It therefore addresses the complex relations between processes of security and the enactment of lived everyday urban life.

Additionally, through its focus on the ways in which security becomes part of a lived, everyday urbanism, this thesis discusses the implications for UK cities of the UK Government's National Security Strategy (NSS) (Cabinet Office, 2008a, 2009a; HM Government, 2010a) and CONTEST, the UK Government's counter-terrorist strategy (HM Government, 2006, 2009a, 2010b, 2011a, 2011b). In the UK, and through the broadening of the NSS and the ongoing development of CONTEST, urban spaces and urban life have become a 'referent object' of security, where the spaces of cities are figured by the UK Government as 'vulnerable', 'preferred', 'likely' and 'high profile' targets for terrorist attacks (HM Government, 2009a:16-17). The spaces of civil life, the spaces where people 'live' and 'work', are spaces that the UK Government's CONTEST strategy states cannot be subject to more traditional forms of counter-terror security without the risks of radically changing public experience or undermining public use of public spaces, for these are everyday spaces where the UK Government has stated that security must "allow people to live normally, free from fear" (HM Government, 2009b:5). What is required in this context is a specific form of counter-terrorist security apparatus, primed to be part of and embedded in urban space and urban life in different ways. The aims of this form of security are biopolitical, to enable a set of 'freedoms' and to foster 'good' circulations that sustain a certain form of valued life in the context of cities in the UK, ultimately to *let life live* (Foucault, 2007). In the UK, this biopolitical security apparatus is increasingly centred around rationalities of 'appropriateness' and 'proportionality' that involve the reconciliation of security with urban life and require approaches tailored to different urban contexts. I am interested in how a biopolitics of security can be utilised to extend discussions of the processes aimed at securing urban spaces and the efforts to protect of a certain form of 'valued life'. With reference to the expressions of *life* that are enacted through a biopolitics of security, I will argue that in urban contexts different expressions of life coalesce as the city becomes the 'referent object' of security. There are then implications for how security understands, secures and indeed enables a certain form of 'valued life' through the protection and facilitating of particular processes and circulations that come to define liberal-democratic life.

In the context of a discussion of the everyday life of security, this thesis will demonstrate how contemporary urban counter-terrorist security apparatuses are designed to oscillate between invisibility and response to events. It will be argued that invisibility is

now central to how new ways of securing public space function. More specifically, the thesis will trace how forms of 'invisible security' (see Briggs, 2005), that I will argue now dominate attempts to secure everyday urban life, become part of the life of everyday life. Whilst it is acknowledged that there has been work that has begun to engage with this shift, we still know little about how forms of 'invisible security' are practiced nor how these interventions, which are embedded into the ordinary spaces and happenings of cities, are then encountered and lived in the context of particular apparatuses of security (although see Boddy 2008; Briggs 2005; Coaffee et al. 2009; Nemeth 2010). In addition to the steps that are taken to embed security into urban environments, in and through everyday life, security becomes a normalised and often background presence. This requires that we draw attention to the mechanisms through which forms of security are encountered as a background presence and then appreciate how these various mechanisms can take on a heightened presence to disrupt the life of everyday life and how security as *present* within everyday life is experienced. This thesis maintains that the geography of security is a geography of absences and presences.

The issue of difference and identity in everyday life and for the everyday life of security is a significant and recurring theme in both existent academic research on the subjects and with respects to how security is practiced (see Bari, 2011; Bentham, 2011; Greer, 2010; Hickman et al. 2010, 2011; Hillyard, 1993; HM Government, 2011c; Liberty, 2004, 2011; Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009; Travis, 2009). There are longstanding debates regarding the ways in which forms of security differentiate, and critiques of how difference is enacted in and through different forms of violence that are inherent in various security apparatuses. It is commonly argued that security apparatuses are discriminate, critiques have focussed on how processes of differentiation are enacted and how in different security apparatuses differentiation is, or has been, based on forms of racial, class, gender, sex, codings and means of classification. There have been further and more specific issues raised in relation to difference and identity and counter-terrorism security, in the context of the UK and elsewhere. These include widespread concerns regarding the ways that counter-terrorist security apparatus differentiate, in particular via forms of 'profiling' that enact specific codings to establish *threat* and a *non-threat*. Whilst acknowledging the importance of these issues and associated debates, the focus of this thesis lies elsewhere, and as such these themes are not addressed directly here. As a result it is acknowledged that the thesis is largely, and deliberately, blind to the difference that social differences makes to everyday encounters with urban security practices. Accordingly, as far as is possible bodies are positioned in this thesis without difference or as neutral.

This thesis offers a more thorough investigation of how the materialities of security are encountered and how security is experienced as part of the everyday life of urban space. In so doing I seek to provide a more nuanced set of geographies that witness and describe the encounters and enactments of security interventions in everyday urban settings. This is an argument which is made in the context of a case study focusing on a specific security apparatus, the CONTEST strategy, and how a range of counter-terror security measures become part of everyday urban spaces.

### **1.3. Research location**

In this thesis I discuss the emergence and the everyday life of a specific form of security apparatus, that of contemporary counter-terrorist security in cities in the UK. More specifically, this study is interested in the processes of securing urban public spaces and the UK Government's category of so-called 'crowded places' (HM Government, 2009a). I provide a case study of this form of counter-terror security, its rationalities and the presence of a range of distinct security mechanisms within urban spaces that are intended to 'govern terror' (see Dillon, 2007). I then question how these different security interventions are encountered and become part of 'lived' everyday life. The discussion of the everyday urban geographies of this form security is traced through a study of the rationalities of current counter-terror security policy in the UK, via the NSS (Cabinet Office, 2008a, 2009a; HM Government, 2010a) and CONTEST (HM Government, 2006, 2009a, 2010b, 2011a, 2011b), and the enactment of counter-terror security through interventions located in London and within two research sites, the Victoria Line of the London Underground (see Figure 4.1), and the Southbank and Bankside area of the South Bank (see Figure 4.2).

The focus of this study on London, and its attention to public spaces within the city, responds directly to the broadening of the UK Government's NSS (Cabinet Office, 2008a, 2009a) and the continued iterations made to CONTEST (HM Government, 2006, 2009a, 2010b, 2011a), and in particular to the inclusion of the so called 'soft targets' of cities and civil life and the category of so-called 'crowded places' (HM Government, 2009a). Civil spaces have emerged as a category of 'insecure' space, increasingly considered by the UK Government to be 'vulnerable', 'preferred', 'likely' and 'high profile' targets for terrorist attacks, these 'crowded places' include "places where people *live* and *work*" (HM Government, 2009a:16-17, 56, my emphasis). In order to attend to and then discuss the emerging urban geographies of threat and of this form of counter-terror security, London provides an ideal case. Whilst this form of security involves a rationality of site specificity, it

remains widely accepted that the increased trends towards counter-terror security have emerged most notably in cities that are regarded as economically and/or strategically important locations, such as London. In addition, the examples that the UK Government has provided in its recently published guidance papers are predominantly drawn from the experiences of counter-terror security as it is enacted in spaces and contexts within London (HM Government, 2010c, 2010d, 2010e).

The two research sites, the Victoria Line of the London Underground, and the Southbank and Bankside area of the South Bank, were then selected as a combined case through which to explore the material implications of these recent shifts in UK counter-terror policy. These two sites allow the thesis to consider a form of counter-terror security apparatus which responds to an emerging category of 'insecure' public space in UK policy, namely 'crowded places' (HM Government, 2009a). It is stated by the UK Government that 'crowded places' remain the preferred target for international terrorists and the "most likely target for a crowded places attack is one which is easily accessible, regularly available and offers the prospect for an impact beyond the loss of life alone" (Cabinet Office, 2008b:25). The two sites offer examples where these rationalities and this emerging counter-terrorist security apparatus are enacted via a range of security interventions. The Victoria Line and the South Bank permit this thesis to examine the ways in which public spaces have been refigured as 'insecure', as 'threatened' and as at 'high risk' from and 'vulnerable' to terrorist attack. It is then the task of this thesis to witness and describe how the different security interventions within the two research sites become present in everyday life and are experienced. In addition, the two sites raise interesting and important questions regarding the relationship between freedom and circulation, and freedom and security within public spaces. As such, the case study draws on both sites as it contributes to debates concerning how security can be reconciled with the requirements of openly accessible public sites of circulation. This raises questions both in the study of contemporary counter-terror security and for practical matters concerning security interventions in urban environments.

The two sites do not form a comparative study. Instead, the Victoria Line and the South Bank develop a case study allowing this thesis to discuss a specific and emerging contemporary counter-terrorist security apparatus. The case then serves as a means of providing a more nuanced and more context specific account of the implications of this form of security apparatus for and within urban contexts. With reference to these two research sites I examine how the interventions of this specific counter-terrorist apparatus are experienced as they become part of the everyday life of cities.

#### **1.4. Research aims, objectives and questions**

In summary, and in light of this context, this thesis develops an approach that explores how new forms of counter-terrorist security are practiced in urban spaces and provides a more detailed investigation of how the materialities that make up processes these apparatuses of security are encountered and enacted as they become part of 'lived' everyday urban life. This allows the thesis to examine how a particular apparatus of security is imbricated into the spaces and happenings of urban life so that it is lived, in the double sense of the life of security and life as secured. In so doing this thesis aims at supplementing recent conceptualisations of security as exclusively, or primarily, functioning as 'principles' of state formation (see Agamben, 2002). This focus is for two reasons. First, existing research on securitisation tends to concentrate on the processes of securing rather than how security measures are encountered and experienced through the everyday use of urban spaces. The result is often, if not exclusively, the reproduction of a vision of cities as dominated and manipulated by a set of 'top down' forces that contrasts with the emergence of what Amin and Thrift (2002) describe as an 'everyday urbanism'. Second, despite the relative lack of attention to everyday use, it has been argued that central to understanding security measures has been a set of implicit assumptions about how they have, or might, be encountered within everyday life. However, an explicit connection has not thus far been made. To this end, the thesis asks three questions:

1. How is the everyday city imagined, governed and secured as it becomes the 'referent object' of security in terrorist orientated processes of securing the spaces of urban life?
2. How are the visible, if mundane, materialities of securing, CCTV cameras, traffic bollards and blockages, police officers for example, habitually (or otherwise) encountered and enacted in the everyday use of urban spaces?
3. How, in the context of these complex relations between the securitisation of urban spaces and the life of everyday life, to theorise the relations between everyday life and security?

In sum, this thesis focuses, first, on the processes through which the everyday city is secured and, second, it describes how those processes of securing are encountered and enacted as they become part of everyday urban life.

## **1.5. Thesis outline**

Chapter 2 moves to establish this thesis within the wider context of recent theoretical debates concerning biopolitics, security and urban security. Together with Chapter 3, Chapter 2 establishes the theoretical framework for the thesis. In the first section of Chapter 2 I focus on the biopolitics of security in relation to a particular problem, that of securing urban spaces. Here I consider works on biopolitics and the biopolitics of security inspired by Michel Foucault, to consider how this body of work might contribute to discussions of urban security and everyday life. The first part of this section thus discusses Foucault's account of biopolitics. The second part then moves to a discussion of more recent developments and updates of this body of work, in particular the reappraisal of Foucault's work and the development of a 'biopolitics of security' by Michael Dillon. The final part of the section takes this work forward, offering a reassessment and rethinking of biopolitics in relation to security and contemporary urban space, and considering the potentials for using these approaches for analysing security, cities and the everyday life of security. This leads to the second section of the chapter, which turns its focus more directly to recent work that has concentrated on issues and practices of the securing of contemporary urban spaces, and in particular counter-terrorist security responses. In reviewing these contributions I consider the predominant focus on the forms, techniques and functions of security in the city, the technical and instrumental dimensions of security practice, the presence and efficacy of techniques, and their relation to changes in contemporary governance. Here I suggest that whilst such work is of considerable utility, it has only begun to hint at the complex relations between security and everyday life. As such, the chapter concludes by asserting that everyday life is often under theorised, also contending that where lived experience does feature, the relations between security and the everyday life of cities is overly reliant on a set of implicit assumptions.

Having drawn out the problem of the lack of explicit attention to 'everyday life', in Chapter 3 I then develop a conceptual framework that can address security and its relations to everyday life and lived experience. Developing this theoretical framework allows this thesis to challenge the somewhat narrow conceptions that have emerged in existing discussions regarding security and its relations to lived everyday urban life. Firstly this chapter introduces and discusses the work of Georges Perec whose writings and reflections on the everyday form the conceptual foundation for this thesis' engagement with the everyday life of security. Perec is of considerable utility in this regard as his writings encourage us to attempt to approach, to register and to describe the commonly unnoticed

and unthought-of of the everyday, the 'infra-ordinary', as well as the more excessive happenings of daily life. The second section of this chapter further develops a sense of the lived everyday life of security through an examination of three conceptual devices: encounter; affect | emotion | feeling; and attention | distraction. Questioning whether the terms 'the everyday' and 'everyday life', and similar, are too broad as the analytic with which to understand the everyday life of urban security, this section disentangles and differentiates within these and similar terms. Through the three parts of this section I suggest three analytic devices with which to further develop the framing of this study and engage with the distinct problem of security as part of everyday life and lived experience. Taken together, the two theoretical chapters are integrated with one another to explore the theoretical issues and offer a review of the literatures that develop and provide the conceptual framing of this thesis.

The conceptual approach outlined in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 necessitated a particular set of methods. Chapter 4 presents and poses a discussion of the methodology developed and practiced in this study. This methodology is designed to permit an engagement with the dispositifs of security and with everyday practices, to consider both the presence of an emerging security apparatus in the city and how security is experienced day-to-day. As such in this chapter I outline and explain the methodological strategy used to research counter-terrorist security in the context of urban public spaces within the UK, the incidence and imbrications of security within the two research sites, and the relations between security and lived experiences. The first section of this chapter outlines the rationale for the methods practiced, describing some of the practical and conceptual issues, as well as concerns and problems that researching the everyday, and in particular the everyday life of urban security, pose. The second section then outlines the methodological approach itself. I begin by outlining the two research locations, explaining the case study approach and the rationale for the choice of the two research sites. Following this discussion I outline each of the methods used. For the sake of clarity this is divided into two parts: dispositifs of security; and the everyday life of security. This is a pragmatic distinction, and in light of the theoretical imperatives, each of the methods work together following Law's (2004) example of a method assemblage. This method assemblage serves to allow this study to address and to present everyday practices and encounters, counter-terrorism policy and the work of security professionals. The third and final section of this chapter offers a brief discussion of the processes of analysis, description and presentation in the chapters to come.

Chapter 5 situates the specific form of counter-terror security apparatus which establishes the case study of this thesis in the context of public spaces within cities in the UK. The chapter also provides a discussion of how, through this emerging apparatus of security, the everyday city and urban life become a 'referent object' of security (see Dillon, 2008; Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2008). The chapter begins by examining CONTEST (HM Government, 2006; 2009a; 2011a), the UK Government's counter-terrorist security strategy, before focusing on cities as a particular problem for contemporary security, with reference to London as a named example. The second section provides a discussion of how counter-terrorist security practices have been translated into action within the spaces of urban life. This section examines how urban spaces are imagined and the issues of how rationalities of 'appropriateness' and 'proportionately' are increasingly central to counter-terrorism as it is incorporated into cities and practiced day-to-day. The final section of this chapter is divided into two parts, focusing on the two research sites, to consider how in relation to the particular problematics identified in the first two sections of this chapter, security becomes present within specific urban spaces. Importantly this does not form a comparative study, the chapter concludes that the two sites are figured and imagined as a referent object of security in remarkably similar ways. The two sites provide a case study of a specific form of security in order to discuss how these new ways of securing public space are enacted where the aim is to ensure a set of 'freedoms' and to foster 'good' circulations that enable a 'valued life' to be enabled and lived. The following two chapters draw from the interviews, diaries and observant participation to describe how the materialities of a security apparatus that is primed to be part of everyday life are encountered and enacted in specific ways.

In Chapter 6 I pay attention to the conditions of encounter – where bodies enact security as it becomes part of everyday life. I suggest that one of the generic ways in which security is present within the everyday life of cities is as part of the infra-ordinary background of urban life. As such, the chapter explores the very ordinariness of security and the ordinary ways in which it is encountered and enacted. We see here how security moves from being a set of mechanisms to something lived, and how everyday life shifts from being an object of security to that within which security lives. The chapter begins by developing the idea of security as a part of the infra-ordinary background of the city and the ordinary ways security is encountered and enacted through everyday practices. Following and extending this analysis, the second section considers some of the implications of this infra-ordinariness in the context of a structure of expectation that urban spaces will always be somehow secured. Third, I explore the ambiguous role of security within the everyday life of cities. In the final section of this chapter I then move to discuss the ways in which security



as a background presence is experienced as a background feeling, as an affective atmosphere. In sum, this chapter argues that with respects to the form of the security apparatus described in the previous chapter, invisibility is increasingly central to these new ways of securing public space. Whilst it is true that mechanisms of security are ever more ubiquitous, security is not as omnipresent as has previous been claimed. Having explored the conditions of encounter, the chapter maintains that through the everyday use of urban space, security becomes and is so often enacted as background, as a sunken part of that which is truly daily in our daily lives.

To extend the analysis of Chapter 6, in Chapter 7 I focus on the second generic way in which security is present within cities, that is, those moments where security emerges as a more intensified presence and is enacted as a more heightened presence within everyday life. Here my analysis moves to the particular mechanisms through which forms of security within the two research sites are encountered and take on an intensified presence to disrupt the life of everyday life in different ways. My aim here is to develop the analysis of the previous chapter in order to examine how security changes form and becomes present, then considering how security interventions are encountered and enacted as more intensely present within the everyday life of urban space. In order to explore security as it changes form and how the interventions of security become more intensely present, the chapter is structured around two substantive sections: the birth to presence; and the presence of presence. The first section investigates the birth to presence of security; it will discuss the rips to the fabric of the infra-ordinary as security changes form and becomes present. The second section describes how security can become an intensified presence and how these changes in its form are experienced and the affects of security as present. By focusing more closely on the ways in which security is encountered as it emerges as a heightened presence, and then how these security materialities are enacted, this chapter argues for a more nuanced account of the life of security. In so doing this chapter argues for an account of contemporary urban security that disrupts and moves beyond current claims that the ubiquity of the security induces widespread insecurity. It also poses a challenge to the assumption that security is always somehow already present within the life of everyday life. Taken together with the previous two empirical chapters, I maintain that the biopolitics of security in cities is not only a matter of how the everyday becomes the 'referent-object' of security, it is about how the materialities of security can and do themselves become part of everyday life.

In the final chapter I provide an evaluation and an overview of the research as a whole. This concluding chapter offers a summary of the main theoretical and empirical

contributions made in this thesis and the implications of this study for work in geography and in particular for the urban geographies of security. Here I discuss the central themes of this research project through a summary of the major features of the specific security apparatus that the thesis discusses. The first section of the chapter summarises and addresses the key themes of this research. It presents the principal characteristics of this form of counter-terrorist security and how it becomes part of the everyday. Following this, in the second section I discuss three implications of this study, firstly focusing on contemporary counter-terrorism, secondly on the life of security and lastly for work on everyday life. In the final section of this concluding chapter I provide a set of closing reflections that present and discuss a set of possibilities that this research offers for further work.

## 2. Theorising Urban Security

### Introduction

Conceptually, this thesis offers an alternative means of thinking about and researching urban security. In particular it provides a contribution to how we might think the everyday life of security as it lived and folded into everyday experience. This chapter, along with Chapter 3, offers a review of academic literatures and provide a conceptual overview for the thesis in order to set up the theoretical debates that inform this work. Then, these two theoretical chapters address the problem of the lack of explicit attention paid to 'everyday life' within existing works on security and the securitisation of cities, and the concomitant absence of theoretical and empirical accounts of the complex relations that emerge between urban life and processes of securitisation.

In the first section of this chapter I engage with works on biopower and biopolitics inspired by Michel Foucault (1978, 2003, 2007, 2008). In so doing I consider how this body of work might contribute to discussions of urban security and everyday life. The first part of this section focuses on Foucault's account of biopower and biopolitics, considering his development of these concepts. The second part then presents and examines more recent ways in which biopower and biopolitics have been used by Michael Dillon (2004a, 2004b, 2005a, 2005b, 2007a, 2007b, 2010; Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2008, 2009), in particular his updates and development of Foucault's works into the 21<sup>st</sup> century and through the 'biopolitics of security'. The final part of this section returns to Foucault's (2007) discussion of the space of the town to explore Foucault's *dispositif* (apparatus) of security as a conceptual and methodological tool for analysing security, cities and lived experience. Here, following Foucault and arguing for the utility of biopower and biopolitics, I am interested in the problematic of contemporary forms of security framed as problems of circulation and the aleatory, which Dillon (2005; see also Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2008) in his development of Foucault's work on biopolitics has argued are characteristic of a biopolitics of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. In particular I am interested in how biopower, biopolitics and the biopolitics of security can be utilised in the contemporary analysis of the securing of urban spaces. In addition, I discuss how these conceptual tools can engage with the securing of a form of 'valued life' framed and enacted in terms of the coalescing of 'biological' life and urban 'life' as it is deferred and constituted by other elements. The task of security becomes that of the regulation and protection of these elements, enabling certain processes and circulations,

whilst regulating and securing against more ‘dangerous’ elements, in order to secure ‘life’. If, as Foucault (2007) contends, biopolitics involves the administration of bodies and the calculated management and regulation of life, here and leading to the following section of this chapter, I question how security understands and secures a ‘valued life’ whilst crucially ‘letting life live’. In so doing, I address issues of security and freedom as attempts are made to bring them forms of reconciliation. As with Dillon’s Foucault-inspired contribution, I acknowledge that Foucault’s original work on the spaces of the town requires updating in order to reflect and offer a useful analytics of the security landscape of the contemporary city and develop the conception of a ‘life’ as the ‘referent object’ of security.

Following this, the second section of this chapter poses a discussion of recent work that has concentrated on issues and practices of the securing of contemporary urban spaces, and in particular with work that has engaged with issues concerning forms of counter-terrorism security. In reviewing literature that are concerned with matters of security and the securitisation of urban spaces, I examine the prevailing focus on the forms and functions of security in the city, arguing that this is largely a body of work which comments on and debates the presence and efficacy of security techniques, mapping the geographies of security, as well as examining how these result from and reflect changes in contemporary governance. As such, and reflecting the literature itself, this section considers urban landscapes of security and defence, with a particular focus on discussions of urban security post September 11<sup>th</sup> 2001. Through this section, and as will become clearer in the Chapter 3, I argue that work that has focused on the spaces of security and on the securitisation of everyday life has only begun to hint at the complex relations between security and everyday life. Notwithstanding the importance of existing work, due to the overwhelming focus on the presence and efficacy of security techniques, the imbrications of security and the city, the mapping of the geographies of security, and debates over how to achieve more secure cities, everyday life has been under theorised, all too often assumed, and frequently overlooked altogether. The conceptual framework developed within this chapter and Chapter 3, and the empirical study it informs within this thesis, addresses this lacuna.

## **2.1. Biopolitics and security**

### **2.1.1. Biopolitics**

For Michel Foucault one of the most significant phenomena of the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was the emergence and development of ‘biopolitics’

and 'biopower'. Dillon succinctly frames the task undertaken by Foucault, writing that biopolitics may, in general, be said to be "the interrogation of what happens to politics and power when the biological properties of the human species become the referent object of politics and power" (2010:62). Foucault (1978, 2003, 2007, 2008) traces the emergence of a new form of politics which he suggests signifies the incorporation of life, and the dimensions and processes that are said to define life, into modern forms of politics. This is a politics which relates to "what it means to be a living species in a living world: biology is drawn into the domain of power and knowledge" (Marks, 2006:333). The most noted and oft used translations of Foucault's accounting of biopower and biopolitics appear in the final lecture of *Society Must be Defended*, and in the final chapter of *The Will to Knowledge* entitled 'Right of Death and Power over Life'. A more thorough and extensive account is developed through the lecture courses devoted to this theme delivered by Foucault at the Collège de France recently translated and published as *Security, Territory, Population* and *The Birth of Biopolitics*. Through this series of lectures and writings biopower and biopolitics are introduced, developed and changed by Foucault<sup>2</sup>.

Foucault endeavours to trace the emergence of biopolitics and biopower, arguing that starting in the seventeenth century, power is situated and exercised at the level of life, coming to be exercised over the individual body and the collective body of the population of which they are part. Foucault examined the emergence of questions of population and the problem of 'species life' and how these came to be "problematized in the field of political thought", and through "the analysis of political power" (Foucault, 2003:241), leading to an "explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugation of bodies and the control of populations" (Foucault, 1978:140). As Foucault observes within the final chapter of *The Will to Knowledge*, the emergence of biopolitics represents a dramatic shift in the "configurations in which forms of power take shape and function" (Collier, 2009:80) and the patterns of correlation between different forms of power, between the mechanisms of sovereignty and those of the disciplinary society, to techniques of government which situate and exercise power over life, "a power whose highest function was perhaps no longer to kill, but to invest life" (Foucault, 1978:139)<sup>3</sup>. According to Foucault, from the seventeenth century, power over life evolved and was situated and exercised through forms

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<sup>2</sup> It is worth remembering, as Rabinow and Rose note, that "Foucault promised to flesh out his sweeping generalizations" however, "[t]hat promise was not fulfilled" (2006:196).

<sup>3</sup> As Foucault argues: "There is not a series of successive elements, the appearance of the new causing the earlier ones to disappear. There is not the legal age, the disciplinary age, and then the age of security. Mechanisms of security do not replace disciplinary mechanisms, which would have replaced juridico-legal mechanisms". Rather, "you have a series of complex edifices in which ... what above all changes is the dominant characteristic, or more exactly, the system of correlation between juridico-legal mechanisms, disciplinary mechanisms, and mechanisms of security" (2007:8).

of discipline, regulatory intervention and control, seeking to “invest life through and through” (1978:139). Describing how historically “the ancient right to take life or let live was replaced by a power to *foster* life or *disallow* it to the point of death” (Foucault, 1978:138, original emphasis), Foucault, in the first volume of *The History of Sexuality*, explains that this modern power over life developed in two different yet interlinked forms:

In concrete terms, starting in the seventeenth century, this power over life evolved in two basic forms; these forms were not antithetical however; they constituted rather two poles of development, linked together by a whole intermediary cluster of relations. One of these poles—the first to be formed, it seems—centered on the body as a machine: its disciplining, the optimisation of capabilities, the extortion of its forces, the parallel increase in its usefulness and its docility, its integration into systems of efficient and economic controls, all this was ensured by the procedures of power that characterised the disciplines: an *anatomo-politics of the human body*. The second, formed somewhat later, focused on the species body, the body imbued with the mechanics of life and serving as the basis of the biological processes: propagation, births and mortality, the level of health, life expectancy and longevity, with all the conditions that can cause these to vary. Their supervision was effected through an entire series of interventions and regulatory controls: a *bio-politics of the population*. The disciplines of the body and the regulations of the population constituted the two poles around which the organisation of power over life was deployed (Foucault, 1978:139, original emphasis)

Foucault thus describes a bipolar diagram of power, through which he illustrates how biopower has taken control of the body, population and life itself. Foucault states that this is “the power to ‘make’ live and ‘let’ die” (2003:241), though he explains that the logic of biopower is one of production: “It exerts a positive influence on life, endeavours to administer, optimize, and multiply it” (1978:137). As Ojakangas argues, in the case of biopower “it is no longer a matter of bringing death into play in the field of sovereignty, but of distributing the living in the domain of value and utility. Its task is to take charge of life that needs a continuous regulatory and corrective mechanism” (2005:6). This represents a move towards the management of the well-being and life of the population, through mechanisms capable of ensuring its regulation and control. The emerging focus of biopolitical power is thus, for Foucault, centered on bodies and on populations. The regulation of the individual,

the modern subject, itself becomes connected with the strategic needs of the population and society:

For millennia, man remained what he was for Aristotle: a living animal with the additional capacity for a political existence; modern man is an animal whose politics places his existence as a living being in question (Foucault, 1978:143)

Foucault describes how the supervision and regulation of the population began to be effected through an entire series of interventions, techniques of management and regulatory controls through which existing and entirely novel methods and technologies of power are re-deployed and recombined in diverse assemblies of biopolitical government. As Lazzarato explains, from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries onwards, “the dispositifs of power and knowledge begin to take into account the ‘processes of life’ and the possibility of controlling and modifying them” (2002:99). The biopolitics of the population and the regulation and management of species life became the ultimate end of government, where “power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large scale phenomena of population” (Foucault, 1978:137). For Foucault, biopolitics, understood as specific strategies of power situated and exercised over the population, thus concerns the collective mass, but simultaneously necessitates the regulation of its depths and its details:

The exercise of power is not a naked fact, an institutional right, nor is it a structure which holds out or is smashed: it is elaborated, transformed, organised, it endows itself with processes which are more or less adjusted to the situation (Foucault, 1982:224)

Biopolitics is “power exercised over living beings – applied at the level of life itself; it was the taking charge of life” (Foucault, 1978:143), and it is this ‘taking charge of life’ which, for Foucault, gives power its access to the human body and its capacity to effect forms of regulatory management of the population.

Power is now understood to be situated and exercised at the level of life, marking the advent of the society of government and “the genesis of a political knowledge that was to place at the centre of its concerns the notion of population and the mechanisms capable of ensuring its regulation” (Foucault, 1997a:67). The governmentalisation of the state, rather than witnessing the cessation of a society of sovereignty or discipline, consists of a triangle

that incorporates “sovereignty, discipline and governmental management, which has population as its main target and apparatuses of security as its essential mechanism” (2007:107-108)<sup>4</sup>. Foucault demonstrates that an entirely new series of interventions and regulatory controls were established that addressed the emergence of the questions of population and the problematics posed by humans figured as ‘living beings’, this represents “a shift of accent and the appearance of new objectives, and hence of new problems and new techniques” (Foucault, 1997a:67). These, Foucault (2007:10-11) states, support the general economy of power in a society which is becoming the domain of security.

Power, Foucault claims, now has the function of administering life, that is, managing the population and ensuring species survival. It is the emergence of security which for Foucault provides “the set of mechanisms through which the basic biological features of the human species became the object of a political strategy, of a general strategy of power” (2007:1). Foucault (2007:29) contends that the mechanisms utilised to deal with such issues, constitute a *dispositif* of security rather than a juridico-disciplinary system. Foucault details his desire to trace the emergence of biopolitics and biopower, particularly through a concern for “the ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit very complex, power that has the population as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument” (Foucault, 2007:108). This is a task which has been taken on in order to offer an account of biopolitics and theorisations of the relations between biopolitics and modern security and governmental practice.

The original articulation of biopolitics forwarded by Foucault was presented over thirty years ago and his genealogical account provides examples of power situated and exercised over life over a period spanning in excess of two hundred years. Any consideration of what the analytic might offer today needs to take account of how it has been translated and appropriated in the intervening period. Whilst some have deviated significantly from Foucault’s account of biopower and biopolitics, other thinkers, such as Michael Dillon, have

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<sup>4</sup> Collier (2009) provides a thorough and detailed discussion of the conceptual and methodological shift Foucault undertakes in his approach to biopolitics, in particular within the lectures of *Security, Territory, Population* and *The Birth of Biopolitics*. Collier suggests that the lectures of 1978-79 are “notable first of all for the fact that they scramble the periodizing structure of Foucault’s prior work. They break down Foucault’s sometimes epochal claims concerning a shift from a society of sovereignty to a society of discipline (in *Discipline and Punish*) or normalisation (in *Society Must be Defended*); and they cut off any suggestion that the rise of security should be read in similarly epochal terms” (2009:88). Collier argues that Foucault’s 1978-79 lectures question was how “these figures of sovereignty, discipline and security are combined in ‘complex edifices’, ‘systems of correlation’” (2009:95) or, as Collier proposes, topologies of power. Expanding on and explaining his choice, Collier writes: “Terms like ‘patterns of correlation’, ‘configuration’ or simply ‘topology’ seem preferable to ‘system’ because they emphasize a definite principle of relationality among heterogeneous elements without suggesting any global logic of the whole that they form” (2009:103). An approach that adopts a ‘topological’ analysis provides a more flexible approach to the different configurations, relations and transformations in and through which forms of power, their techniques and mechanisms take shape and function.



sought to take on and develop these originary works so as to make Foucault's biopolitical project relevant to the 21<sup>st</sup> century, developing and extending Foucault's theses. I restrict the following section to the significant engagement of Dillon whose Foucault-inspired works offer considered analyses of contemporary biopolitical power relations and biopolitical arts of government to provide a 'biopolitics of the 21st century'.

### **2.1.2. The biopolitics of security in the 21<sup>st</sup> century**

Michael Dillon (2004a, 2004b, 2005a, 2005b, 2007a, 2007b, 2010; Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2008, 2009) has sought to extend Foucault's work on biopower and the biopolitical, developing a 'biopoliticisation of security' which he states demonstrates the transformation and change of the subject in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. There are a number of clear parallels between Dillon's work and that of Foucault, however, and as I will detail below, Dillon's contribution is also marked by divergence, developments that Dillon contends "theorises beyond Foucault" (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2008:265). Dillon seeks to trace biopower and biopolitics and its development in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, extending Foucault's genealogical analysis of the heterogeneous domains of modern power relations. In concentrating on contemporary biopolitical practices he poses an analytics of the ways "apparatuses or technologies of modern power and governance work" (Dillon, 2010:62).

For Dillon, Foucault's account addresses the biopolitics of security as a 'politics' of security. As a result, for Dillon the central question becomes: "What happens to politics and power when the biological properties of the human species become the referent object of politics and power" (2010:62). Dillon's Foucault-inspired engagement with the biopolitical is produced by the "profound transformation" (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2008:269) undergone by the referent object of biopolitics since Foucault. It involves asking "what has happened to population as well as to 'life' in the interim between Foucault's initial interrogation of the biopolitical economy of biopower and the biopolitics of the 21st century" (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2008:266). As Dillon (2007a) rightly contends, different discourses of danger revolve around different referent objects of security, these referent objects give rise to different kinds of governmental technologies and political rationalities. According to Dillon, security "is not a fact of nature but a fact of civilization. It is not a noun that names something, it is a principle of formation that does things" (1996:16). Following this, it becomes necessary to question security as a process, to secure "is not a state but a process, a doing" which "both invents and changes whatever is so secured" (1996:122): "In short, for something to be secured it must be acted upon and changed, forced to undergo

some transformation through the very act of securing itself” (1996:122). For biopolitics, different problematisations of security depend on how ‘life’ and how ‘species life’ are known and classified, as well as what power/knowledge techniques and political rationalities are employed (Dillon, 2004a:78).

Dillon states that the contemporary politics of international relations should necessarily be viewed as a biopolitics of liberal governance that requires extensive apparatuses of security (see Dillon 2004a, 2004b, 2005a, 2005b, 2007a, 2007b, 2010; Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2008; Dillon and Reid, 2001). Dillon’s is an exploration of the biopolitical ways in which liberal regimes of power have come to operate, a vision of liberal biopolitics dedicated to power over life: “a *biopolitical project* in pursuit of the propagation of population welfare, rather than the more traditional strategic goals associated with sovereignty, the control of territory and the sequestration of resources” (2004a:76, original emphasis). For Dillon, the importance of biopolitical as well as geopolitical concerns has meant that both, and the changing interplays between bio- and geo- politics “now drives western security politics” (2007a:9). As such, according to Dillon, both must now be addressed when discussing problematics of contemporary security.

In order to undertake his analysis, Dillon relies on and utilises Foucault’s works on biopower and biopolitics, yet his understanding and articulation of biopolitics, the regulation of population, the ways in which power is exercised and situated at the level of species life, as well as his appreciation of dispositifs of security often diverge from Foucault’s work. Dillon is of course concerned with questions of global governmentality and the biopolitics of states and thus apprehends biopolitics and questions of populations and species life at an entirely different level of analysis to that addressed by Foucault. In addition, and importantly, Dillon is seeking to write a ‘biopolitics of the 21<sup>st</sup> century’, an extension and update of Foucault’s investigations of the emergence and rise of biopolitics, that can clarify and further develop Foucault’s original analytic and offer a contemporary analysis of the operations of biopower, biopolitics and security, tracing its development into the 21st century. Dillon thus draws directly on Foucault’s works in order to question the mechanisms and technologies that are presently deployed by those power relations that take life as their referent object.

Dillon writes of the need to broaden the scope of the concerns of biopolitics, following his belief that “biopower is developing a deep concern with the science of systematic behaviour not simply of biological bodies, but also of hybrid and cyborg-like assemblages, or complex adaptive systems” (2004a:82). Within his writings on the subject, Dillon consistently demonstrates a belief that advances in the bio-medical sciences, the life

understood within molecular biology, as well as developments in the technological sciences that have produced forms of digitalised intelligence, mean that biopolitics cannot avoid incorporating different versions of 'life'. 'Life' is to be understood as molecular, digital, and also include 'life-like' elements, which fold into the concerns of contemporary dispositifs of security and biopolitics (Dillon, 2005a:39; see also Dillon and Reid, 2001:49-51; Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2008, 2009). In so doing, Dillon is in the process of instigating a new description of species life, one which is different to that understood by Foucault.

Dillon is correct in his assertion that "whatever life is now, it is no longer the original biologised life of early biopolitics" (2005a:39). However, in many ways Dillon overstates the role of molecularisation, information, digitalisation and advances in the biomedical sciences in his account of contemporary biopower, biopolitics and the securing of species life. Notwithstanding Dillon's claim that this work should be read as a revision of Foucault's original theses, extended "to the analysis of the political rationalities and technologies of security which are now common among regimes of biopower which increasingly characterise the 21<sup>st</sup> century" (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2008:269), it risks overwhelming and so losing sight of other characterisations and expressions of what 'life' is or might be. There is a danger of losing sight of how, in different contexts, different expressions of life are simultaneously the referent object of the biopolitics of security in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The turn to the digital, information and the molecular as 'life' is too quick in its dismissal of Foucault's original focus, and I would argue that this is of limited utility for discussions of the 'life' which is the referent object of security operating within cities and found in the examples in the section to follow and in this thesis more broadly. In his original analysis, the objects of this biopolitics of population identified by Foucault, are cited as the biological phenomena of 'species life' (the birth rate, the mortality rate, longevity, and so on), Foucault also indicates the importance of "whole series of related economic and political problems" that were, Foucault says, biopolitics' "first objects of knowledge and the targets it seeks to control" (Foucault, 2003:243). As Dillon himself notes, "biopolitically, species life may be determined in all sorts of ways, furnishing principles of formation for different kinds of power relations" (2004a:82), thus changing the character of 'life' as the referent object of the biopolitics of security.

Attempts to demonstrate how species life may be determined in a variety of ways will inevitably lead to changes in the concerns and aims of biopolitics. If 'life' is taken to be digital, the bio-molecular or even constituted via 'life-like' elements, as is presented by Dillon, biopolitics will necessarily begin to involve an entirely new and different series of problematics. Not all milieus require that life be understood at the level that molecular

biology now permits, nor do 'life-like' elements necessarily have to be incorporated into our understandings of 'life' as the object of contemporary security apparatuses. In the context of this thesis, and as Chapter 5 will show, the protection and preservation of different versions of life coalesce and are enacted within contemporary counter-terrorist security strategies. In the context of UK cities, and written into the NSS and CONTEST, these are broadly figured in terms of human species being; a way of life; and through the processes, circulations and interdependencies that make up a valued life and allow it to be sustained. These different characterisations of 'life' are then inseparable as they coalesce and are expressed as a form of 'valued life' that is taken as the 'referent object' of security and becomes the fulcrum through which security is expected to operate.

Dillon supports Foucault's analysis of the role of biopolitics and security's willingness to permit, even accentuate circulation, an indication that biopolitical governance necessitates and is to be reconciled with forms of freedom: "freedom is nothing else but the correlative of the deployment of apparatuses of security" (Foucault 2007:48). Dillon recognises the clear benefits of circulation and the relationships between security and mobility, yet he raises a series of concerns regarding global circulation. Dillon (2005b:2) states that when analysing security and questions of international circulation, it is impossible to escape the problems posed by disparate and numerous interdependencies and flows that emerge, suggesting that circulation itself poses a seamless web of interdependent problems. Dillon contends that circulation translates the new global security problematic from a 'geo-strategic' into an 'ecological' problem "characterised by the escalatory dynamics of complex interdependencies" (2005b:2). Dillon's interpretation of contemporary biopolitics addresses circulation as a particular problem for international security agendas, rather than as something that must be regulated and fostered, as Foucault proposes. For Dillon, circulation is a distinct and dangerous problem that must be controlled, even prevented. Dillon certainly draws on Foucault's understanding of circulation and the milieu here, writing of the need to foster good forms of circulation within a space of security. Yet in his extension of Foucault's analysis, he is more concerned with addressing what he deems the many dangers of 'global systems' of circulation, proposing that security apparatuses must consider the potential and ability to be connected, to be drawn into global circulations of various kinds, and the existence of circulations, in somewhat negative, dangerous terms. This is in contrast with Foucault's proposal of the capacity of security to promote freedom and to enhance and regulate living through facilitating 'good circulation', whilst addressing and where necessary securing the 'bad'.

The question of circulation ultimately leads Dillon to his assertion of the seminal importance of contingency as a contemporary biopolitical concern, as well as his contention that the contingent has become the central problematic for contemporary international security. For Dillon, global circulation is intimately and inescapably bound with the contingent, for “contingency is what complex global systems of circulation circulate—massive and dynamic sets of spatio-temporal conjunctions and correlations” (2005b:2). Again, the dangers of interconnection and flow are brought to the fore, as contingency is presented as the consequence of ‘bad’ circulation, an effect that must be secured against. Dillon warns of the dangers presented by complex systems of circulation, stating that interdependence and connection raise risk and uncertainty, as “the very smallest perturbations or anomalies in one system of circulation can have the potential to cascade into large-scale crisis” (2005b:2). Rather than founding the relationships of circulation and contingency as the basis of constructing the milieu as the space of security as Foucault sought, Dillon renders the contingent as that which must become the object of biopolitics and so the referent object of dispositifs of security.

For Dillon, in his interpretation of biopolitics, contingency has succeeded ‘species life’ as the referent object of security. Dillon’s reading of Foucault’s analysis of biopolitics centres on the contingent as the most important feature of dispositifs of security and indeed, for biopower and biopolitics more generally. Dillon even goes so far as to state that Foucault’s own observations about biopolitical governance “revolves around what he calls the contingent or ‘aleatory’ features that are displayed by populations” (2007b:41). Dillon situates contingency as the central concern for contemporary global biopolitics, simultaneously rendered as the primary apprehension for international security. This follows from Dillon’s assertion that the contingent has now become the primary strategic principle of formation for the generic securing of life which liberal governmental rule now pursues globally: “Having to take into account the autonomous nature of the thing to be governed biopolitics seeks to govern through contingency since contingency is what characterises its very object” (2007b:46). There is a large degree of disparity between Foucault’s use of the term ‘aleatory’ and the ways that Dillon deploys ‘contingency’.

The aleatory and chance are, for Foucault, an inevitable factor of life, thus, when governing through biopolitics, the aleatory is unavoidable: Foucault argues that a dispositif of security “lets things happen” (2007:45) and then reacts to this reality in a certain way in order to limit or even neutralise its more random, aleatory effects (2007:46-47). Thus the aleatory is understood as a thing that must be secured and governed through process of

strategic elaboration, yet it is ultimately 'life' itself which remains the object of security or government.

The phenomena addressed by biopolitics are, essentially aleatory events ... security mechanisms have to be installed around the random element inherent in a population of living beings so as to optimise a state of life" (Foucault, 2003:246).

The contingent, for Dillon retains the sense of the aleatory as subject to chance as in Foucault, but additionally, and importantly for his account of biopolitics, Dillon suggests that an event or series of events occurs only if certain other circumstances are present. Dillon takes the randomness or chance that is found in Foucault, and develops this through his work on radical relationality to suggest that if entities are conceptualised to be the product of relations, then by definition, these entities are contingent (dependent) on their relations: "Contingency does not mean pure arbitrariness, it means being critically dependent upon the detailed correlations of time and space" (2005b:2). In Dillon's account of biopolitics, contingency becomes similar to 'life' for Foucault, essentially a regulatory thing in a system of biopolitics. The contingent becomes an object of calculative government, the problem to be secured is contingency: "Arguably, the contingent has now become the primary strategic principle of formation for the generic securing of life which liberal governmental rule now pursues globally" (Dillon, 2007b:46).

Although his contribution is mainly focused on politics and international relations, Dillon's analytic retains its utility for distinguishing the contemporary security landscape and highlighting concerns which develop the biopolitical and the work of Foucault. Dillon forwards an account of the emerging field of the 'biopolitics of security' as he traces the development of biopower and biopolitics into the 21<sup>st</sup> century. His account demonstrates the importance of differentiating between the different spaces at which biopolitical processes occur, and the different ways these processes must be analysed. Dillon identifies circulation and contingency within his work on biopolitics, these retain their importance for this thesis, but they need to be reworked and rearticulated in the context of urban security and the problem of the urban. For the purposes of this thesis, we find more useful starting points by returning to Foucault's original biopolitical project and Foucault's work on examples of the town and town planning in particular. Here the problem with Dillon's work is twofold, firstly although I support his attempts to attend to the transformation of life, in its presumption of molecularised, digitised life, and the 'life like', Dillon's biopolitics and his 'biopolitics of security' overlooks and downplays the 'life' which is the 'referent object' of the dispositif of

security which forms the case study for this thesis. And second, Dillon's account of the contingent is too different from the aleatory and the event in Foucault, and should not be seen to surpass life as the referent object of security at all levels of analysis.

### **2.1.3. General features of security apparatuses: the spaces of security ~ the example of the town**

In this section I return to Foucault in order to offer a reassessment and rethinking of biopolitics in relation to security and contemporary urban space, building on Foucault's ideas of dispositifs of security, and in particular his examples of the general features of apparatuses of security discussed through the spaces of security and the 'town' (see Foucault, 2007; Pløger, 2008). Foucault (2007:245) remarks that the population is essentially an urban problem and as Elden suggests, the themes of Foucault's works on the biopolitical and his concern for security raise questions of what it is that actually allows "the functioning of everyday life, particularly in the urban environment" (Elden, 2003:241). Indeed, Foucault goes so far as to write that "from the eighteenth century on, every discussion of politics as the art of government of men, necessarily includes a chapter or series of chapters on urbanism, collective facilities, on hygiene, and on private architecture" (1984:240). For an examination of the securitisation of contemporary cities and the securing of urban life, whilst Dillon's 'biopolitics of the 21st century' remains salient, returning to Foucault's examples of the town is of considerable utility for examining contemporary urban governance and security, and the everyday life of security.

The opening lectures of *Security, Territory, Population* are concerned with dispositifs of security, of which Foucault gives three examples: town planning; food shortages; and vaccination campaigns. These are intended to illustrate four general traits: the spaces of security; the treatment of the uncertain, the aleatory; the form of normalisation specific to security; and the correlation between techniques of security and population, as the moment of the emergence of the question of population (Foucault, 2007:11)<sup>5</sup>. Foucault explains that the concept of security differs in three important ways from discipline. First, discipline is essentially centripetal; it isolated, concentrated, and enclosed space. Dispositifs of security

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<sup>5</sup> When asked to explain his understanding of the meaning and methodological function, of dispositif, Foucault replies: What I'm trying to pick out with this term is, firstly, a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions ... Such are the elements of the apparatus. The apparatus itself is the system of relations that can be established between these elements. Secondly what I am trying to identify in this apparatus is precisely the nature of the connection that can exist between these heterogeneous elements ... In short, between these elements, whether discursive or non-discursive, there is a sort of interplay of shifts of position and modifications of function which can also vary very widely. Thirdly, I understand by the term 'apparatus' a sort of ... formation which has as its major function at a given historical moment that of responding to an urgent need. The apparatus thus has a dominant strategic function" (1980b:194-195).

“have the constant tendency to expand; they are centrifugal ... Security therefore involves organising, or anyway allowing the development of ever-wider circuits” (Foucault, 2007:45). Second, whereas discipline by its definition regulates everything, allowing “nothing to escape”, the dispositif of security “‘lets things happen’. Not everything is left alone, but *laissez-faire* is indispensable at a certain level” (2007:45). Third, discipline divides everything according to a code of the “permitted and the forbidden”, seeking to eliminate and eradicate the forbidden completely, a ‘good discipline’ “tells you what you must do at every moment” (2007:46). Security involves “standing back sufficiently so that one can grasp the point at which things are taking place, whether or not they are desirable ... grasping them at the level of their effective reality” (2007:46-47). Security works with this reality, trying to use it as a support, to optimise its components to function in relation to each other and to regulate to the most advantageous level fundamental in dispositifs of security.

Of particular interest in the theoretical framing of this thesis is Foucault’s (2007) case of the town, examined as an example of spaces of security, one of the general features of security apparatuses. The town, as the space of security, is developed by Foucault through three examples of planning urban space and models for the management of towns in the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: Alexandre Le Maître’s *La Métropole*; Richelieu; and Nantes. The key question Foucault addresses through these examples concerns the space of security and the operation of biopolitics and circulation, specifically questioning the ways mechanisms of security operate in a spatial order “to be a perfect agent of circulation” (2007:17). Foucault contends that whilst discipline operates through the enclosure and circumscription of space, and sovereignty capitalises a territory, biopolitical apparatus and mechanisms of security are concerned with the facilitation and organisation of circulation, allowing things to be in motion, and so security requires the opening up and release of spaces, to enable, to regulate, to organise and ultimately to secure circulation:

we see the emergence of a completely different problem that is no longer that of fixing and demarcating territory, but of allowing circulations to take place, of controlling them, sifting the good and the bad, ensuring that things are always in movement, constantly moving around, continually going from one point to another, but in such a way that the inherent dangers of this circulation are cancelled out (Foucault, 2007:65)

As Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero observe, Foucault’s use of *circulation* refers to “circulation in the widest and most generic sense of the term” (2008:279). Indeed, Foucault states that in his use of the concept he means circulation understood “in a very broad sense



of movement, exchange and contract, as form of dispersion, and also as a form of distribution” (2007:64)<sup>6</sup>. At the same time Foucault identifies a set of more technical issues regarding circulation, as the problematic of biopolitics and circulation includes diverse *modes* of circulation and not just the things that circulate. Accordingly, circulation emerges as both the key instrument and target of biopolitics (see Aradau and Blanke, 2010; Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2008; Lobo-Guerrero, 2007, 2008):

by ‘circulation’ we should understand not only this material network that allows the circulation ... but also the circulation itself, that is to say, the set of regulations, constraints, and limits, or the facilities and encouragements that will allow the circulation of men and things (Foucault, 2007:325)

Foucault argues that the ‘insecurity’ of towns was to be met by technologies of security with the objective of “organising circulation, eliminating its dangerous elements, making a division between good and bad circulation and maximising the good circulation by diminishing the bad” (2007:18). This raises what Foucault identifies as ‘the problem of circulation’: “the problem being: How should things circulate or not circulate?” (2007:64). The purpose of biopolitics is fundamentally, therefore, the facilitation and optimisation of ‘circulation’: “Circulation is concerned with flows, but flows have to be monitored and regulated” (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2008:268). Following this, the security problematic of circulation for biopolitical security is posed by Foucault in terms of differentiating *good* circulation from *bad* circulation, requiring the knowledge of circulation and interventions that regulate and organise the flows of circulation and provide the means to distinguish between *good* and *bad* circulation. Indeed, as Adey observes, “the continual calibration of circulation is organised in order to protect that circulation from strangling life” (2010:12). As a consequence, security faces the challenge of knowing and coping with the emergence of *bad* circulations, diminishing and eliminating dangerous elements. This is, as Dillon and

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<sup>6</sup> It is important that Foucault’s concept of circulation is not confused with other similar concepts, in particular it should not be read as equivalent to ‘mobility’ or ‘movement’. Indeed as Adey observes, in *Security Territory Population* Foucault makes a distinction between *mobility* and *circulation*, treating the two concepts quite differently when he “positions mobility alongside uncertainty with his understanding of ‘circulation’” (Adey, 2009a:277). Foucault’s use of the concept of circulation is particular to his framing of biopolitics and the security of species-being, it should not therefore be read as, nor assumed to be equivalent to other similar concepts. *Circulation* is understood here in the context of Foucault’s development of biopolitics, circulation is the core problematic of biopolitics, both its key instrument and its target: “every aspect of how *species-being* circulates and every circulation that affects the welfare of *species-being*, including every conceivable transaction and exchange by means of which it is capable of being related to every other form of matter both actual and virtual” (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2009:11, my emphasis). Furthermore, it is important not to confuse Foucault’s use of *circulation* with *mobility* given the upsurge of interest in *mobility* and *mobilities*. This interest and new approach to the study of mobilities has resulted in what Hannam et al. (2006) refer to as the ‘new mobilities paradigm’ and a ‘mobile turn’ (Urry, 2007) being declared or advocated. This concept is now recognised as important within geography as well the wider arts and social sciences (see Adey, 2006, 2010; Bissell and Fuller, 2010; Büscher et al., 2010; Cresswell, 2006, 2010; Cresswell and Merriman, 2010; Elliot and Urry, 2010; Kaufmann, 2002; Sheller, 2011; Sheller and Urry, 2006; Urry, 2000, 2007).

Lobo-Guerrero (2009) note, closely related to the problem of governing too little and governing too much. Security tries to incite and preserve circulation, though Foucault maintains that regulation and intervention should be minimal, biopolitics requires that all remains in motion “but in such a way that the inherent dangers of this circulation are cancelled out” (2007:65). Consequently, power does not operate by prohibition but by the “delimitation of phenomena within acceptable limits, rather than an imposition of a law that says no to them” (Foucault, 2007:66). The ultimate aim and central problematic of biopolitics and the purpose of dispositifs of security, following Foucault, is the facilitation and optimisation of circulation, to get and to keep things moving.

Foucault (2007) contended that the exercise of power through biopolitics and apparatuses of security involved planning and intervening in a ‘milieu’, this he suggested could be called the ‘space of security’<sup>7</sup>. Foucault’s (2007) use of the term ‘milieu’ describes a concept that is both the space and the target of apparatuses of security. As such, following Foucault a milieu can be understood as the “space in which a series of uncertain elements unfold”, then as both “the medium of an action and the element in which it circulates” (2007:20). The milieu as the space of security is not equivalent to the ‘capitalising’ of a state, territory or province as in sovereignty, or a space of discipline (Foucault, 2007: 20, 22). Instead a milieu as the space of security is:

what is needed to account for action as a distance of one body on another ... The milieu is a certain number of combined, overall, effects bearing on all who live in it. It is an element in which a circular link is produced between effects and causes, since an effect from one point of view will be a cause from another (Foucault, 2007:20-21)

Whilst Foucault (2007:29) defines the milieu as the field of intervention of an apparatus of security, he stresses that the concept also describes a set of ‘artificial’ and ‘natural’ givens. As Anderson (2010a) notes, these ‘material givens’ and elements pre-exist techniques of security. In this way Foucault evokes and uses one of the more literal definitions of ‘milieu’, in English as in French, where it is taken to describe ‘surroundings’ or ‘environment’, precisely the sets of ‘material givens’ and the medium of an action, “that in which circulation is carried out” (Foucault, 2007:21). Foucault’s use of the concept of milieu thus refers to and combines both the collections of these ‘material givens’, as well as the

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<sup>7</sup> Foucault states that the concept of the ‘milieu’ is drawn from biology with Lamarck and in physics, as was employed by Newton and the Newtonians. A fuller explanation as provided in footnotes 36 and 37 (Foucault, 2007:27). He transports this notion from physics and biology and discusses it in relation to general features of an apparatus of security through the example of town planning in the 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> century.

contingent configurations of the series of relations between them, and the enactment and entrainment of these through security practices and through apparatuses of security.

Foucault states that an apparatus of security acts as the regulator of a milieu “above all and essentially, making possible, guaranteeing, and ensuring circulations: the circulation of people, merchandise, and air, etcetera” (2007:29). The milieu is the planned space of security where “a series of possible events” and “a series of uncertain elements unfold” and are regulated (2007:20). It is then “that in which circulation is carried out” and involves and relies on a mix of natural (rivers, marshes, hills) and artificial (an agglomeration of individuals, houses, etcetera) ‘givens’ (2007:21):

Security will rely on a number of material givens ... It is simply a matter of maximising the positive elements, for which one provides the best possible circulation, and of minimising what is risky and inconvenient ... while knowing that they will never be completely suppressed” (Foucault, 2007:19)

Politically, Foucault explains, the milieu is also a “field of intervention in which ... one tries to affect, precisely, a population” (2007:21). The mechanisms of security are brought to bear on a population and “the conjunction of a series of events produced by these individuals, populations, and groups, and quasi natural events which occur around them” (2007:21), rather than the sovereign territory or disciplinary space of previous models of political power.

Through his discussion of the milieu, Foucault acknowledges the impossibility of eliminating insecurity altogether, instead the dispositif of security is presented through its relationship to the event, as the art of governing and the treatment of the uncertain, the aleatory. Security is oriented towards a future that is “not exactly controllable, not precisely measured or measurable”, good management therefore “takes into account precisely what might happen” (Foucault, 2007:20). Foucault’s insistence of the centrality of the aleatory demands that any investigation of security takes into account the problems of planning a milieu and effecting security mechanisms that are installed around the random element inherent in a population. Foucault argues that security “lets things happen” (2007:45) and then reacts to this reality in a certain way in order to limit or even neutralise its more random, aleatory effects. This is a technique that Foucault states is organised by reference to the problem of security:

In short, I think we can speak here of a technique that is basically organised by reference to the problem of security, that is to say, at bottom, to the problem of the series. An indefinite series of mobile elements: circulation, x number of passers-by, x number of thieves, x number of miasmas, and so on. An indefinite series of events that will occur ... And equally an indefinite series of accumulating units: how many inhabitants, how many houses, and so on (Foucault, 2007:20)

For Foucault, security and the dispositif of security do not attempt to plan everything, rather, it is a concern for the management of inevitable processes which are neither *good* nor *bad* in themselves.

Dispositifs of security must allow everyday life to function, circulations to move, as such a dispositif of security is faced with the paradox of enforcing regulation or management tasked with permitting circulation. This produces, as Huxley writes, “the conditions in which (regulated) freedoms are exercised” (2007:189). Within *Security, Territory, Population* and *The Birth of Biopolitics*, Foucault presents the tension of security and freedom, and those of government, security and liberalism: “The whole question of critical governmental reason will turn on how not to govern too much” (2008:13). There is a need to protect and regulate through security, whilst at the same time fostering and letting ‘life live’. Freedom is central to biopolitics, as Foucault explained:

An apparatus of security ... cannot operate well except on condition that it is given freedom, in the modern sense that it acquires in the eighteenth century: no longer the exemptions and privileges attached to a person, but the possibility of movement, change of place, and processes of circulation of both people and things (Foucault, 2007:48-49)

The dispositifs of security in the contemporary city necessitates a move away from Dillon’s account of life as molecular and digital, and from the intrusion of ‘life-like’ elements into biopolitics. For contemporary urban space and questions of the securing of cities, ‘life’, and ‘species life’, should be understood in ways similar to those provided in Foucault’s original lectures. How to govern cities and the population remains a question of how to facilitate its life, movements, flows, private life and everyday life through space and for security (Foucault, 2007:11-18). In Foucault’s usage ‘biopolitics’ referred to state involvement in problems of ‘social’ life and not only ‘biological’ life. The objects of biopolitics are described by Foucault as the phenomena of ‘species life’ – “the birth rate, the mortality

rate, longevity, and so on” – but also a “whole series of related economic and political problems” that were, Foucault says, biopolitics’ “first objects of knowledge and the targets it seeks to control” (2003: 243):

From the species to the public; we have here a whole field of new realities in the sense that they are pertinent elements for mechanisms of power, the pertinent space within which and regarding which one must act (Foucault 2007:75)

Foucault’s concern rests with biological factors, but also include the problems of ‘social’ and what he calls the population’s ‘public’ attributes (see Johnson, 2002). Foucault states that the public:

is the population seen under the aspect of its opinions, ways of doing things, forms of behaviour, customs, fears, prejudices, and requirements ... The population is therefore everything that extends from biological rootedness through the species up to the surface that gives one a hold provided by the public. From the species to the public; we have here a whole field of new realities in the sense that they are the pertinent elements for mechanisms of power, the pertinent space within which and regarding which one must act (Foucault 2007:75)

Addressing security and urban space, it is necessary to consider how ‘life’ and the population are deferred, constituted by other elements, where the task of security becomes that of the regulation and protection of these elements, enabling certain processes in order to secure ‘life’. Here ‘life’ is figured as biological and framed as a form of ‘valued life’.

Foucault maintained that the *dispositif* directs attention to the configurations of heterogeneous elements as well as the relations between them. In the context of urban security, I contend that what is required is an appreciation of the ways in which through biopolitics, quite longstanding techniques of security, as identified by Foucault, are redeployed, intensified and returned to in order to regulate and protect the city and urban life. What emerges is a conception of cities and urban life as the referent object of security. Here ‘life’ is characterised both in terms of the biological of human species being, alongside and inseparable from the processes, circulations and interdependencies that make up a ‘valued life’. In accordance with Dillon’s writings, different problematisations of security will inevitably be comprised of different discourses of danger and so will revolve around different referent objects of security, requiring and so generating different kinds of governmental responses, different *dispositifs*. In drawing out, and by returning to Foucault’s lectures, we

can see how he frames the problematic of circulation and the necessary reconciliation of security with freedom. I now discuss contemporary work on urban security and consider the differences that this theoretical background on biopolitics can make to that contemporary work.

## **2.2. Security, the city and everyday life**

This section turns its focus to recent work on everyday security practices and the impacts of security on spaces within contemporary cities. Increasingly the subject of critical attention, I contend that the study of urban security and the securitisation of cities has yielded a fairly narrow means of thinking the relations between security and cities, and the complex processes of urban security, regulation and governance. Although existent work is varied in its aims and objectives, in this section, and in keeping with the broad themes of this thesis, I consider the predominant tendency to research the forms and functions of security, as well as the technical and instrumental dimensions of specific mechanisms of securitisation and how such processes result from, or exemplify, contemporary changes in governance to explore the ways that security is imbricated with cities. It has been widely accepted that security has become an important driving factor in contemporary urbanism, however debates concerning this transformation are focused primarily on technical and instrumental dimensions of the urbanisation of security and the concomitant securitisation of cities. This section discusses concerns for how best to achieve more secure cities against a range of 'traditional' and more 'unconventional' terrorist threats. Ultimately, and notwithstanding the importance of the work detailed here, it is my contention that the relations between lived urban life and processes of security, and so the everyday life of security, has been routinely overlooked.

### **2.2.1. Urban security**

Until recently, the focus of academic and policy debate, almost without exception, has rested on how security professionals and emergency planners design and plan landscapes of security in order to protect and defend 'core global cities' from what are often loosely termed a range of 'traditional' and 'unconventional' terrorist attacks. These conceptions of security, conflict and terrorism have evolved to take into account an increasingly complex, interdependent security environment. Notwithstanding the importance of these contributions, the exclusive conception of processes security, specific security interventions

and apparatuses of security as being only imposed on urban spaces in relation to abstract 'principles' of state formation (see Agamben, 2002) has come to overshadow other interpretations of what security might do within cities and within urban life.

Cities are increasingly drawn into security imaginaries, conceived as threatened and targeted sites. Graham, for example, argues that recent counter-terrorist strategies represent the effects of security practices where "civilian and domestic spaces of urban civil societies emerge, or in many cases *reemerge*, as *geopolitically* charged spaces" (2004a:5, original emphasis; see also Dudley, 2007; Farish, 2003; Glaeser and Shapiro, 2001; Graham, 2002b, 2004b, 2004c, 2006, 2008, 2009, 2011; Light, 2002; Gregory and Pred, 2007; Luke, 2004; Savitch, 2003, 2008; Warren, 2002; Wekerle and Jackson, 2005; Warren, 2002; Williams, 2003). Contemporary terrorism and counter-terrorism policies are brought together in the ways policymakers, security strategists, urban designers, architects and planners, and others think about, plan and manage cities and urban spaces, resulting in the increased securitisation of everyday life (see Collier and Lakoff, 2008; Sorkin, 2008a; Weber and Lacey, 2010; Yacobi, 2009). Indeed, Wekerle and Jackson argue that the extension of "the arm of the state through domestic anti-terrorism policies ... highlights the resurgence of national security issues and their influence on daily life" (2005:46).

Responding to the increase in urban terrorism in the 1990s, Pawley (1998) asserted that urban areas were punctuated by what he termed an 'architecture of terror': "The architecture of terror comes from the universally acknowledged need to protect the highly serviced and vulnerable built environment of the modern world from attacks that fall short of declared war" (1998:148). He suggested that cities would come to reflect the total domination of space through martial and security strategies where a society retreats behind ever more restrictive forms of security. More recently Coaffee (2004a) is amongst a group of urban critics to suggest that sentiments similar to the 'architecture of terror' are found in a form of 'fortress urbanism', a rationality of security that is argued to have "out of necessity, been commonplace after September 11<sup>th</sup>". Similarly, Graham (2002a) has described the significance of September 11<sup>th</sup> 2001 and its impact on urban governance, city planning and design. He writes that after September 11<sup>th</sup> 2001, "issues surrounding international military and geopolitical security now penetrate utterly into practices surrounding governance, design, and planning of cities and urban regions" (Graham, 2002a:589; see also Coaffee, 2005; Coaffee and Murakami Wood, 2006; Little, 2004; Marcuse, 2004; Murakami Wood, 2010; Savitch, 2003; Savitch and Ardashev, 2001; Vale, 2005). Elsewhere Graham has contended that "in the wake of 9/11 and other catastrophic terrorist acts of the last few years, the design of buildings, the management of traffic, the physical planning of cities and

neighbourhoods, are being brought under the widening umbrella of 'national security'" (2004a:11). Cities and urban sites are increasingly, it is claimed, mirroring security concerns as contemporary political violence operates in and through the sites, spaces and life of urban life that are characterised as "intrinsically threatening or problematic necessitating political violence, militarized control, or radical securitisation" (Graham, 2011:xxix). This is a position supported by Marcuse (2004) who suggests that measures to secure the city, and other acts of 'counter-terrorism', have had the most significant impact on the design of cities since September 11<sup>th</sup>. Furthermore, Marcuse claims that current counter-terrorism measures represent a continuation of tactics present prior to September 11, now "reinforced and aggravated by the cover given by the so-called 'war on terrorism'" (2004:264). Rather than considering security after September 11<sup>th</sup> as representing a new age, it is more useful to analyse the diverse 'assemblies of biopolitical government' which have taken shape and now function in processes and rationalities of security. Empirically, as Briggs observes, although "physical defences have been stepped up somewhat since September 11<sup>th</sup>, there is no evidence to suggest this constitutes more than a gentle reinforcement of existing measures; an evolution rather than a revolution ... British cities are merely consolidating what they already have in place" (2005:71). It is more prudent, therefore, to think in terms of the broad configurational principles through which new formations of security are assembled.

It is true that security is responsible for the transformation of cities and urban spaces. Indeed, throughout history, cities have been shaped and reshaped by security as urban spaces themselves become expressions of changes in governance. Foucault's (2007) own biopolitical work of course utilises examples of the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth century towns and town planning to provide a careful and thorough working and analysis of developments of regulatory power and apparatuses of security. Through these examples, Foucault demonstrates differing configurations of techniques of power expressed and combined in biopolitical governance. As Coaffee rightly asserts, contemporary cities are "no different from their predecessors in terms of making explicit attempts to use defence to structure the urban landscape and to 'design out crime' and fear of crime" (2005:447). However, what has changed in terms of security and its relation to cities and urban life is the extension of security "beyond fears of assault, robbery, and drug dealing that prompted the earlier calls for defensible space" (Vale, 2005:38). There has been a tendency within literature on design and counter-terrorism practices to offer a vision of biopolitical power as domination, as an actor acting over and in relation to the exertion of domination of subjects in and through disciplined space. This is an articulation of biopolitical power as disciplinary,



an approach to security that is reliant on an analysis of those mechanisms and devices operating according to a disciplinary logic. Whilst there are instances where this is the case, I am critical of the dominant concept of discipline deployed in this work. The persistent claims that critique styles of 'security architecture' (Kornberger and Clegg, 2004:1102), 'fortress urbanism' (see Coaffee, 2003a, 2004b, 2009a), practices of 'barricading' the city (see Marcuse, 2002) and the 'citadelisation' (see Marcuse, 2004) of urban space work with, and are reliant on, a vision of power as disciplinary. There is little sense of how other biopolitical techniques are or might be deployed and combined, and how 'tactics' of power are able to arrange, control, regulate and at times discipline. I maintain that it is not the sole aim of security practices to discipline bodies and spaces, as a result of this focus, these accounts have largely bypassed the freedoms that security insists on and regulates. We should instead consider a more nuanced approach which addresses how biopolitical forms of power work in conjunction with each other.

Foucault argues that how well power regulates, manages and indeed fosters domains of life through security involves the balance between regulating too little and regulating too much. The task of governing and of security becomes that of discovering how much regulation is enough for successfully promoting life in pursuit of making life live (Foucault, 2007). Turning to biopolitics and to Foucault's work on power offers a more nuanced account of power and its operation through security and in relation to cities and everyday urban life. As Deleuze observed:

A control is not discipline. You do not confine people with a highway. But by making highways, you multiply the means of control. I am not saying this is the only aim of highways, but people can travel infinitely and 'freely' without being confined while being perfectly controlled (Deleuze, 1998:18)

What is required is a more nuanced approach that considers how freedom and security are currently reconciled, and the site specificity of this in security practice. Rather than equating security as discipline, what is needed is a more "supple analysis of the configurations in which forms of power take shape and function" (Collier, 2009:80), one able to attend to and describe intensifications of different types of security practices and redeployments of different mechanisms, techniques and processes in specific apparatuses that imbricate with one another.

The impact and response to security within urban areas has, of course, "been spatially contingent, reflecting both the history and geography of different cities" (Coaffee,

2004a:202)<sup>8</sup>. The more ‘traditional’ urban defences against terrorism are described as involving territorial interventions that seek to enclose and thus close off parts of the city. A style of disciplinary territorial control where “discipline operates through the enclosure and circumscription of space” (Elden, 2007:565) subjecting these spaces and the subjects within to increased control and surveillance. Coaffee contends that the post September 11<sup>th</sup> city is shaped by the “inevitable growth in the popularity of physical or symbolic notions of boundaries and territorial closures – for example, enclosed defensive enclaves around residential gated communities, airports, civic buildings or major financial districts” (2005:449). Unlike many commentators (see Marcuse and van Kempen, 2002), I am dissatisfied with speculations that the threat of terrorism has led to a process of increased urban fragmentation. Although there can be no disputing that this has occurred (see Nemeth, 2008; Nemeth et al, 2008), the frequency and styles of such responses should be questioned. As will be demonstrated and discussed in Chapter 5, developments in UK policy, in addition to the interventions and pressures of urban planners, architects as well as security professionals, and a variety of academic and non-academic sources, has sought to mitigate and annul this trend. As such, it is important to emphasise the contingent nature of urban counter-terror security. In addition, taking spatial contingency as a starting point is more prudent than broad and generalised characterisations, given that threat and counter-threat are constantly shifting. Furthermore and related, it is now more relevant to consider how security processes and interventions are being reconciled with the circulations and freedoms of urban life, rather than presenting a single account of security as imposed on cities through disciplinary rationalities.

A number of critical accounts have developed concerning recent domestic apparatuses of security, and in particular counter-terrorist security practices, measures and associated policies, centring on the processes of ‘fortification’ (see Coaffee, 2003a, 2004a; 2004b, 2009a; Davis, 1992; Newman, 1972), and urban ‘militarism’ and the ‘militarisation’ of urban space (see Farish, 2003; Graham, 2002b, 2004c, 2006, 2009, 2011; Light, 2002; Warren, 2002). Urban ‘fortification’ and associated denunciations describing and critiquing ‘the fortress city’ have explored the relationships between defensive architectures, urban planning and design, and desires for ever more secure urban environments in contemporary Western cities that are characterised by “explicit attempts to use defence to structure the urban landscape” (Coaffee, 2003a:3). Elsewhere, there has been a diagnosis of intensified trends toward an ‘urban militarism’ and the attendant increased ‘militarisation’

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<sup>8</sup> For examples of differing counter-terrorist responses post September 11<sup>th</sup> 2001 as well as examinations of European and Asian responses to the ‘war on terror’, see the 2007 special edition of the *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*.

of urban space, that is said to be characterised by the “deepening crossover between urbanism and militarism” (Graham, 2011:xxix). Not only is it alleged that warfare is being urbanised, it is claimed that cities are becoming militarised, where urban spaces are the terrain, instruments and targets of “permanent and boundless war” which is “radically intensifying the militarization of urban life” (Graham, 2011:60). Through the lens of urban ‘militarism’, cities are seen as “intrinsically threatening or problematic places” (Graham, 2011:xviii), necessitating the reorganisation and restructuring of the city through forms of contemporary warfare, political violence, militarised control, or radical securitisation that have penetrated utterly the sites, spaces, infrastructures and permeate the life of everyday urban life all of the time (see Graham, 2004c, 2009, 2011).

These particular visions of urban ‘militarism’ and ‘fortification’ are further highlighted through commentator’s discussions of the technical and instrumental dimensions of specific mechanisms of securitisation, and discussions of the role of ever advancing technology in the ‘war against terrorism’. Whilst there exists a wide a varied work focussed on a range of technical and instrumental practices and dimensions, particular and keen attention has been paid to the developments in and the increased use of disparate forms of digitalised and algorithmic surveillance. There now exists a well rehearsed set of discussions concerning the apparent omnipresence of surveillance in our daily lives, as well as detailed accounts addressing the complex and multiple ways in which surveillance and urban society have interacted (see Ball and Murakami Wood, 2006; Levin et al., 2002; Lyon, 2001, 2003; Murakami Wood 2009a, 2009b; Murakami Wood and Webster, 2010).

It is accepted that what can be loosely termed more ‘conventional’ terrorist attacks were directed at economic, military, political and symbolic targets, with the primary aim of inflicting disruption and gaining media coverage rather than causing large numbers of casualties. Now ‘life’ itself is recognised to be under increased threat and as a result, increasing attention is being paid to the complex and localised impact of a range of security and defensive strategies upon social, political and economic life. The result, as Coaffee and Murakami Wood explain is a situation where security is necessarily “becoming more civic, urban, domestic and personal: security is coming home” (2006:504). The more ‘traditional’ range of targets, such as governmental or financial buildings and districts, critical national infrastructure and military targets, are now accompanied by more unfamiliar and more everyday spaces. The changing terrorist methods and ever evolving terrorist tactics sees ‘soft targets’ and so-called ‘crowded public’ places as viable targets (see HM Government, 2009a, 2010c). The UK Government, for example, now considers all public spaces to be at risk from attack, this will be discussed at length in Chapter 5. As Coaffee has observed,

these 'crowded places' and areas of civil life are often described as 'soft targets', cited as sharing "common vulnerabilities such as their lack of access control, and this has led to a largely reactive and protective counter-terror response in many western cities through the employment of overt security features" (2009b:345). Whilst iconic buildings, financial, political and military spaces, as well as specific hubs such as airports and railway stations have long been identified as targets for terror attacks, a more general reading of public places as emerging 'insecure spaces' within counter-terror security is required if security and resilience are to be enhanced. The message from governments in many western states appears clear: "defence of the city – of the places where people work, relax and live – is promoted as being central to wider national security" (Coaffee, 2009b:345).

There is a suggestion that a dominant rhetoric of inevitability now drives counter-terrorist security practice. This finds its legacy in prior international threat scenarios, and has come to hone feelings of vulnerability which necessitate the subsequent requirement for additional and enhanced security and increased resilience: "it is not a case of whether a major city will be targeted but where, when and how – a situation that often requires pre-emptive anticipatory planning" (Coaffee, 2009b:344). Anticipatory logics have emerged as a key driver of a reconceptualised western security policy as security and then attendant processes of resilience are sought against an array of traditional and unconventional threats. Anticipatory action is considered increasingly important to the ways that cities and urban life are secured through the myriad of 'hard' engineering and design solutions and 'soft' governance and management arrangements available. The language of 'inevitability' must be understood through its relation to the emergence of discourses of risk that follow probability calculations; there can be no complete alleviation of risk, no safe or secure future. Dillon (2008) argues that risk has become a prevailing biopolitical security practice, arguing that risk commodifies contingency by first making it 'calculable' and then 'fungible'. Security, it seems, no longer relies on rendering the future fully knowable, instead it focuses on the aleatory and on the contingent in order to reduce vulnerabilities, to mitigate the consequences of a successful attack and to recover from an attack should one take place. Counter-terrorist experts now talk of a 'new normality' where "risks can only be managed, not completely eradicated", requiring a series of "active anticipation and 'reflexive' risk management strategies" (Heng, 2006:70) and contingency planning.

Urban resilience, as the activity of securing and protecting against, and then planning responses to a range of security challenges, "refers to both the design alterations (structural, architectural, land-use planning) and managerial and governance measures that seek to prevent or mitigate the physical and social vulnerability of areas, ultimately to

protect life, property and economic activity” (Coaffee and O’Hare, 2008:173). Little has contended that there is a recognised need for a ‘holistic’ strategy for urban counter-terrorist security, arguing that the challenge of “ensuring the continuity of vital services in the face of terrorism and other hazards is more complicated than just the protection of physical assets” (2004:52). The turn to resilience demands a focus on more than just the physical assets, and greater attention is now paid to systems and infrastructures, the complex interplay of activities, institutions, people as well as the assemblages of all manner of bits and pieces that make up sites and spaces which are to be made (more) resilient. As Anderson (2010a, 2010b) notes, in the UK context, the aim has been to develop anticipatory logics and security practice “build the capacity of ‘resilience’ into the very life that is to be secured” (Anderson, 2010b:791). Discourses of resilience produce and foster specific subjectivities that are themselves aimed to be adept at responding to and recovering from disasters, these subjectivities are produced by contemporary governmental practices and ‘complement’ the structural forms of resilience (see Zebrowski, 2009).

It is important to develop a more variegated sense of the different spatialities of security that are understood to be operating in concert within cities, in particular the different spatialities of security which emerge and coalesce in relation to a *dispositif* of security (see Law and Mol, 2001; Mol and Law, 1994). We might think here in terms of a space of circulation; the space of the zone; the space of the cordon; the space of the sphere; the space of the network; the space of the assemblage and so on (see Klauser, 2010). It is important to consider the different spaces of security as different spatialities and how these different spatial forms can hold together in a *dispositif* of security. These different types of spatialities are not fundamentally separate, but neither are they necessarily collapsed into one another, they coexist, and their forms of coexistence is what enables a particular *dispositif* of security to exist. Following Foucault’s example of the *dispositif* allows us to think how these different spaces and the different discursive and non-discursive properties of security can be brought into relationships but remain heterogeneous. The *dispositif* should still be understood as Foucault explained:

a resolutely heterogeneous grouping composing discourses, institutions, architectural arrangements, policy decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophic, moral and philanthropic propositions; in sum, the said and the not-said, these are the elements of the apparatus. The apparatus itself is the network that can be established between these elements (Foucault, cited in Rabinow and Rose, 2003:xvi)

Such an approach questions the distribution of security within a city or a milieu, and the specificity of a delimited site in relation to articulations of threat and danger and security responses. Taking on the task of describing the spatialities of security offers a route beyond the accounts detailed above, to analyse how these complex spaces interact, are layered, assemble, how they identify and respond to problems and how within one 'site' there are multiple spatialities. Considering the different spatialities of security as well as taking Foucault's account of dispositifs and the relations between heterogeneous discursive and non-discursive elements in an apparatus offers a means of conceiving how security operates. An approach which discusses how the spatialities of sites and spaces change and the spatialities of security, is one which is also open to other things and other happenings, the aleatory. This would help to explore ideas of security as centrifugal, as continuously expanding to incorporate new elements and would avoid assumptions of fixity and inertia.

Academic work, as well as the work of those concerned with the practical dimensions of security, must find ways of conceptually and empirically engaging with these new and emerging spaces of security, so far it has been slow to address and conceptualise this broadening of the security agenda. I agree with Collier and Lakoff who suggest that what is needed "is not an overarching critique of the 'militarisation' or securitisation of civilian life but an analytics that allows us to distinguish between different processes underway in the complex field of contemporary security" (2008:25). In the context of this research, and as the empirical chapters will demonstrate, it is not that rationalities of urban 'militarism' or the 'securitisation' of urban spaces characterised by the aggressive reorganisation of cities and forms of aggressive political violence, dominate security. Different logics of security emerge, are enacted and a variety of security rationalities configured so as to meet the various challenges of securing cities and different enactments of threat. Foucault's work on dispositifs of security, and his 'topological' approach offer a more appropriate set of methodological and conceptual tools for analysis of the configurations of security and the operations of biopolitical power. This would offer an analytics which follows Collier and Lakoff's call to "identify specific kinds of security problems and the schemas that have been developed to manage them in a given context" (2008:25).

Following Collier (2009), it is important not to take one set of security practices in one particular place as a generic model for contemporary security in 21<sup>st</sup> century liberal democracies. The idea of topologies of power demonstrates that whilst it is appropriate in many cases to describe a disciplinary apparatus, it is essential these descriptions of 'discipline' are not the sole means of describing complicated and disparate geographies of

security. There are also important questions of what it is that security is acting on, and the spaces it operates within, Foucault's *dispositif* is of considerable utility here. The problematic of urban security is not simply that of securing circulation. Whilst circulation and freedoms may be prime concerns, security itself is not always prioritised within cities. In the UK for example, and as Chapter 5 will go on to discuss, whilst counter-terror security is capable of being a material consideration, this is not written in the statute. Questions of site and site specificity are, in the context of the form of security this thesis is interested in, increasingly important to how security is enacted. Security becomes an articulation of different kinds of circulations and interdependencies. As such, we can take on Foucault's example of the *milieu*, as the planned space where possible events or elements are regulated, and as the space of natural and artificial givens which make up a *dispositif* and are secured by it. Taking on Foucault's biopolitical project allows for an examination of how security practices act as a relation between a body and a site, or objects and other objects.

## **Conclusion**

Through this chapter I have provided an overview of Foucault's biopolitics, as well as some of the recent debates that have emerged within literatures on contemporary biopolitics and the 'biopolitics of security'. I have also discussed works that have engaged with security and the securing of contemporary cities. In addition I have considered the contribution that a biopolitical orientation can offer to researching contemporary urban security, both in terms of conceptual framing and informing empirical directions. First, I presented work on biopolitics and particularly the biopolitics of security inspired by Michel Foucault, also examining recent developments of this body of work by Michael Dillon. In this opening section I have also argued that whilst the work of Dillon certainly offers much to the study of biopolitics and security, for biopolitics and its relation to cities, a return to Foucault's discussions of the spaces of the town and *dispositifs* of security is essential. The second section discussed recent works which have addressed contemporary security practices and processes of urban securing. The dominant focus of this body of work has rested with the presence of security techniques, reflecting changes in forms of governance, as well as discussions of the efficacy of security practices and processes. I have moved through a set of recent works that focus on security practices and the protection of cities against 'traditional' and more 'unconventional' terrorist threats, arguing these offer a narrow range of approaches. I then discussed the contribution that biopolitics, and the related conceptual vocabulary, offers to geographies of security.

Here I have offered a different biopolitical focus to that presented in the work of Foucault and in the recent development offered by Dillon. I have suggested the importance of returning to the lectures in *Security, Territory, Population*, particularly where Foucault examines the space of the town and town planning. Although I suggest that security has certainly moved on and that the referent object differs in many respects, the account presented in this thesis has more in keeping with these lectures. As such, the concerns that I am working through here retain the original focus as forwarded by Foucault. Where Dillon's aim is to update Foucault and provide a biopolitics of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, here the conceptual work seeks to update Foucault, but in different ways to Dillon, and in the context of cities and contemporary practices of urban governance through security. Dillon's is a biopolitics of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, one which offers an analytics of security in the context of international relations, this thesis requires a reframing of biopolitics in the context of urban spaces and the securing of everyday life. It is therefore concerned with the ways in which quite long standing techniques of security have been redeployed, have been intensified, have been returned to in ways that demonstrate continuities with previous ways in which certain threats and circulations have been secured.

Utilising Foucault and biopolitics provides a means of framing this research. This has a number of interrelated implications. Understanding that practices of security intervene in life, through power penetrating "subjects' very bodies and forms of life" (Amin and Thrift, 2002:28), is to consider how security seeks to protect biological life and attempts to protect and intervene in the 'taking-place' of lived experience through the staging of a milieu. Whilst Dillon is right to assert that life is increasingly known and intervened in as molecular, information, as digital and as 'life like', 'life' continues to be figured through the original biologised life, the life of species being and social life, of Foucault's early biopolitics. The 'life' of biopolitics must distinguish between cases, as both Foucault and Dillon show, referent objects of security change over time and across space. In the city, species life, the protection and preservation of life is central to security practices, particularly in the context of terrorism. At the same time, security is tasked with protecting the freedoms of 'social' life, which involve attempts at the engineering of experience, of intervening in the taking-place of lived everyday life itself and the composition of a distinct 'way of life'. In the context of cities, the securing and protection of both biological life and social life can be understood through reference to a particular form of 'valued life'. Security operates through the deferral of life and the population, understood and constituted by other elements and processes, protection "aims to stop the effects of an event disrupting the circulations and interdependencies that make up a valued life" (Anderson, 2010b:791).



In keeping with Foucault's original project, the 'life' that is taken as the referent object of security in this thesis is that of the population. However this is extended and understood as caring for, regulating and securing life as both biological and a particular form of 'valued life' of a public and society. This is a 'life' conceived by the UK Government in its broadening of the NSS and through CONTEST which is then figured and enacted through reference to a 'normal way of life', 'ordinary life' and 'business continuity', 'freedom', secured through reference to and through the deferral of life and the population, constituted by other elements and processes. There are important questions concerning what security is acting on, and it is not always people, as such we must develop an analytics to identify specific kinds of security problems and the schemas that have been developed to manage them in a given context: "The question, then, is not whether something is being securitised, but what type of security is being discussed. What is being secured? Through what kinds of interventions? And with what political implications?" (Collier and Lakoff, 2008:25).

Following Foucault, security is understood to open spaces up in ways that lets things happen, to preserve and protect the complex circulations and interdependencies of a valued life and the city, through limited interventions. Foucault's example necessitates considerations of how contemporary urban security practice regulates in ways which intervene in and through circulations. Moving away from describing security through disciplinary modes of securitisation that treat mobility and circulation as incipient risks to be limited and enclosed. Security organises and reconciles mobility, planning and intervening circulations through the milieu. Security should be understood through its relation to sites and circulations in terms of fixity and flux. This requires that we are more attentive to the form or perhaps the forms of circulation, and how these differ. This also encourages means of distinguishing the differences and spatial contingency of security as it is enacted in urban settings.

Whilst the works discussed in this chapter have contributed much to describing the imbrications of security and the city, the lack of attention to how security measures are encountered means that too much can come to be assumed about both their efficacy and about the resultant nature of urban life. The everyday is too often presented in accounts of urban security as something which already known, it is therefore too regularly assumed, presented as significant but then left under-explored and under-theorised. These accounts do little to address the everyday other than offering hints towards it, often assuming that the reader will know and understand what 'everyday life' is. In addition, and as Gandy rightly observes, in accounts of security, and within readings of the biopolitical inspired by Foucault, "the physicality of the body retains a somewhat ambiguous position ... the

emphasis on the discursive production of the body has tended to occlude any clear engagement with the lived experience of space” (2006:497). The following chapter will begin with a discussion of the complexity and sheer breadth of understandings of ‘everyday life’, before it develops the conceptual framework that, in the context of the aims and objectives of this thesis, can address security and its relations to everyday life and lived experience. To overcome the neglect of the everyday, and to consider security as a range of presences and absences, the following theoretical chapter provides a more explicit focus on the everyday life of urban security and the range of everyday encounters and practices through which security is enacted and experienced through the life of everyday life.

### 3. Everyday Life and Urban Security

#### Introduction

Question your tea spoons.

What is there under your wallpaper?

How many movements does it take to dial a phone number?

(Perec, 2008a:210-211)

This chapter turns its attention to developing a conceptual framework that can address security and its relations to everyday urban life and lived experience. The everyday has been established as a field of interest and research in its own right, with the proliferation of texts dedicated to the study of ‘the everyday’ and ‘everyday life’ (see for example, Felski, 1999-2000; Gardiner, 2000; Gardiner and Seigworth, 2004; Highmore, 2002a, 2002b, 2011; Jacobsen, 2009; Johnstone, 2008; Moran, 2005; Sheringham, 2006, 2007). This everyday literature is large, variegated and at times contradictory. As Felski, in a critical reappraisal of the use of and approaches to ‘the everyday’ and ‘everyday life’ in theory, comments, “Because it has no clear boundaries it is difficult to identify” (1999-2000:15). My interest in this chapter is with the everyday and everyday lived experience, and I turn from the more traditional perspectives on security and the accounts that have focused on examining security in everyday life discussed in the previous chapter, to a more specific theoretical perspective that can offer a conceptual vocabulary for examining and describing the everyday life of security and how the everyday is secured.

There can be little question that security is increasingly ubiquitous within cities and the spaces of urban life; indeed it is difficult to imagine urban spaces without thought for security practices, processes and materialities. The presence of security within cities and urban life has of course come under intense scrutiny from both academic and non-academic sources. As Coaffee et al. rightly observe, “security policy can have a tangible impact upon the spaces in which we live, work and socialise (and how we do so)” (2009:507). Whilst I am in agreement with this and similar statements, the relations between security and lived everyday urban life have been largely under theorised and there has been a tendency to presume the life of the everyday and the relations between security and everyday life without thorough nor sustained engagement. In this second theoretical chapter my purpose is to consider how security moves from being a set of mechanisms as it is lived and

experienced day-to-day, and how everyday life shifts from a 'referent object' of security to that within which security lives. This chapter builds on and develops the theoretical work of Chapter 2 and locates the specific empirical study to follow, it does so through two sections.

Within the range of theorists who have conceptualised and attended to the everyday and everyday life, here I engage with the writings and thought of Georges Perec<sup>9</sup>. The elusive category of the everyday is a thread that runs throughout Perec's career, a theme that comes to be explored through his diverse output of descriptive, theoretical and creative texts. However, Perec's contributions to the study of the everyday and everyday life remain remarkably underused in Geography as well as in the wider arts and social sciences. Here I offer a sustained engagement with Perec's thought and writing, doing so in order to further develop a conceptual vocabulary for describing both the everyday life of security and how the everyday is secured. Perec's array of resourceful approaches and writings, as Sheringham (2006) observes, through their remarkable inventiveness, wove together and extended ways of thinking about and interrogating the everyday. Perec attempts to 'think through' the everyday and it is his insistence that the *quotidien* requires fastidious attention at its own level, and his use of an extensive array of 'practical exercises' to make possible such a quixotic empiricism, that are developed within this thesis. Additionally, through his extreme and quixotic modes of witnessing and his undertaking of what he himself

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<sup>9</sup> Georges Perec was born in Paris on 7<sup>th</sup> March 1936, he died of lung cancer four days short of his forty-sixth birthday in Paris in 1982. In spite of his desires to become a writer, as Sturrock suggests, Perec seemed not to have sufficient confidence in his abilities and success to become "a writer pure and simple" (1999:xvi), and so for most of his life Perec worked full-time as an archivist in a scientific research laboratory only giving up his position four years before his death to concentrate solely on his writings. On Perec's life see David Bellos' (1999) comprehensive biography *Georges Perec: a Life in Words*. On Perec's works see Schwartz's (1988) *Georges Perec: Traces of His Passage* and Motte's (1984) *The Poetics of Experiment: A Study of the Work of Georges Perec*. As a writer Perec was polymathic, original and highly productive, by the time of his death he was the author of one large book, *Life a User's Manual*, and several short books – *Things: A Story of the Sixties*; *A Man Asleep*; *W or The Memory of Childhood*; *A Void*; *The Art and Craft of Approaching Your Head of Department to Submit a Request for a Raise*; and the unfinished *53 Days*. In addition Perec produced a catalogue of other pieces, including poetry, scripts for television and film, radio plays, book and art reviews, translated works, pastiches of literary and scientific language, essays, articles, collections of crosswords, puzzles and brain teasers. Perec also co-founded the sociological journal *Cause Commune* – determined to undertake 'an investigation of everyday life at every level, in its folds and caverns that are usually disdained or repressed – and was an enthusiastic member of the *Ouvroir de Littérature Potentielle* (OuLiPo) (see James, 2009; Motte, 1986; Motte and Arnaud, 1998). Although much of Perec's oeuvre remains to be translated into English, as well as the above list of translated works, other examples include *Species of Spaces and Other Pieces*, *Thoughts of Sorts*, and *An Attempt at Exhausting a Place in Paris*. Perec's work is marked as much by its originality as by its variation. This should not be surprising, for as he reflects in his literary self portrait, the essay *Statement of Intent*, his real ambition was "to run through the whole gamut of the literature of my age without feeling I was going back on myself or treading ground I had trod before, and to write every kind of thing that it is possible for a man to write nowadays" (2009:4). Versatile and innovative, Perec likened his idiosyncratic and ambitious literary itinerary to a method of cultivation: "As I see it, I should rather compare myself to a farmer with many fields" (2009:3). The four main 'fields' of enquiry, Perec suggests are: the sociological – the ordinary and the everyday; the autobiographical; the ludic (usually relating to Oulipian constraints); and the novelistic (2009:3-4). Perec acknowledges that this distribution is arbitrary, as each of the main 'fields' is importantly and inescapably interconnected: "Rather than remaining separate categories, these dimensions of Perec's work exist in complex interaction with one another, an interaction that is articulated differently in different works" (James, 2009:199). It is the first of these modes that I draw on primarily in this thesis, the sociological, and in particular Perec's fascination with and careful attention to the everyday and everyday life. The elusive category of the everyday is a thread that runs throughout Perec's career, explored through a variety of literary forms. Many of Perec's literary projects, as Becker rightly suggests, form "ethnography as generalized fiction" (2001:6), however it is in his shorter works and essays, for example those collected in *L'infra-ordinaire* (1989) and the short but exemplary text *An Attempt at Exhausting a Place in Paris* (2010), that Perec is able to apprehend, to attend to and to present the everyday and lived experience in its rawest form: to live, to witness, to describe the rest instead.

acknowledges is an impossible task, that of observing and describing ‘everything’, Perec achieves something that social scientists often do not do very well, descriptions of the ordinary, the essential, the taken for granted, background noise, as well as the event(al), the truly extraordinary, the ‘big event’ etcetera. Perec’s polymathic approaches and diverse outputs are intended to be read as modest contributions, studies of the everyday and everyday life that should necessarily be read as *attempts* to apprehend and witness experience and space as it is ‘taking-place’. Perec’s contributions are examples of extreme empiricism marked by limits, always acknowledging and struggling, albeit playfully, with the complexities of an everydayness that is “endlessly forming and reforming” (Sheringham, 2007:205).

In the first section of this chapter I offer a sustained engagement with Perec’s thought and writing. My concern in this section, as with Perec’s thoughtful and practical engagements with and investigations of the everyday and everyday life, is to ask, what of the rest? To offer an account that apprehends and is attentive to the more excessive moments within the everyday and that at the same time witnesses and describes the ordinariness of everyday life, in particular considering how although the ordinary is always the already-known, it is rarely acknowledged (see Sheringham, 2000)<sup>10</sup>. Importantly in Perec’s works, as James rightly observes, the “tension between ‘background noise’ and ‘event’, between the infra-ordinary and the extraordinary, is not a conflict between clearly defined opposites; rather, the two poles are constantly shifting in relation to each other” (2009:210). Here, and anticipating the empirical chapters to follow, I focus on what Perec describes the ‘infra-ordinary’, the things that we do everyday and the places we do them in without thought or acknowledgement, the largely unnoticed background of everyday life that requires a kind of quixotic or excessive attention: “one or another of the miscellaneous elements that comprise the everydayness of life” (Perec, 2008a:12): the rest instead. This is the realm of everyday life that is so often written out or underplayed, where “nothing happens – and yet an awful lot happens as well” (Amin and Thrift, 2002:94). Perec questions and describes the ‘infra-ordinary’ through quixotic attention to everyday spaces, happenings and things which, according to Emerson, “anchor his writing within the real world” through the development of a “phenomenological method that would accurately reflect observed reality in language” (2001:95). Interested in thinking of security as a part of

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<sup>10</sup> As Weiss acknowledges, it should be remembered that what counts as “ordinary experience for one individual can be extraordinary experience for another and vice versa” (Weiss, 2008:1-2); the parameters of ‘ordinariness’ vary and can be “irrevocably disrupted at any point in time” (2008:1). This is a fundamental problem for Perec, however, he is aware of the ambiguity which lies at the heart of his project, and is “nevertheless not paralysed by the impossibility of expressing the infra-ordinary in its pure insignificance and nothingness” (James, 2009:201).

this background, of “the world hidden in plain view” (Highmore, 2005: no pagination), as well as attending to moments where security is a more foreground and intensified presence, and of how we might think these presences and absences of security as practiced, experienced and lived, I firstly present an account of the everyday and everyday life inspired by Perec.

The second section of this chapter develops a sense of the lived everyday life of security through an examination of three conceptual devices. Acknowledging and accepting the enormous variations within the use of ‘everyday life’ and the ‘everyday’, as well as the diverse range of alternatives and cognate expressions (Sheringham, 2000), this section recognises that such terms are too broad as the analytic with which to understand and conceptualise the everyday life of urban security. In this section I thus disentangle and so differentiate within these notions of ‘the everyday’ and consider three interrelated themes that are used in order to explore the distinct problem of security as part of everyday life and lived experience: encounter; affect | emotion | feeling; and, attention | distraction. Firstly I take encounter, considering how in witnessing and describing the everyday life of security and in acknowledging the infra-ordinary we develop a sense of the ways in which security is encountered and enacted through the taking-place of practices and everyday lived experience. This draws on non-representational theories and on the ontology of an ‘everyday urbanism’ (Amin and Thrift, 2002). Attending to encounters is a move to take seriously the realm of practice and lived experience, advancing understandings of the world as ‘momentary’, ‘constantly generative’ and ‘always in the now’ (Thrift, 2000a:556). Secondly, and intimately bound with encounters, I consider affect | emotion | feeling. Here I am interested in the intensities of encounters and given how security and affects, emotions and feelings are and have been witnessed and described previously, I wish to advance a more differentiated and nuanced set of geographies. In addition, here and in the thesis more broadly, I present and discuss ‘(in)security’ as a nuanced range of a background intensities that following Williams are often “at the edge of semantic availability” (1977:134). These are discussed through the concept of affective atmospheres (see Anderson, 2009a; Bissell, 2010; McCormack, 2008, 2010; Stewart, 2011). The final part of this section moves to consider attention | distraction, again following from encounters, experiences and everyday transactions with security. I am interested in how attention | distraction and acts of noticing take place in and through embodied engagements with the city and with security. Here, and in the context of the empirics to follow, I am keen to avoid ocularcentrism, as such this part of the chapter addresses attention | distraction as tactile, haptic, sensual and embodied.

Read together with Chapter 2, this chapter explores the theoretical issues and offers a review of the literatures which develop the conceptual framing of the empirical study.

### **3.1. The infra-ordinary: what happens when nothing happens, what passes when nothing passes**

DATE: 18 OCTOBER 1974

TIME: 12:40 PM

LOCATION: CAFÉ DE LA MAIRIE

tens, hundreds of simultaneous actions, micro-events, each one of which necessitates postures, movements, specific expenditures of energy:

conversations between two people, conversations between three people, conversations between several people: the movement of lips, gestures, gesticulations  
means of locomotion: walking, two-wheeled vehicles (with and without motor), automobiles (private cars, company cars, rented cars, driving school cars), commercial vehicles, public services, public transport, tourist buses

means of carrying (by hand, under the arm, on the back)

means of traction (shopping bag on wheels)

degrees of determination or motivation: waiting, sauntering, dawdling, wandering, going, running toward, rushing (toward a free taxi, for instance), seeking, idling about, hesitating, walking with determination

body positions:

seated (in buses, in cars, in cafes, on benches)

standing (near bus stops, before a shop window (Laffont, funeral parlor), next to a taxi (paying it))

Three people are waiting near the taxi stand. There are two taxis, their drivers aren't there (hooded taxis)

All the pigeons have taken refuge on the gutter of the district building.

A 96 passes by. An 87 passes by. An 86 passes by.

A 70 passes by. A "Grenelle Interlinge" truck passes by.

Lull. There is no one at the bus stop.

A 63 passes by. A 96 passes by.

A young woman is sitting on a bench, facing "La demure" tapestry gallery; she is smoking a cigarette.

There are three mopeds parked on the sidewalk in front of the café

An 86 passes by. A 70 passes by.

Some cars dive into the parking lot.

A 63 passes by. An 87 passes by.

It is five after one. A woman is running across the square in front of the church.

A deliveryman in a white smock comes out of his van parked in front of the café de glaces (food) where he is making a delivery on rue de Canettes.

A woman is holding a baguette in her hand

A 70 passes by

(it is only by chance that I can see 84s pass by at the other end from where I'm sitting)

Automobiles follow obviously privileged traffic routes (one-way) from left to right where I am); it's much less noticeable with pedestrians: it would seem that most are going to rue de Canettes or coming from it.

A 96 passes by.

(Perec, 2010:10-11)

On three successive days, Friday 18<sup>th</sup>, Saturday 19<sup>th</sup>, and Sunday 20<sup>th</sup> October 1974, Georges Perec spent a number of hours in the Place Saint-Sulpice in central Paris, observing from the vantage points of three cafés – the Tabac Saint-Sulpice, the Café de la Mairie and the Fontaine Saint-Sulpice – located on different sides of the square, and on one occasion from a bench set in the middle “RIGHT IN THE SUN, AMONG THE PIGEONS, LOOKING IN THE DIRECTION OF THE FOUNTAIN (SOUNDS OF TRAFFIC BEHIND)” (Perec, 2010:32). After a short preamble, *An Attempt at Exhausting a Place in Paris* [*Tentative d'épuisement d'un lieu parisien*]<sup>11</sup> consists of a written-up transcript of the notes Perec took over the three days as he attempts to observe, to apprehend, to register and to describe what is going on around him, an attempt to record everything that happens, everything as it happens. In the prelude of *An Attempt at Exhausting a Place in Paris*, Perec begins with a statement, “There are many things in place Saint-Sulpice”, he then composes a list of these ‘many things’:

There are many things in place Saint-Sulpice; for instance: a district council building, a financial building, a police station, three cafés, one of which sells tobacco and stamps, a movie theatre, a church on which Le Vau, Gittard, Oppenord, Servandoni, and Chalgrin have all worked, and which is dedicated to a chaplain of Clotaire II, who was bishop of Bourges from 634 to 644 and whom we celebrate on 17 January, a publisher, a funeral parlour, a travel agency, a bus stop, a tailor, a hotel, a fountain

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<sup>11</sup> In the afterword of the English translation Marc Lowenthal states that Perec's *An Attempt at Exhausting a Place in Paris* is a “cornerstone to his oeuvre” (2010:49): “Attempt was one of Perec's clearer efforts to grapple with what he termed the ‘infra-ordinary’: the markings and manifestations of the everyday that consistently escape our attention as they compose the essence of our lives—‘what happens’, as he puts it here, ‘when nothing happens’. Whether it was by recording, composing, or transforming these substrate of experience, Perec utilized the infra-ordinary throughout the majority of his books” (Lowenthal, 2010:51). *An Attempt at Exhausting a Place in Paris* belongs to a group of writings for which formed part of a larger unfinished body of such projects of description named *Lieux* (for examples see Perec, 2001a, 2001b, 2001c, 2001d).



decorated with the statues of four great Christian orators (Bossuet, Fénelon, Fléchier, and Massillon), a newsstand, a seller of pious objects, a parking lot, a beauty parlour, and many other things as well (Perec, 2010:3)

Only to suggest that these are already too significant, too obviously noteworthy: “A great number, if not the majority of these things have been described, inventoried, photographed, talked about or registered” (Perec, 2010:3). Most of this initial list may seem already insignificant enough, for as Adair attests, “by their banality, by their quotidian ‘invisibility’”, the majority of such items appear to constitute Perecquian “commonplaces (or ‘common places’)” (2009:184). Perec however is dissatisfied with this initial attempt, the preamble continues and Perec writes that he intends in the pages to follow to describe what remains, what is happening even when nothing is happening, what passes when nothing passes, nothing noteworthy, nothing but everything, “the rest instead” (2010:3):

that which is generally not taken note of, that which is not noticed, that which has no importance: what happens when nothing happens, other than the weather, people, cars, and clouds” (Perec, 2010:3).

Not only does Perec intend to describe ‘the rest instead’, in keeping with his task of describing the everyday life of a space, he is to convey what was there, these common things, as neutrally as possible: *L’infra-ordinaire* — the infra-ordinary<sup>12</sup>:

What’s really going on, what we’re experiencing, the rest, all the rest, where is it? How should we take account of, question, describe what happens every day and recurs every day: the banal, the quotidian, the obvious, the common, the ordinary, the infra-ordinary, the background noise, the habitual? (Perec, 2008a:209-210)

Through various descriptive, theoretical and creative texts Perec undertakes an always incomplete interrogation and a common fascination with the quotidian, for Perec’s interest in the everyday and with everyday life is elaborated through a distinctive concern for the markings and manifestations of the everyday that consistently escape our attention. As his friend and collaborator Virilio notes, Perec teaches us “to watch what we would not normally watch, listen to what we would not otherwise hear” (2001:136). Perec’s texts

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<sup>12</sup> The term ‘infra-ordinaire’ was in fact originally coined by Paul Virilio when used as the title for issue 5 of *Cause Commune* published in February 1973 | *L’infra-ordinaire*, *Cause Commune* n° 5, Février 1973, Seuil: Paris |

associated with the infra-ordinary and his everyday project comprise an eclectic mix that were, as James reminds us, “written for a variety of purposes and audiences” (2009:199). His is a project that seeks to resist the temptation of focusing on the exceptional, the sensational, the extraordinary and the spectacular, a move away from the ‘big event’, through the fascination with which it can appear “as if life reveals itself only by way of the spectacular, as if what speaks, what is significant, is always abnormal” (Perec, 2008a:209). As Perec suggests, rips of and disruptions to the infra-ordinary when they occur are what often catch and hold our attention. Importantly, as he acknowledges, these need not be “the historic, significant and revelatory” events that hold public attention such as “[t]idal waves, volcanic eruptions, tower-blocks that collapse, forest fires, tunnels that cave in, the Drugstore des Champs-Élysées burns down” (2008a:209). Following his example we must not leave aside the ‘common things’ (Perec, 2008a) and those moments that Stewart describes as the “more ordinary disturbances of everyday life” (2007:74). Perec encourages us to attempt to approach, to witness, to register and to describe the unnoticed and unthought-of of the quotidian, the infra-ordinary background of everyday life. As Perec insists, “In our haste to measure the historic, the significant and revelatory, let’s not leave aside the essential” (2008a:209).

The project detailed in *An Attempt at Exhausting a Place in Paris* is a part of a much broader task undertaken by Perec. The infra-ordinary was a recurrent theme throughout the majority of Perec’s writings, however, it is in his shorter works and essays — particularly those essays collected posthumously in *L’infra-ordinaire* (1989) — that Perec presents it in its rawest form; a form of extreme empiricism, focused quixotic attention on what he would argue we commonly, and without thought, take for granted (Lowenthal, 2010). As Virilio explains in the context of Perec’s involvement in the periodical *Cause Commune*:

Our approach to the city ... no longer connected to traditional notions of urban geography (cadastral survey, social classes, concentration, density and other phenomena); rather, it connected to what we termed the ‘infra-ordinary’, i.e. what we do when we do nothing, what we hear when we hear nothing, what happens when nothing happens (Walker and Virilio, 2001:15)

It is the oft unnoticed that is subjected to the keenest reflections, what Virilio described elsewhere as investigations on the theme “living the inhabital” (1972-74:13-16, cited in Schilling, 2009:198).

As Highmore (2002a) observes, Perec uses the neologisms ‘infra-ordinary’ and ‘endotic’ to describe an everyday that is neither ordinary nor extraordinary, neither banal nor exotic, the rest instead. Virilio further explains, “In the city there is never a void. There is always background noise, there is always a symptom, a sign, a scent. So we are interested precisely in those things which are the opposite of the extraordinary yet which are not the ordinary either – things which are ‘infra’” (Walker and Virilio 2001:15). Perec uses the term ‘the endotic’ in opposition to the exotic, “emphasising the unfamiliarity of what is inside (*endo*), rather than the strangeness of the outside or the other” (James, 2009:200, original emphasis). The infra-ordinary is, for Perec, “first and foremost the opposite of the *extraordinary*, of that which immediately leaps to our attention. It does not entirely correspond to the *ordinary*, but rather, as the prefix suggests, to what lies hidden beneath the surface of ordinariness” (James, 2009:198, original emphasis). Here Perec explores the everyday life usually disdained and repressed, for the infra-ordinary is, the things, places, events, happenings, spaces and practices that people do not normally notice, that are seemingly unremarkable, ostensibly unimportant. These are, as his translator John Sturrock (2008) declares in the back matter of *Species of Spaces*, “the things we do everyday ... and the places we do them in without giving them a moment’s thought”:

to see not just the rips, but the fabric (but how to see the fabric if it is only the rips that make it visible: no one ever sees buses pass by unless they’re waiting for one, or unless the Paris City Transport Authority pays them a salary to count them ... )

Also: why are two nuns more interesting than two other passersby? (Perec, 2010:33-34)

With the resolve to be exhaustive rather than selective Perec’s works demonstrate a commitment to interrogating the infra-ordinary, and the belief Perec had “that we none of us give enough attention to what is truly daily in our daily lives, to the banal habits, settings and events of which these lives almost entirely consist are all but an unnoticed background. The infra-ordinary is what goes, literally, without saying” (Sturrock, 1999:xiv). Perec’s task then is to apprehend and uncover, to render the infra-ordinary, albeit fleetingly, noticed and in so doing to foreground what is so often taken for granted, overlooked and left over in everyday life: the rest instead. This approach, Highmore (2002a) contends, demonstrates the possibility of a ruthless, systematic attention that is yet to differentiate between the significant and the insignificant. In so doing, Perec foregrounds that which is “continually overlooked when traditional notions of significance are applied” (Highmore, 2002a:176). As

such, whilst ordinary events, spaces and objects are necessarily and inevitably transformed, Perec's works attempt to "resist their own sense-making enterprise and question their mode of organising the real" (James, 2009:190).

The problem is, as Perec observes, that we are not accustomed to such interrogations, precisely because we are so habituated to what happens every day and recurs every day<sup>13</sup>. While it might initially seem that Perec "sets out to passively and randomly record objects and events around him, without any particular order or hierarchy", his project in fact "requires a method of training the gaze to notice things that might otherwise escape attention" (James, 2009:202). And so, through many of his writings Perec takes on the challenge, asking how should, or perhaps given his fondness for experiments, puzzles and play, how could, we uncover, apprehend, witness, take account of, question, interrogate, inventory, and describe what happens when nothing happens, what passes when nothing passes, what would otherwise escape us, the rest instead:

the banal, the quotidian, the obvious, the common, the ordinary? ... We don't question it, it doesn't question us, it doesn't seem to pose a problem, we live it without thinking, as if it carried within it neither questions nor answers, as if it weren't the bearer of information. This is no longer even conditioning, it's anaesthesia. We sleep through our lives in a dreamless sleep. But where is our life? Where is our body? Where is our space? (2008a:210)

Perhaps it is a matter, Perec suggests, of the reinvention of ethnomethodology. He reflects on this in the essay *Approaches to What?* suggesting that the task is that of

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<sup>13</sup> Perec's turn towards the unspectacular of everyday life aimed, at times, to draw attention to routine practices and processes of habituation: "This is experience at ground level, what you might call background noise. It's experience grasped at the level of the setting in which your body moves, the gestures it makes, all the ordinariness connected with ... your daily routine, with exploring your space" (2008:131-132). He seeks to find ways of describing habits so that they can be recognised for what they are, anaesthesia as he puts it, as we sleep through our lives in a dreamless sleep. Macgregor Wise (2000:302) states that habit is "a series of actions that become automatic and seemingly divorced from conscious thought", which for Beckett "is a compromise effected between the individual and his environment, or between the individual and his own organic eccentricities, the guarantee of a dull inviolability, the lightning-conductor of his existence" (1987:18-19). Habit and habituation lend a consistency to everyday life, "sets of techniques for on-going coping of and within given forms of life" (Harrison, 2000:512). We might think of Perec's 'anaesthesia' through Thrift's (1996:37) acknowledgement that subject's understandings of the world come from the ceaseless flow of conduct, which, rather than coming from deliberately and intentionally moving through spaces, often comes from 'absorbed coping', 'engaged agency', or 'comportment'. There is then a problem, for as soon as a habit is recognised then it is broken, by definition. However, deformations of habit within the everyday are themselves important to Perec, for whilst insisting that we describe the habitual for what it is, he also acknowledges that the quotidien involves change, variation and evolution. Encouraging the disruption of habit, Perec suggests, will allow us "to rediscover something of the astonishment" (2008:210) which has been lost in and through habit, the habitual and habituation questioning what happens when habits break down, how this takes place and what accompanies these changes. In Perec this reveals the tensions between distributions of attention, habit and newness, difference and repetition, and the erosion of permanence. These deformations need not be compelled by the 'big event', the 'untoward', the 'extra-ordinary', they can be and are ordinary disruptions, infra-ordinary happenings – our habits are revealed to us through a stumble that awakens us from absorbed walking, an awkward realisation as we find that we have driven somewhere without remembering how we got there, something out of place draws us out from habituation.

“[[founding] our own anthropology, one that will speak about us, will look in ourselves for what for so long we’ve been pillaging from others. Not the exotic any more, but the endotic” (2008a:210). These ‘distracted things’, as Harrison observes, are “of the very close, the familiar, and the habitual” (2000:497). The difficulty, as Perec’s work and his own struggles demonstrate, is to look critically at what is (infra-)ordinary, the fact of its very ordinariness makes it invisible and elusive, for as Highmore explains, “the everyday (yours, mine, and theirs) often exists in the shadows, relatively free from our own scrutiny (Highmore, 2005: no pagination)”. Perec (2008a) suggests that learning to witness the infra-ordinary world would be tantamount to a reinvention of academic enquiry.

Nothing strikes you. You don’t know how to see (Perec, 2008a:50)

As Perec notes, “What speaks to us, seemingly, is always the big event, the untoward, the extra-ordinary: the front-page splash, the banner headlines” (2008a:209). Daily newspapers, Perec (2008a) humorously observes, are misnamed as they are concerned with and recount everything except what is actually daily in our daily lives. There are occasions in *An Attempt at Exhausting a Place in Paris*, when something exceptional (exceptional in this context) impresses into Perec’s awareness. These moments Perec dutifully notes, occasionally offering a commentary on his becoming distracted and not only of what it is that attracts him, but also crucially how it is that he is drawn from his task. In one observation Perec recognises Paul Virilio, his friend and colleague, who crosses the square to see the film version of *The Great Gatsby*, or as Perec refers to it, “*The Lousy Gatsby*” (2010:33, original emphasis), at the local Bonaparte cinema; on another occasion Perec describes an individual, “shaken, but not yet ravaged, by tics (movements of the shoulder as if he were experiencing a continual itching in the neck” (2010:19), Perec’s curiosity drawn by virtue of him holding his cigarette in the manner that Perec imagined that only he himself did, between the middle finger and the ring finger: “it’s the first time I’ve come across someone else with this habit” (2010:19). For the most part Perec records the happenings of Place Saint-Sulpice as “dispassionately and democratically as a train spotter, displaying towards its each and every manifestation an ecumenical favouritism, a favouritism equally extended to all” (Adair, 2009:185). Nothing is accorded precedence over anything else, in keeping with Perec’s frustrations with tendencies towards and obsessions with the momentous and the unexpected, the ‘event’. Perec argues that “natural cataclysms, or historical upheavals, social unrest, political scandals” (2008a:209) leaves aside and omits the essential. And so Perec, thinking with and through the infra-ordinary is concerned with

the common, distracted things, with the “passing impression of (almost) imperceptible events” (Walker and Virilio, 2001:136):

To question what seems so much a matter of course that we’ve forgotten its origin ...  
To question that which seems to have ceased forever to astonish us. We live, true, we breathe, true; we walk, we open doors, we go down staircases, we sit at a table in order to eat, we lie down on a bed in order to sleep. How? Where? When? Why?  
(Perec, 2008a:210)

For Perec, locating the infra-ordinary consists in refusing, above all else, “the dislocating effects of the extraordinary, the draw of apparent singularity that destroys a city more surely than any bombardment” (Walker and Virilio, 2001:136). The infra-ordinary is a world that we are so inured to that we often inhabit it as if anaesthetized, wandering distractedly in, as Perec observes, a kind of ‘dreamless sleep’: “A very large layer of such stuff – buses going by, people putting up umbrellas, pigeons flying, letters on the sides of trucks – surrounds us all the time” (Becker, 2001:71). Perec contends that we become aware of this infra-ordinary everydayness only when something appears ‘out of order’, in its movement somehow ‘out of the ordinary’ – a bus is late, an umbrella is raised and it is not raining, a flying pigeon defecates close by. As Virilio explains, “We were very much aware that there are unknown things concealed by what is visible, things that are hidden not in the obscure but in the obvious” (Walker and Virilio, 2001:17). Perec asks how to trouble this, how to reveal what is obscured in the obvious, to foreground the ‘background noise’ of the everyday? To extract the quotidian of our daily existence from the disregard of distraction Perec problematises the ordinary and transforms the overlooked, the background, into a series of questions:

How are we to speak of these ‘common things’, how to track them down rather, flush them out, wrest them from the dross in which they remain mired, how to give them a meaning, a tongue, to let them, finally, speak of what is, of what we are (2008a:210).

These questions posed by Perec in the essay *Approaches to What?* emphasise the unfamiliarity of the infra-ordinary, indicating the “illusive and hidden nature of [Perec’s] object” (James, 2009:201).

In *An Attempt at Exhausting a Place in Paris* and elsewhere, Perec undertakes an impossible task, for as Blanchot observes, “Whatever its other aspects, the everyday has

this essential trait: it allows no hold. It escapes” (1987:14). What continues to preoccupy Perec is precisely what escapes, for him ‘what remains’, what is left when everything else has been observed, recorded. James suggests that the object of investigation as the “interrogative ‘what?’” in the title of *Approaches to What?* “indicates that the object of is not predefined. This object is, in fact, bound to flee the writer’s grasp at every turn” (2009:200-201). As Lowenthal writes, this is a “noble exercise in futility”, the “attempt to communicate everything, to describe everything — to exhaust everything — is always a sympathetic effort, however doomed to failure it may be” (2010:50). Resigned to the fragmentary and potentially trivial nature of undertaking this style of research, in *An Attempt at Exhausting a Place in Paris* and through his other pieces, Perec’s responses are both playful and artful, emphasising a projects own arbitrariness and his disposition toward the rest instead, the unfinished, the incommunicable, the and, the ... . Often we find with Perec that he is frustrated at his apparent failure to reproduce space and to pursue time in total: “the mere inventory — and it could never be exhaustive — of the items of furniture and the actions represented has something truly vertiginous about it” (2008a:41). However, and in spite of his chagrin, Perec’s systems always and necessarily point beyond themselves and remain open. For example, Perec’s enumerations rarely claim to be exhaustive, “the ‘etc.’ remains implicit”, these enumerations are for Perec “merely *attempts* at exhaustivity or drawing up inventories” (James, 2009:212, my emphasis).

As Sheringham notes, Perec’s task involved apprehending and describing the present and how it is in its “[c]easeless ‘émergence’” (2006:263), that is to say, as it takes place. The infra-ordinary is presented through provisional narratives — fragmentary, temporary modes of illustrative understanding, which describe, without pretence of exhaustion, the world as it is observed, as it becomes, as it exceeds and escapes in its emergence which, and crucially for Perec, leaves the task of apprehending the everyday as always unfinished. This openness recognises that “*the world does not add-up*. The world does not resolve or come to rest” (Dewsbury et al., 2002:437, original emphasis). The attempt to communicate everything, to describe everything, is always sympathetic and faithful, however doomed to failure it may be. The series of one off observations that Perec composes, as Sheringham (2006) observes, reminds us of the way apparent sameness is in fact ever changing and that we ourselves are part of this constant process: “Time, unarrestable, works against his project, though, and he is diverted from his observations by an effort to observe what has specifically changed in his field of view ... seemingly nothing, but then again, yes ... what will, in fact, eventually become everything” (Lowenthal, 2010:49). Perec’s texts are always a struggle against elusive space and time. His writings are the “residue of a singular

*expérience*” (Sheringham, 2006:265, original emphasis), for as Beckett observed, “the creation of the world did not take place once and for all time, but takes place everyday” (1987:19, cited in Dewsbury et al., 2002:437):

I would like there to exist places that are stable, unmoving, intangible, untouched and almost untouchable, unchanging, deep-rooted; places that might be points of reference, of departure, of origin ...

Such places don't exist, and it's because they don't exist that space becomes a question, ceases to be self-evident, ceases to be incorporated, ceases to be appropriated. Space is a doubt: I have constantly to mark it, to designate it. It's never mine, never given to me, I have to conquer it.

My spaces are fragile: time is going to wear them away, to destroy them. Nothing will resemble what was ... Space melts like sand running through one's fingers (Perec, 2008a:91)

Perec achieves something that social scientists do not do very well, descriptions of the ordinary, the infra-ordinary, descriptions of everyday experience as it is ‘taking-place’ (see Anderson and Harrison, 2010a). Perec's goal, in *An Attempt at Exhausting a Place in Paris* and elsewhere, as Sheringham points out, is “to make the everyday visible not as an objective reality but as something in which we participate” (Sheringham, 2006:268). He achieves this through his playful and artistic use of description, commendable, for as Amin and Thrift rightly observe, “there is a problem of description. Often we do not seem to have the vocabulary to make the everyday life of the city legible; so much seems to pass us by” (Amin and Thrift, 2002:5). In the *Lieux* project, *An Attempt at Exhausting a Place in Paris*, *Still Life/Style Leaf* and elsewhere, Perec uses “‘raw description’ as a fundamental device by which ‘reality’ is given to the reader” (Becker, 2001:73). Perec's descriptive tasks develop and undertake experimental methods that can speak of the infra-ordinary, the essential, of what we are. Given our anaesthesia, Perec proposes methods to “exit this insensitivity: all preconceived ideas must be expelled; nothing should be taken for granted. Perec interrogates his space, establishing elementary distinctions” (Emerson, 2001:93). Perec presents neutral, often enumerative descriptions of places and spaces, and attempts not to interrogate these, as “banality is the ideal to which the texts aspire: what is seen is what is, and nothing more” (Leak, 2001:31). As Virilio explains, “our goal was to be



journalists of that which did not seem to interest anybody, to talk about things that were not obvious” (Walker and Virilio, 2001:15). Perec accepts that such a project will be “fragmentary, barely indicative of a method”, suggesting that for him these should seem trivial and futile because “that’s exactly what makes them just as essential, if not more so, as all other questions by which we’ve tried in vain to lay hold on our truth” (2008a:211).

This approach and Perec’s focus on the way things happen is demonstrated in *Species of Spaces*, presenting itself as the ‘journal by a user of space’. Perec offers a series of projects, exercises in perception and description, that “introduce, for the first time, enumeration or lists as an alternative to realist description” (Emerson, 2001:92). These are experimental, playful and gentle modes of witnessing and questioning, different styles of enquiry and investigation that revel in devices such as list making, enumeration, orientating, classifying and above all description. It is important to note, and particularly for Perec’s works on the infra-ordinary, that whilst Perec sought to ‘record everything’, at the same time he acknowledges the need to be drastically selective. As Sheringham concedes, “given the profusion of simultaneous events, leads him to classify and analyse, diverting his attention along specific channels, away from any sense of totality” (2006:269). As Perec himself declares, “You must set about it more slowly, almost stupidly. Force yourself to write down what is of no interest, what is most obvious, most common, most colourless” (2008a:50):

We live in space, in these spaces, these towns, this countryside, these corridors, these parks. That seems obvious to us. Perhaps indeed it should be obvious. But it isn’t obvious, not just a matter of course (Perec, 2008a:5)

In his essay *Approaches to What?* Perec describes the infra-ordinary and the difficulties posed by the task of apprehending and observing the rest instead. Perec demands that we must go about this task more slowly, almost stupidly, learning to ‘see more flatly’. He contends that we must learn to question that which we take most for granted about the everyday, that which is ‘infra-ordinary’ – “bricks, concrete, glass, our table manners, our utensils, our tools, the way we spend our time, our rhythms” (2008a:210). For Perec, the implications of seeing and writing more flatly meant that prose would avoid, as far as possible, “adjectival and adverbial excesses: such adjectives as there are, do indeed tend to be as neutrally constative as possible: the colour of objects, their dimensions, their form, their relative positions” (Leak, 2001:29). To see flatly involves questioning how we might attend to the everyday not as “the closed realm of empty repetition and routine, nor yet the site of authenticity, but a space whose enigmatic character is revealed little by little,

by our homing in on it, rather than delving behind it” (Sheringham 2006:94). To question the habitual. But that’s just it, we are habituated to it:

What we need to question is bricks, concrete, glass, our table manners, our utensils, our tools, the way we spend our time, our rhythms. To question that which seems to have ceased forever to astonish us. We live, true, we breathe, true; we walk, we open doors, we go down staircases, we sit at a table in order to eat, we lie down on a bed in order to sleep. How? Why? Where? When? Why?

Describe your street. Describe another street. Compare.

Make an inventory of your pockets, of your bag. Ask yourself about the provenance, the use, what will become of each of the objects you take out.

Question your tea spoons.

What is there under your wallpaper?

How many movements does it take to dial a phone number? Why?

Why don’t you find cigarettes in grocery stores? Why not?

It matters little to me that these questions should be fragmentary, barely indicative of a method, at most of a project. It matters a lot to me that they should seem trivial and futile: that’s exactly what makes them just as essential, if not more so, as all the other questions by which we’ve tried in vain to lay hold on our truth (Perec, 2008a:210-211)

In his essay *The Street*, Perec puts forward a programme for the study of the everyday life of a street, at once appealing to the reader’s participation he writes:

Observe the street, from time to time, with some concern with a system perhaps. Apply yourself. Take your time ... Note down what you can see. Anything worthy of note going on. Do you know what is worthy of note? Is there anything that strikes you? Nothing strikes you (Perec, 2008a:50)

This essay is one example of Perec turning to ‘practical exercises’, experimental methods and modes of enquiry. Here he advocates interrogating, inventorying, and describing – traditional modes of ethnographic enquiry – but through the project of the infra-ordinary, these are here addressed to unfamiliar objects: “In Perec, the enumerative ‘enquête’ [investigation] does not aim at statistical truth or description, but at apprehending daily experience in its flow, its rhythm, its ‘émergence’” (Sheringham, 2000:194).

Through many of his projects Perec attempts to ‘think through’ the quotidien, embracing “the paradox that the compelling interest and pertinence of the everyday lies in its resistance to abstract definition and classification and the necessity to explore it at its own level” (Sheringham, 2007:205). Perec questions what it means to attend to the everyday, and acknowledges the difficulties of doing so, emphasising innovation and novelty within his experiments and projects which are open-ended and necessarily provisional, for the everyday “comes into view — is invented (Certeau), acknowledged (Cavell), and affirmed (Nancy) — when it receives attention” (Sheringham, 2007:205). In establishing and working through ‘practical exercises’ Perec composes “the contingent ground-rules and stipulations [that] serve to open up rather than close the field of enquiry” (Sheringham, 2000:199):

Carry on

Until the scene becomes improbable

until you have the impression, for the briefest of moments, that you are in a strange town or, better still, until you can no longer understand what is happening or not happening, until the whole place becomes strange, and you no longer even know that this is what is called a town, a street, buildings, pavements ... (Perec, 2008a:53)

At the same time that Perec describes and catalogues things, he remains attentive to happenings, what we might call the ‘taking-place’ of lived everyday life (see Anderson and Harrison, 2010a); “the present, alive with the force of lived but uncategorizable experience” (Sheringham, 2007:203-204). I am in agreement with Sheringham (2006) who writes that Perec goes somewhat toward providing and producing, at times, and in a variety of ways, descriptions of ‘lived experience’. There is certainly evidence in *An Attempt at Exhausting a Place in Paris* that points to “a crucial feature of [Perec’s] project, that its aim is not to arrive at abstract knowledge but to explore the lived experience of an individual subject seeking to apprehend a dimension of his own reality that is inseparable from his participation in the wider circuits of the everyday” (Sheringham, 2006:271). In *Penser/Classer*, a text he wrote about the provenance of the objects on his writing desk, Perec described the project as “a way of marking out my space, a slightly oblique approach to my everyday activities ... an attempt to grasp something that belongs to my own experience, not at the level of its distant reflections, but at the core of its ongoing emergence” (Perec, 1985:23 cited in Sheringham, 2006:263). As Sheringham notes, the texts are devices based on present perception, in the context of the exploration of the quotidien, for appropriating the space in which one lives,

and of grasping experience as process. They are the “record, the log, of an experience, not its summation, and one of the most striking features of [*An Attempt at Exhausting a Place in Paris*] is that to read this experiment in forms of attention is to reduplicate something of the experience itself” (Sheringham, 2006:266). Sheringham (2007:204) contends that an additional strength of Perec’s writings are found in his ability to skilfully devise ways of exploring both individual experiences and the commonalities of collective everyday life.

Perec’s texts thus bear a fascination not only with things, but with the ways things happen, with practice and the ways in which spaces are lived. He considers how happenings are situated, and offers clues within his methods for marking time as it unfolds. His projects, through their versatility, present examples of where and how life is lived and experienced in its taking-place: “the ‘growing of the real’. That is, to see the ‘real’ grow out of the ‘present’” (Walker and Virilio, 2001:17). The descriptive texts, through their attention to detail capture experience as process and they highlight “quintessence of the experience ... that which knots together the basic connective tissue of our lives - it is that towards which Perec is concerned to turn our attention” (Adair, 2009:181-182). Perec on occasion reflects on the experience that he is undergoing, his records punctuated intermittently by bodily sensations and changes of mood further revealing how his descriptive texts served as a way of marking out his spaces, his activities and everyday experiences at its emergence.

I’m drinking Vittel Water, whereas yesterday I was drinking a coffee (how does that transform the square? (Perec, 2010:30)

This sense of ceaseless emergence is present throughout his work, as Perec attempts to register what is going on around him, faithful to the impossible task of an observer, the witness who finds himself wrapped amidst and seeking to exhaust interminable unfolding. Perec admits that he is exhausted:

*(fatigue)* (Perec, 2010:24, original emphasis)

The simultaneous orientating, questioning, commentating, observing, inventorying, cataloguing, classifying, describing, experiencing, as well as other playful encounters permitted and forced Perec to go into the city’s spaces, “looking, seeing, observing and writing, all within the same act” (Emerson, 2001:93). For Emerson this meant that both Perec and the place of his excursion are “physically present on each occasion, giving him the opportunity to interrogate the space within and through the description. Ultimately,

Emerson writes, Perec would appropriate the places by a slow and repeated immersion within them, noting everything” (2001:93). This was necessary, as for Perec, attending to the everyday involves “chipping patiently away” (Lowenthal, 2010:54) at spaces and times, which is a challenging and endless task. Through his oeuvre, emerge a set of meticulous “elliptical investigations into the ‘background noise’ of our existence” (Clucas, 2000:11) which problematise the everyday, as they track it down, flush it out, wrest it from the dross in which it remained mired. Perec apprehends the (extra-) (infra-)ordinary, seeking out problems and questions that would allow him to pursue and describe what remains.

The rest instead.

DATE: 20 OCTOBER 1974

TIME: 1:05 PM

LOCATION: CAFÉ DE LA MAIRIE

For quite a while now (half an hour?) a cop has been standing, without moving, reading something, on the curb of the plaza, between the church and the fountain, his back to the church.

A taxi two mopeds a fiat car whose make I don't know

A man running

Sunny spell. No car. Then five. Then one.

Oranges in a string bag.

Michel Martens, with a geranium umbrella

The 63

The 96

A health service ambulance (Paris hospitals)

A ray of sunlight. Wind. A yellow car in the distance

A police car. Some cars. An Atlas Reisen car ...

A dark blue Volkswagen crosses the church square (I've seen it before)

Rarity of complete lulls: there is always a passerby in the distance, or car passing by

The 96

Tourists are photographing each other in front of the church

The church square is empty: a tourist bus (Peters Reisen), empty, crosses it

The 63

It is five to two

The pigeons are on the plaza. They all fly off at the same time.

Four children. A dog. A little ray of sun. The 96. It is two o'clock

(Perec, 2010:45-47)

### 3.2. Differentiating the everyday

Perec's constant fascination with the *quotidien*, his careful attunement with the background noise, the humdrum, the infra-ordinary of the everyday and his assertion that what is ordinary can so often itself be 'scandalous', provides an important and influential contribution to thinking about and apprehending the everyday. At the same time Perec is attentive to more intense happenings, to the event(al), to the truly extraordinary, the 'big event', and the ordinary disturbances of everyday life. Given the concern here for how security is encountered and enacted as it moves from a set of mechanisms to becoming lived and experienced day-to-day, Perec's work is an invaluable resource for a more explicit theoretical and empirical engagement with the everyday life of security than has been previously undertaken. Perec provides a means of attending to security as it is encountered as it is absent and/or present within the everyday life of the city so as to apprehend the fabric of the infra-ordinary as well as the 'rips' where security is encountered as a more intensified presence. In addition, and as Sheringham observes, Perec's rich and illuminating approaches go some way to nullifying distinctions between theory and practice, "combining brain-work with legwork, grasping everydayness at the level of movements, gestures, practices" (Sheringham, 2000:187). This provides a supplement to accounts of urban security that have tended to focus exclusively on the imbrications of security and urban space and on the various security interventions that now populate cities. It also offers a means of moving beyond work that has only considered urban security practices as principles of state formation. Perec's attempts to 'think through' the *quotidien* and his experimental methods and styles of presentation offer particularly useful conceptual devices which can extend the work of theorising and attending to the complex relations between processes of security and the enactment of everyday life.

Attending to and theorising the everyday, even through the diverse range of creative and versatile methods Perec proposes, continues to be problematic. Felski (1999-2000) is right in her assertion that in spite of its apparent self-evidence, 'everyday life' as a theoretical and analytical concept is unclear, difficult to identify and delimit: "At first glance, everyday life seems to be everywhere, yet nowhere. Because it has no clear boundaries" it is "the most self-evident, yet the most puzzling of ideas" (Felski, 1999-2000:15). These sentiments echo those of Maurice Blanchot whose essay *Everyday Speech*, ominously subtitled 'The Everyday: What is Most Difficult to Discover', warns that the everyday "allows no hold", arguing that it always escapes as "it belongs to insignificance" (1987:14). Blanchot writes that the instability of the everyday, that it exceeds through its "inexhaustible,

irrecusable, constantly unfinished” nature, means that it “always escapes forms and structures” and such is inaccessible to “panoramic vision”; therefore we cannot “introduce it into a whole or ‘review’ it” (1987:14). Learning from these warnings and accepting the enormous variations within the use of these concepts, as well as the diverse variety of alternative categories, there is a question as to whether the terms ‘the everyday’ and ‘everyday life’ are too broad as the analytic with which to understand the everyday life of urban security. There is a need to disentangle the ‘everyday’ and ‘everyday life’, and to differentiate within these and similar terms. I propose the use of more precise analytic vehicles to develop the work of the previous theoretical chapter, Perec’s account of the infra-ordinary and the overall conceptual framing of the empirical study. In this section I differentiate within this notion of ‘the everyday’ considering three interrelated themes in order to explore the distinct problem of security as part of everyday life and lived experience: encounter; affect | emotion | feeling; and, attention | distraction.

### **3.2.1. Encounter**

... how the worlds are, given that encounters are all there is, and their results cannot be pre-given (Thrift, 2008:2)

Here, and drawing on non-representational theories, I am interested in the practices of everyday life and with how we might think the ‘taking-place’ of security – the many and different ways security is encountered and enacted, and how it happens day-to-day. The approach adopted here is similar to that forwarded by Amin and Thrift, a conception of cities which “strives to be close to the phenomenality of practices, without relapsing into a romanticism of the everyday, and of action for itself” (2002:4). This offers a means of thinking of security as a range of materialities, practices and processes as well as intensities — I will explore this final point further in the section to follow.

Encounters are a vital concept in this approach to cities and to an analysis of the everyday life of urban security. Central to this thesis is a concern for how security measures are, or might be encountered, enacted and experienced, as a range of absences as well as presences, through the everyday use of urban spaces, and through a range of daily, mostly ordinary practices. Taking Perec’s diverse range of experimental approaches as a starting point, this involves asking how we might attend to the many and different ways in which security is encountered, of what happens in and through these encounters and of how these encounters take-place. Then it is to witness the outcome of such encounters, remembering

that places “must be seen as dynamic, as taking shape only in their passing” (Thrift, 1999:310). Following from the previous section, security is understood as not always ‘present’, it is not always part of the foreground of the city, nor is it at the fore of our attentions. So often security is encountered, enacted and experienced as a part of the known but rarely acknowledged background of everyday life, the unnoticed infra-ordinary: the rest instead. Therefore it is essential to examine those encounters where security is enacted as a range of presences, but also as something that can be a part of the background of everyday life, as absent. It also recognises the transactions, the movements between absence and presence, between presence and absence and considers how these take place, and the outcomes of such movements (see Ophir, 2005).

Embracing an “ontology of encounter” and emphasising the principles of “connection, extension and continuous novelty” (Amin and Thrift, 2002:27), I approach cities and lived everyday experience through an understanding of spaces as relational, marked by processes and importantly as unfinished:

In other words, encounter, and the reaction to it, is a formative element in the urban world. So, places, for example, are best thought of not so much as enduring sites but as moments of encounter, not so much as ‘presents’; fixed in space and time, but as variable events; twists and fluxes of interrelation (Amin and Thrift, 2002:30)

Cities and urban sites are thus conceived as moments of encounter, made up of encounters, or associations, within and between all manner of things, peoples, images, and events that come together in specific networks or assemblages. Here I am interested in how objects by definition partake in multiple assemblages. For security this means that multiple assemblages will always emerge through encounters, some of which are related to security, some of which are not. These are brought together, assembled, through a diverse range of encounters, some of which are expected, anticipated and planned for as part of security architectures and dispositifs, whilst others are unplanned and unforeseen, often unforeseeable.

Security can then be understood as overdetermined, “continually and differentially constituted” (Gibson-Graham, 1996:16), simultaneously in more than one set of relations where “every entity or event exists at the nexus of a bewildering complexity of natural and social processes” (Gibson-Graham, 1996:29). As Rose (2002:462) explains, in an overdetermined world, the objects and identities we engage with are never defined by their inherent properties. Rather, and as Gibson-Graham (1996) suggests, they are determined



by the contexts within which they are used. Rose states that the key to a theory of overdetermination is recognising that the “determination of an object, concept, norm, etc., does not move sequentially from one context to the next but is always defined by multiple operations at the same time” (2002:462), the process of world making is never conclusively determined or foreclosed. Things are determined by the multiplicity of overlapping contexts, “they are always taking shape as they are expressed differently through different practices” (Rose, 2002:462). This necessitates that we consider the *potential* for security to be enrolled in experience, and the actual outcomes of these encounters. This depends on conceiving and bearing witness to the world as “associational, as an imbroglio of heterogeneous and more or less expansive hybrids” (Thrift, 1999:317):

- Fleeting slogans: “De l’autobus, je regarde Paris [From the bus, I look at Paris]”
- Ground: packed gravel and sand.
- Stone: the curbs, a fountain, a church, buildings...
- Asphalt
- Trees (leafy, many yellowing)
- A rather big chunk of sky (maybe one-sixth of my field of vision)
- A cloud of pigeons that suddenly swoops down on the central plaza, between the church and fountain
- Vehicles (their inventory remains to be made)
- Human beings
- Some sort of basset hound
- Bread (baguette)
- Lettuce (curly endive?) partially emerging from a shopping bag (Perec, 2010:5-6).

This is an approach that conceives places, and in the context of this research security, less as somehow stable and fixed, but as involving “billions of happy and unhappy moments of encounter” (Thrift, 1999:302). Adopting this approach appreciates that any security measure, practice, process, dispositif, will always be a multiplicity made up of all manner of heterogeneous bits and pieces. The forwarding of such an approach accepts that the world is made up of all kinds of things that are continually and ceaselessly brought into relation with one another “by many and various spaces through a continuous and largely involuntary process of encounter” (Thrift, 2008:8). As Thrift writes, things are folded into the human world in all manner of “active and inseparable ways and most especially in the innumerable interactions between things and bodies which are placed at particular

locations” (1999:312). These sentiments are echoed in Perec’s writings, where he foregrounds an understanding that requires us to acknowledge not only our experiences of space, but also how “‘things’ take place, just as events do” (Walker and Virilio, 2001:16). Through everyday practices and encounters we come into contact with the thingly world, our ordinary lives are lived out “in the midst of things ... most of the time they receive our ‘daily inattention’. We don’t notice them, but we do interact with them” (Highmore, 2010:58; see also Stewart, 2003, 2007). As a range of materialities, we encounter security objects as absences and presences, knowingly and unwittingly, through day-to-day practices, and it is important to consider the materialities that constitute security practices and the spaces in which they are found through a focus on objects, materialities and their organisation.

An ontology of encounter and togetherness foregrounds the practised, emergent nature of space and the daily, often (infra-)ordinary associations with and within spaces. Non-representational theories are concerned with everyday practices, with what humans and/or non-humans do, and with the flow of everyday life understood as ‘in process’ and ‘open ended’ (see Anderson and Harrison, 2010a; Thrift 1996, 1997, 2000a, 2000b, 2004b, 2008). Following Thrift (2008; see also Anderson and Harrison, 2010a) this is a geography of what happens. Non-representational theory, Thrift suggests, is about “practices, mundane everyday practices, that shape the conduct of human beings towards others and themselves in particular sites” (1997:142). Developing non-representational theory is not a project obsessed with “representation and meaning, but with the performative ‘presentations’, ‘showings’ and ‘manifestations’ of everyday life” (Thrift, 1997:126-27)<sup>14</sup>. These approaches align with Perec’s notion of the infra-ordinary and “what happens when nothing happens” (2010:3), through their engagements with the taking-place of practices, things and events. Whilst Perec’s projects certainly explore lived experiences and attend to everyday practices and happenings, his approaches do not take encounters as their explicit focus. Non-representational theories concern for everyday practice allows for an appreciation of the various styles of encounter and enactment of security and the transactions and exchanges between absence and presence that take place as we encounter security measures of different kinds. And this permits us to engage with and intervene in life as it is lived, the taking-place of practices “which allows us to become caught up in the rhythms of diverse and moving materialities” (McCormack, 2006:332; see

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<sup>14</sup> As Dewsbury et al, explain in one of the first commentaries on non-representational theory, representations become understood as presentations, as performative in themselves; as things, as doings and events that enact worlds, rather than as “masks, gazes, reflections, veils, dreams, ideologies, as anything, in short, that is a covering which is laid over the ontic”. Non-representational theory takes representation seriously, “representation not as a code to be broken or as an illusion to be dispelled rather representations are apprehended as performative in themselves; as doings. The point here is to redirect attention from the posited meaning towards the material compositions and conduct of representations” (2002:438).

also Latham, 2003; Latham and McCormack, 2004). Returning here to Perec and the infra-ordinary, these are approaches that encourage forms of engagement that are able “to see not just the rips, but the fabric” (2010:33-34). This is a commitment to engaging with and presenting the “undisclosed and sometimes undisclosable nature of everyday practice” (Cadman, 2009:456) and recognises the impact and importance of the infra-ordinary, the momentary, the fleeting and the partial.

Cities are practiced and composed of habitual practices of walking, looking, moving, talking, hearing and so on, security measures are, therefore, understood as being engaged with primarily through a range of everyday practices, accidentally, habitually as well as more purposefully and consciously. Non-representational geographies, through attempts to engage “more actively with the heterogeneous entanglements of practice” (Latham and Conradson, 2003:1901), have sought to grasp these taken for granted background practices and embodied dispositions through a renewed interest in the taking-place of life, attending to the routinised, habitual, the mundane, the ordinary as well as the more intense practices and moments of lived experience. Importantly in the context of security, this approach acknowledges that so many encounters pass unnoticed, or at least unacknowledged. It is through the many day-to-day, ordinary encounters, ordinary exchanges and the accumulation of these sorts of relations, between a body bypassing, or enacting security through an ordinary exchange, that Perec’s fabric of the infra-ordinary is composed. This is where the ordinary happens as it were, the taking-place of Perec’s infra-ordinary. It is from this position that we can appreciate the transactions, or transition points, between the habitual and the conscious, where habits and states of distraction are broken, attentions focused and where security moves from the background to the foreground. I will consider this process further in the final two parts of this section.

Importantly given the framing of power in the previous chapter, this is an approach to cities and to everyday practice which accepts that cities are sites of security, regulation and control. Importantly it is recognised that whilst “urban practices are in many ways disciplined ... these practices constantly exceed that disciplinary envelope. Each urban encounter is a theatre of promise in a play of power” (Amin and Thrift, 2002:4). Although places may be designed to elicit particular practices, and whilst security is enrolled in regulatory and disciplinary projects, these give way to the unintended and unexpected outcomes and practices as all kinds of other practices take place which “they were never designed to admit” (Thrift, 1999:311). Taking seriously the more ordinary, unintended encounters of and with security acknowledges that security is enrolled in multiple assemblages and has multiple potential futures about which we can know very little, only some of which involve

security acting as security. Bennett encourages us to engage with what she describes as ‘vibrant matter’ and ‘lively things’, explaining: “By ‘vitality’ I mean the capacity of things – edibles, commodities, storms, metals – not only to impede or block the will and designs of humans but also to act as quasi-agents or forces with trajectories, propensities, or tendencies of their own” (Bennett, 2010:vii, 2001, 2005; see also Anderson and Tolia-Kelly, 2004; Anderson and Wylie, 2009; Aradau, 2010a; Latham and McCormack, 2004). Security as both background and foreground, as absent and present, can be encountered and enacted in much the same way as other things, other absent and present elements, and at once has the potential to be/act as security, as ‘lively’. It is therefore essential that we appreciate and acknowledge that “the ‘background’ itself is hardly inert” (Anderson and Harrison, 2010b:9).

An ontology of encounter acknowledges and gives space to the complexity and indeterminacy of the everyday. For an account of the everyday life of security, and in considering how security becomes part of the everyday life of cities, this engages with and through the different associations that emerge. This serves to witness the absences and presences of security, and the capacities for bodies to enact security in different ways as a more heightened presence and as part of the background, as a presence to secure and as another type of thing entirely. Non-representational theories share a fidelity to emphasising the flow of practice in everyday life as “embodied, as caught up with and committed to the creation of affect, as contextual, and as inevitably technologised through language and objects” these are approaches “concerned with the on-going creation of effects through encounters” (Thrift and Dewsbury, 2000:415), following this approach allows for both a collective and personal account of the everyday life of security.

### **3.2.2. Affect | emotion | feeling**

An ontology of encounter both encourages and is attentive to everyday geographies and forwards an urbanism that can respond to the taking-place of life, to everyday practice and performance, and importantly in the context of this research, to embodiment and “how the various modalities of the more than/less than rational, including affects, emotions and feelings, compose urban life” (Anderson and Holden, 2008:145). This involves the valorisation of the “seemingly ephemeral, transient, incorporeal, and inorganic status of everyday life”, which are granted equal status with “the presumably much harder and faster world of materiality and corporeality” (Seigworth, 2000:257). Here, I am interested in the embodied practices through which human bodies encounter and enact security through day-

to-day practices and how we might develop an affective, emotive and felt urbanism which, following Anderson and Holden, is “adequate to the complexity and indeterminacy of modern cities” (2008:145).

As I have described in previous sections of this chapter and in Chapter 2, despite the relative lack of attention to everyday life it has been routinely argued that central to understanding security measures are a set of implicit assumptions about how they have, or might, be encountered and experienced day-to-day. Coaffee et al. are not alone in their claim that the manifestations of security policy “within the built environment can transmit powerful messages, both intentionally and unintentionally, eliciting a range of subjective emotional responses” (2009:507). Elsewhere Adey (2008) and Thrift (2004c) have written more persuasively of how spaces are designed, and architectures and technologies deployed instrumentally in attempts to actively engineer affect and emotion with particular, often politicized aims. Amin and Thrift suggest that this ‘engineering’ is centred around biopolitics and in particular biopolitical practices of “engineering the body and the senses – and life more generally – so as to produce governable subjects. Power penetrates subjects’ very bodies and forms of life” (2002:28). Whilst I agree that the state and business increasingly attempt to engineer the body and ‘cast spells over the senses’, it is important to remember that no matter what the affective, emotive and felt reactions intended to be stimulated or engineered, there is no guarantee; security does not necessarily produce the affect that it names. Rather, “manipulation, where it is achieved, is always a fragile and contingent achievement” (Anderson and Harrison, 2010b:11), that is, “prone to failure and always reliant upon being continually reworked in ... creative responses” (Ash, 2010:655). In the context of researching the everyday life of security and how security is experienced, it is important to develop an understanding of the multiple ways in which affectivity and the emotive life of cities comes to matter in collective and more personal accounts of the everyday life of security.

As with biopolitics and everyday life, affect, emotion and feeling have been understood in various ways and have a variety of theoretical foundations<sup>15</sup>. There is no one vocabulary nor a stable definition of affect, emotion and feeling, so is the “diverse literature on affect and emotion within geography and other social sciences” (Anderson and Harrison,

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<sup>15</sup> As well as acknowledging the disagreements around how to theorise ‘affect’ and ‘emotion’ within geographical writings, Anderson and Harrison (2010b:16) write that “the debate about affect, emotion and their interrelation have turned around three points of concern and critique; the apparent distinction between emphasising an impersonal life and the embodied experience of subjects; the relation between affect and signification; and the crypto-normativism that has arguably been smuggled into work on the politics of affect” (see Anderson and Harrison 2006; Barnett, 2008; Bondi, 2005; McCormack 2006; Thien, 2005; Tolia-Kelly, 2006). There is an ‘affective turn’ occurring beyond Human Geography where similar issues have become important concerns (see for example Clough, 2007; Stewart, 2007).

2006:333). The distinction used here emerges from and draws on the works on affect in non-representational geographies (see for example Anderson, 2004, 2005, 2006; Anderson and Harrison, 2006; McCormack, 2003, 2008; Thrift, 2004c). Following Anderson, thinking through affect begins from an attunement to affect as “a transpersonal *capacity* which a body has to be affected (through an affection) and to affect (as the result of modifications” (2006:735, original emphasis). Affect is ‘unqualified’, and, as such, “not ownable or recognizable” (Massumi, 2002:28). Affects emerge as pre-personal, unformed and unstructured intensities, as the intensity of relations between bodies, where bodies are not necessarily human. As Massumi states, “affect is autonomous to the degree to which it escapes confinement in the particular body whose vitality, or potential for interaction, it is” (2002:35). Affects may be felt as intensities in the body, or find “corporeal expression in bodily feelings” (Anderson, 2006:736). Feeling can be described as the sensed registering of this affective intensity in a body, as sensation, a corporeal expression checked against prior experiences and labelled; it is personal and biographical as every person has a distinct set of previous sensations from which to interpret and label their feelings: “Movements of affect are expressed through those proprioceptive and visceral shifts in the background habits, and postures, of a body that are commonly described as ‘feelings’” (Anderson, 2006:736). Both affect and feeling can be further distinguished from emotions. Emotion is understood as sensed intensity articulated and expressed in a socially recognisable form of expression. Following Massumi, an emotion is a “subjective content, the sociolinguistic fixing of the quality of an experience which from that point onward is defined as personal” (Massumi, 2002:28). Emotion is “qualified intensity”, it is “intensity owned and recognized” (Massumi, 2002:28) and is therefore related to an “already established field of discursively constituted categories in relation to which the felt intensity of experience is articulated” and therefore “conceives experience as always already meaningful” (McCormack 2003:495). It is important to make this distinction for as Latham and McCormack note, to speak of the affective materiality of the urban is to “speak of the intensity of the relations in and through which it consists, relations that are always more than personal and are always playing out before the reflective event of thought kicks in” (Latham and McCormack, 2004:706). This cannot therefore be reducible to the emotional experience of the city, it operates prior to the personal qualities of emotions: “Affect is a felt but impersonal, visceral but not neatly corporeal, force of intensive relationality” (Latham and McCormack, 2004:706).

Working with this line of thought, and distinguishing between different modalities of the more than/less than rational, I take cities to be made up of multiple, differentiated affects, feelings and emotions:

Within each of these modalities are numerous differences both in degree and in kind. Such an attention to constant qualitative differentiation begins to foster an everyday urbanism attentive to the taking place of affects, feelings, and emotions that avoids assuming that cities have, or could have, a single or dominant identifiable, affective register” (Anderson and Holden, 2008:145).

Acknowledging the importance of this last point is integral to bearing witness to and then providing a more nuanced sense of the affective and emotive geographies of security and involves appreciating that multiplicity is key to everyday geographies of affect and emotion. Cities are the sites for the generation of all kinds of affective and emotive experience. Here security as a condition and the emphasis on being-(in)secure is suggestive of a variegated affective landscape of engagement and encounter with security, which cannot be reduced to the naming of a set of simplified positive (safety, confidence) or negative (anxiety, fear, terror) affects. Secondly, affect and emotion are only contingently related to security, they are overdetermined by other things. Thirdly, these affective presences have a strange durability, they come and go, they are fleeting, they are transitory, following Mussumi (2002), they are autonomous. As such, they mesh with one another, they interfere with one another, they resonate with one another, they are transmitted and they have consequences for what people do, for their actions and this then feeds back into how they engage with the space and with security.

Taking this seriously and thinking security and its relation to everyday life, and to peoples experiences takes us away from the preoccupation with the security ‘event’ and of understandings of security as somehow and always already present within cities and urban life, to explore the more nuanced ways in which security is enacted both in the infra-ordinary and as a range of more intense presences. The infra- and more extra- ordinary are significant to a description of the role and ways security are encountered and the difference security makes. Doing so questions the many ways in which, through everyday encounters, security presses upon us in qualitatively different ways, or goes by unnoticed, but still taking seriously the moods, experiences and energies of the perceiving subject. Affect, emotion and feeling are important to address life lived ordinarily, following Perec, the infra-ordinary is a realm of existence which, like background noise, goes all but unnoticed precisely because it is unremarkable involving “an event to which we may not have paid any attention, that we may not even have perceived” (Walker and Virilio, 2001:17). This approach to affect, emotion and feeling, and in taking the relational seriously, is useful when it is acknowledged

that “most of the time in most of our everyday lives there is a huge amount we do, a huge amount that we are involved in, that we don’t think about, when asked about, we may struggle to explain” (Anderson and Harrison, 2010b:7).

Affective and emotive experience consist, in part, of distributed atmospheres and intensities that circulate through and register differentially in bodies and agencies of various kinds (see Anderson, 2009a; Bissell, 2010; Böhme, 1993, 2002; McCormack, 2008; Stewart, 2011; Zumthor, 2006). This provides a means of thinking not only how an atmosphere, or more collective public feeling takes place, but also how these are experienced intimately. Utilising the concept of affective atmospheres in order to discuss and reflect on the everyday life of security considers the role of security in both foreground and background affective and emotive life. Thinking here of how atmospheres “can pull the senses into alert or incite distraction or denial” (Stewart, 2011:453). Atmospheric pressures can be such that they demand engagement, they also “become the *live* background of living in and living through things” (Stewart, 2011:453, my emphasis), the infra-ordinary. The concept of atmosphere is interesting and useful in the context of this research precisely because it “holds a series of opposites – presence and absence, materiality and ideality, definite and indefinite, singularity and generality – in a relation of tension” (Anderson, 2009a:77). Here I question how atmospheres envelop, surround and press upon life, following Anderson (2009a) this is a move to consider more closely the sense of atmospheres as collective affects ‘in which we live’.

It is the holding together of opposites, in tension, that is interesting here. Security as a range of presences and absences, encountered and enacted through a range of everyday practices. Returning to the infra-ordinary, this considers the background sense as a sense of ‘security’, precisely as an atmosphere. It is that sense of security which need not necessarily ever be present to the person experiencing it, it is not necessarily known or knowable, it is always there somewhere, somehow, sometime, as a background feeling and affective atmosphere: “enigmas and oblique events and background noises that might be barely sensed and yet are compelling” (Stewart, 2011:453). The term *atmosphere* expresses something vague, “it evades definition” (Preston, 2008:7), refusing capture, yet pervasive, everywhere but nowhere, atmospheres rest “at the very edge of semantic availability” (Williams, 1977:134). Although affective atmospheres express something vague, something which “hesitates at the edge of the unsayable”, at the same time, “the affective qualities that are given to this *something* by those who feel it are remarkable for their singularity” (Anderson, 2009a:78, original emphasis). McCormack describes affective atmospheres as “something distributed yet palpable, a quality of environmental immersion



that registers in and through sensing bodies whilst also remaining diffuse, in the air, ethereal” (2008:413). These dynamic qualities allow us to consider the idea of this being a feeling but not quite a feeling, named but not nameable, there but not there – this is central to this account of urban security and emerges through encounters, affect, emotion and feeling.

Tears, pulls, rips in the infra-ordinary background, of varying intensities, may change atmospheres, and atmospheres “may interrupt, perturb and haunt fixed persons, places or things” (Anderson, 2009a:78). Security becomes present, or more intensely present in relation to atmospheric movements, as an affective state, as a background atmosphere coalesces around events which push at the background, bringing it to the fore, punctuating it, reshaping it, a “scene in which the sense of something happening becomes tactile” (Stewart, 2011:453). Here it is helpful to think of affective atmospheres following Bissell, as a “*propensity*: a pull or a charge that might emerge in a particular space which might (or might not) generate particular events and actions, feelings and emotion” (2010:273, original emphasis). Returning to Perec, such events need not be spectacular nor somehow extra-ordinary, a myriad of ordinary disturbances, encounters and transactions, seemingly incidental mundane happenings can and do tear the fabric of the infra-ordinary as it is constantly forming and reforming. Here the focus falls on a consideration of the intensification of presence, and the production of what Ophir (2005) terms an excitation, the where the presence of the encounter overshadows the presence of what is encountered – whether greatly or slightly: “the intensification of a presence that makes present the experience of presence itself for one who is presented with something ... An excitation is an event in which the presence of some thing acts upon one-who-is-present such that the encounter with that thing is shifted from background to foreground” (Ophir, 2005:211). This is to ass how people become attuned to or sense the emergence of atmospheres, how these endure and resonate, and also how they can become diffuse and unstable. As Bissell contends, when producing accounts of the qualitative effect of these intensities “we should keep in mind that intensity in this respect can and should be considered as a sliding scale” (2008:1699). This allows us to consider how intensities can be either intensified or diminished, finished and unfinished. Atmospheres move, continually “forming and deforming, appearing and disappearing ... They are never finished, static or at rest” (Anderson, 2009a:79). Atmospheres “are always being taken up and reworked in lived experience” (Anderson, 2009a:79), they are always in the process of emerging and transformation.

### 3.2.3. Attention | distraction

Apply yourself. Take your time ...

Anything worthy of note going on. Do you know what is worthy of note? Is there anything that strikes you?

Nothing strikes you (Perec, 2008a:50)

The above extract from Perec's essay *The Street* is a reminder that everyday attentions, distractions and practices of noticing are far from straightforward. As Thrift writes, "The question is not so much do we notice (attend to) the city? No doubt we do. Rather the point is how do we notice it?" (2000c:398). Here I am interested in exactly this question, how attention and acts of noticing take place in immediate embodied engagements with the city and with security. In this regard Perec is again of value, for as Sheringham states, *An Attempt at Exhausting a Place in Paris* indicates "the sheer multiplicity of the channels with which we engage with the world" by making us aware of "the concrete presence of the experiencing subject" (2006:268-269). As Thrift continues, "for long periods of time, I suspect we notice very little at all, at least in the accepted sense of the term. Rather 'we' are very small parts of a 'transhuman' field of activity which ebbs and flows. Our urban world, in other words [is] there and not there, only fitfully attended to" (2000c:398). The task, as with that undertaken by Perec above, involves trying to understand how we notice the city, even if only fitfully, and following both Perec and Thrift, how it notices us. Theorists of modernity, of everyday life in the city, such as Walter Benjamin, Siegfried Kracauer, and Georg Simmel, have described the difficult situation of the modern subject in terms of attention and distraction. Here I consider this situation and how attentions are distributed in everyday life, how attentiveness is heterogeneous and complex, echoing Crary's notion of an 'overloaded field' (2001:365). I am concerned with how we might think the relations between attention and security, both when security is a part of the infra-ordinary and the intensification of a presence when security is more foregrounded, as well as attentions implication in the continuous transactions and exchanges between absences and presences.

An ontology of encounter necessitates a move away from understandings of attention as primarily, and often purely ocular, to consider attention as embodied, haptic and multi sensory (see Ingold, 2000; Latham, 1999a, 1999b; Middleton, 2010, 2011; Paterson, 2009; Simpson, 2009; Steinbeck, 2004; Taussig, 1992, 1993; Thrift, 2000c): "my gaze, my touch and all my other senses are together the powers of one and the same body integrated into

one and the same action” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962:317-318). Following Thrift, embodiment is central to understanding how attentions are practiced, due to the “power of bodies to get a hold of the world”, emphasising sensed and tactile appropriation where embodiment “articulates and is articulated by a whole range of senses” (2000c:402). Drawing on Ingold (2000) this intends to question how the whole body perceives through its involvement and movements in an environment, understanding that attention and “embodiment makes no sense taken apart from the ‘object world’” (Thrift, 2000c:402).

Following this, it is important to consider how shifts and movements in attention take place and what is involved when one comports ones body to attend to something, as one turns towards it, what kind of modes does comporting to something take?

If we turn our head in one direction, then in another, we don’t even manage to see completely everything there is around us; we have to twist our bodies round to see properly what was behind us (Perec, 2008a:81)

In *An Attempt at Exhausting a Place in Paris*, as Perec shifts his attention his writings demonstrate how he moves through a range of bodily comportments and gestures, altering the angle of his vision, moving from one café to another, or to the bench in the centre of the square. Following Ash, this concentrates on the materiality of bodies, seeking to attend to “the practices of spatial orientation as constructed by bodies through their own movements” (2010b:415). Orientation and attention must be considered “in coordination with, the body’s physical and profoundly tactile knowing of a space” (Latham, 1999b:463). We routinely speak of our attentions being drawn, fixed and so on, but too often think little of how these movements take place, or how they involve the whole body brought together in the action of its involvement in an environment (see Ingold, 2000).

Everyday practices of attention relate to the ways things happen and take place, as much as people’s engagements with their environment, coming together in specific assemblages, a process which Taussig describes as an “unstoppable merging” (1992:25). As Thrift contends, [t]hings are such a vital part of the world that they cannot be separated: they are a vital part of embodied perception” where “[o]bjects are not inanimate; they are a part of what it is to be animate” (2000c:402). This is as much about the things, security objects, materialities, intensities, human and non-human bodies that make up everyday situations as the dynamic attentions of bodies who enact them through a diverse range of everyday encounters, where there is “a palpable, sensuous connection between the very body of the perceiver and the perceived” (Taussig, 1993:21). Perec (2010) concedes that

he is drawn to the unusual wherever and whenever it occurs, his observations reflect this as on occasion he turns from the infra-ordinary in unexpected directions. Perec is fascinated by the “mechanisms of perception and interpretation, by the ways in which the insignificant is drawn to our attention, by the shifting boundaries of vision” (James, 2009:201). Following Perec’s example, this is a move to address the different ways that presences emerge through encounters and through disruptions, transactions between absence and presence. This is better posed as a question of attunement and engagement involving attentions and the coming to presence and the departure from presence of security in the context of diverse shifts in attention.

There are moments in *An Attempt at Exhausting a Place in Paris* where Perec describes the difficulties in remaining attentive, the text is, as the title suggests, an *attempt* and thus serves as “a lesson in the impossibility of the kind of aimless description Perec aimed at, and so it is a lesson in how and why investigators have to focus their attention on something” (Becker, 2001:72). Perec’s experiments demonstrate the capacity to switch attention from one space to another whilst acknowledging that any encounter with the object of ones attentions is always with additions and exclusions within an ‘overloaded field’ as identified by Crary (2001:365). Security is received whilst attentions are channelled elsewhere, ‘paying attention’ involves “a disengagement from a broader field of attraction” we will inevitably encounter and enact security whilst our attentions are otherwise occupied as “our lives are so thoroughly a patchwork of such disconnected states” (Crary, 2001:1). In addition, and in the context of urban security, questions of attunement must consider how dispositifs of security aim to utilise and even manipulate attentions and distractions. Attempts to cultivate absences and presences, to engineer attentions and distractions become integral to landscapes and practices of everyday urban security – where some security techniques and technologies are deliberate, their efficacy relying on prominence, for others discretion is key.

Perec is “conscious of how chance determines what he may or may not see, but also of how attending to one level of phenomena renders others invisible” as a result, he repeatedly “realises that something has happened within his field of vision (a car has parked, someone has gone by), but outside his provisional frame of attention – occluded by other claims, or by a temporary absence of mind” (Sheringham, 2000:198). Attention is always in competition, and in any number of ways, “attention inevitably reaches a threshold at which it breaks down” (Crary, 2001:47):

*Obvious limits to such an undertaking: even when my only goal is just to observe, I don't see what takes place a few meters from me* (Perec, 2010:15, original emphasis)

Returning to Thrift's (2000c) supposition that for long periods we notice very little at all, and Perec's insistence that we must find new ways of attending to the city and to the everyday precisely because we are so habituated, reveals that our urban world is there but not there, absent and present, familiar but not necessarily known, experienced and negotiated through distraction. Sheringham suggests that the way we read and discover more and more in *An Attempt at Exhausting a Place in Paris* "matches the way observing the everyday brings about a transmutation of attention, making visible something that was, according to Perec, disguise by the narrowness of our habitual modes of seeing" (2006:268). Indeed, Perec's everyday writings and investigations are often concerned with questioning "the tenacity of perceptual habits and writing's ability to question and transform these habits" (James, 2009:199). Benjamin's (1992, 1997; Latham, 1999b) writings on cities propose the distracted and habitual as our means of 'understanding' the city, styles of everyday knowing where the appropriation of space is 'tactile' and 'optical', based in 'use' and 'perception'. These descriptions of distracted, everyday knowledges do imply the lack of attention, rather they present "a different, more flexible mode of perception" (Caygill, 1998:115) and conditions of reception which highlight the many and different ways that cities can be noticed. As Harrison, drawing on the writings of Benjamin, observes, distraction "absorbs architecture into the body, and vice versa, via tactility ... An embodied, geohistorically specific, sensuous knowing (enacting) of the everyday" (2000:511). Everyday encounters are often enactments that take place through our distracted, tactile 'knowing', which for Taussig constitute an everydayness not of "sense so much as sensuousness, an embodied and somewhat automatic knowledge that functions like peripheral vision, not studied contemplation, a knowledge that is imageric and sensate rather than ideational" (1992:141). These are the practical knowledges that Thrift (2000c:402) suggests provide the means by which cities keep going. Such accounts are significant for they allow us to think in terms of how the focusing of attention in and through distracted encounters take place, part of everyday life which is so often "unreflexive and not necessarily amenable to introspection" (Anderson and Harrison, 2010b:7).

Attention and distraction are understood here as inseparable and should be thought of as always existing on a single continuum, rather than as dichotomous opposites constitutive of different states: "a continuum in which the two ceaselessly flow into one another, as part

of a social field in which the same imperatives and forces incite one and the other” (Crary, 2001:51). This reveals the importance of thinking about attenuation, and questions of the “economies of rest and indifference” (Latham, 1999a:162) with which attention, arousal and interest are intertwined. Following Crary, attention is “a dynamic process, intensifying and diminishing, rising and falling, ebbing and flowing according to an indeterminate set of variables” (2000:47). As Sheringham writes, Perec’s notations “make us privy to the processes, the vicissitudes, of his attention, relayed to us directly by the intermittent record of bodily sensations and changes of mood; and indirectly by constant fluctuations in his way of articulating what is happening” (2000:197). An attentiveness to particular objects implies a parallel disengagement from other stimuli, following this we can “consider how, during these durations where attention is directed, other objects in the proximate environment are excluded from the perceptual field” (Bissell, 2009a:52). Processes of attention are therefore understood to oscillate between passive and more active interrogative styles, according to indeterminate variables and involving the “dynamics of engagement and disengagement within urban space” (Latham, 1999a:161).

Weiss is correct in asserting that “when life is running smoothly and predictably most people are usually less inclined to question the status of the familiar” (2008:1). As has been acknowledged, there is a difficulty in looking critically at what is infra-ordinary, the fact of its very ordinariness makes it invisible to critical attentions and to the attentions of everyday practice, experienced through the dreamless sleep of Perec’s anaesthesia. As Crary writes, so often “we are in a dimension of contemporary experience that requires that we effectively cancel out or exclude from consciousness much of our immediate environment” (2001:1). The apparent ubiquity of security further complicates an account of attention in and through structures of expectation that make up everyday urban experiences. As with other familiar, taken for granted and expected urban presences, security of one form or another, has come to be known, come to be expected as always somehow already present. In the introduction to his *Everyday Life Reader*, Highmore writes that things become everyday precisely when they no longer hold our attention, as such security can be said to become ‘everyday’ by “becoming invisible, unnoticed, part of the furniture. And if familiarity does not always breed contempt, it does encourage neglect” (2002:21).

Security will, at times and according to an ‘indeterminate set of variables’ attract attention, become the subject of our interest, of our distractions stimulating engagements, of different styles and varying degrees of intensity. Perec’s descriptive texts demonstrate the work of attention along specific channels, also highlighting how attention oscillates, between relative passivity and more active forms of interrogation, fluctuating on a continuum in which

attention and distraction ceaselessly flow into one another. Following Bissell (2009a:57), at times ones perceptual field will be overloaded, whilst at other times it might be calmer, or more attenuated, each having the potential to bring about particular embodied effects. Our attentiveness to security is far from consistent, and far from straightforward, it is important therefore to produce “new senses of how the city can be noticed” (Thrift, 2000c:403), and noticed in new ways.

## **Conclusion**

The theoretical material developed through this and the previous chapter offers a conceptual framework through which this thesis addresses processes of counter-terrorist urban security and the complex relations between security and everyday lived experience. In doing so this conceptual work enables this thesis to analyse and describe issues around the securing urban public spaces, discussed in depth in Chapter 5, as well as how this specific form of security apparatus and the related array of counter-terrorist security interventions are then encountered through different day-to-day practices within everyday life, as developed in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. To this end, this chapter and Chapter 2 offer a conceptual vocabulary and a theoretical framework that enables this thesis to describe the everyday life of security and attend to how the everyday is secured.

As I have insisted, the everyday has been repeatedly under theorised and often overlooked altogether in accounts of urban security, often in spite of claims or hints to the contrary. Considering the everyday life of security following Perec provides a means of theorising the infra-ordinary and how security comes to be submerged, enacted so often as a part of the background of everyday urban life. At the same time Perec’s attention to the event(al), to more ordinary and extraordinary happenings allow this thesis to acknowledge and then witness security interventions as more animated and as a range of intensified presences: “to see not just the rips, but the fabric” (Perec, 2010:33). This appreciates and attends to the shifting complexities of an everydayness which is endlessly forming and reforming in and through encounters. An empiricism which is responsive to the more evental, extra-ordinary tears and which can intervene in, witness and describe the background (infra-)ordinary fabric also.

Following Seigworth’s example, an approach which draws on Perec and non-representational theories provides a conceptual framework that has “its attention directed toward ‘Life’ – not merely in its immediacy ... but life in all of its sticky and slack human/nonhuman, inorganic/incorporeal, phenomenal/epiphenomenal, and banal/intense

everydayness” (2000:246). This provides a means of attending to security as it is encountered, as it is absent and/or present within the everyday life of the city, practiced and enacted as a range of absent presences and present absences.

This contributes to our understanding of how a form of biopolitical security is developed and operates as it seeks to intervene in, to regulate and indeed to promote the everyday city and urban life. Not only does this question the efficacy of security as it takes cities and the life of cities as its referent object and the enactment of the threats of terrorism, it also addresses the ways in which this form of security becomes part of urban life. This is a form of security which is expected to operate within and be reconciled with the conditions of the everyday city. It is primed to become part of urban spaces and the everyday happenings of urban life so as to become a background presence, then intended to emerge in response to a security event. Counter-terrorist security interventions are required to be ‘proportionate’ to a changeable threat environment whilst ‘appropriate’ and so more sensitive to different and spatially contingent urban sites, I will discuss this at greater length through the course of Chapter 5. This is to be achieved against and in the context of biopolitical aims, to regulate and to promote the ‘freedoms’ of liberal-democratic life and enabling the ‘good’ circulations and interdependencies of urban sites.

The following chapter demonstrates how the conceptual approach outlined here leads to particular invocations for method and the development of a methodological approach that can attend to and examine the securing urban public spaces, as well as how security interventions are encountered and lived through everyday life.



## 4. Methodology: Researching the Life of Security

### Introduction

Following the conceptual framework outlined in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, this chapter explains how the methodological approach for this study was developed and undertaken. The methodology provides “vantage points above, below and in between the surfaces of cities” (Amin and Thrift, 2002:7) in order to examine the processes through which security is enacted in cities whilst attentive to, describing and intervening in the taking-place of practices, events and things, as spaces and security emerges through practical enactment.

The first section of this chapter outlines the rationale for the methods practiced, describing the practical issues, concerns and problems that researching the everyday and the everyday life of security pose. These necessitated a methodology that was experimental in approach. It draws inspiration from Foucault’s work on dispositifs; Perec’s work on the everyday, particularly his ‘practical exercises’; and non-representational geographies commitment to developing established and more traditional approaches to methodology, addressing the “methodological timidity” (Latham, 2003:1993; see Thrift 2000a) that social research has been accused of. Following this, the second section outlines the methodological approach, discussing the research sites and the case study approach, and the series of qualitative research methods used, describing how these were practically undertaken. For the sake of clarity this section is divided into two parts: dispositifs of security; and the everyday life of security. This is a pragmatic distinction, and it should be remembered that each of the methods work together following Law’s (2004) example of the method assemblage. The methods are practiced in ways that condition and inform each other, responding to and intervening in the complexities of the research process and the study of the everyday life of security. The third and final section concludes this chapter through a brief discussion of the processes of analysis and presentation.

### 4.1. Encountering everyday urban security everyday

#### 4.1.1. Researching the everyday life of security

The methodology outlined here follows a commitment to embracing the openness of the world. As Dewsbury et al. (2002) maintain, this involves practicing methodologies and

producing accounts that leave a space for something else to happen. As such, and following Law (2004), rather than attempting to uncover and present a singular reality, our task is to find the best ways of thinking through and intervening in the unfolding of complex, diffuse and messy everyday worlds. Engaging with and accounting for the everyday and everyday life as it is lived then requires a modest empiricism which will be partial and always unfinished: “*The world is more excessive than we can theorise*” (Dewsbury et al., 2002:437, original emphasis). This is an important stance for researching the everyday life of security, for where the world is taken to be processually emergent, security certainly does not resolve or come to rest, landscapes of security are shifting, and dispositifs of security whilst marked by specificity and circumstance, are centrifugal. Attending to the concerns of this research does not present a call for the complete dissolution and disavowal of fixities, rather as with everyday life, security practices and processes, events, materialities and so on can be more obstinate, more stable and we must welcome this situation also, questioning how things hold together, if only momentarily. As Law, citing the work of Michael Serres, states “the real – the solid and the fluid – endlessly intersect”, as such the methodology practiced in this study recognises this complexity, and understands that realities are composed of “flux, fixity, and *also* their intersection” (2004:117, original emphasis).

Responding to this, the methodological practices employed here are a modest attempt at appreciating some of this complexity, “pointing to and articulating a sense of the world as an unformed but generative flux of forces and relations that work to produce particular realities” (Law, 2004:7). Dewsbury calls this stance a kind of ‘witnessing’ that is orientated towards being “in tune to the vitality of the world as it unfolds” (2003:1923), attentive to, intervening in, apprehending and describing the taking-place of practices:

Hospitable then to whatever happens; to whosoever or whatever arrives. And importantly, in the meantime, hospitable to the potential for such encounters, even now a space left empty for encounters which may contain the potential to unfold things otherwise, each with its varied accounts and styles of expression for speaking and writing; each enacting a world, again and again (Dewsbury et al., 2002:438)

In their recent progress report, Davies and Dwyer (2007; see also Crang, 2002, 2003, 2005; Davies and Dwyer, 2008, 2010; Lorimer, 2005, 2007, 2008) argue that although many of the practical procedures of qualitative research remain the same, in place of the pursuit of certainty found in generating representations of the world, geographers now recognise that “the world is so textured as to exceed our capacity to understand it, and thus to accede that

social science methodologies and forms of knowing will be characterised as much by openness, reflexivity and recursively as by categorisation, conclusions and closure” (2007:258). This shift to more pluralistic accounts is also acknowledged by Latham, who commends those who have committed themselves to undertaking “methodologically innovative research which is pushing the boundaries of established conventions”, praising a willingness to experiment with established and more traditional methods through the creation and practicing of “innovative, insightful methodological hybrids” (2003:1993).

Within non-representational theories there has been, as Anderson observes, a “nascent experimentation with research methods, as well as diagrammatic and narrative forms of presentation, that take as their task to learn to witness the ongoing taking-place of life” (2009b:505; see also Anderson and Harrison, 2010b; Dewsbury, 2000, 2003, 2009; Dewsbury et al. 2002; Thrift, 2000a, 2000b, 2000c, 2000d, 2000e, 2008; Thrift and Dewsbury, 2000). It is acknowledged that such commitment to innovation and experimentalism goes some way to providing methodological approaches that can better cope with “our self-evidently more-than-human, more-than-textual, multisensual worlds” (Lorimer, 2005:83). There is then a commitment to describing, to bearing witness and to attending to the embodied, the affective, the sensuous and the performative as well as the purely cognitive and reflexive (see Anderson and Harrison, 2010a). Non-representational approaches share a commitment to avoiding what Dewsbury et al. refer to as an ‘embalming obsession’ and ‘vampirism’ where “events are drained for the sake of orders, mechanisms, structures and processes” (2002:438). Instead these, and other approaches, are committed to attending to life and thought as practiced, ‘in process’ and ‘open ended’. Such approaches, as Whatmore suggests, offer a supplement to the familiar repertoire of methods that largely rely on and generate text and talk, with innovative and experimental practices that “amplify other sensory, bodily and affective registers and extend the company and modality of what constitutes a research subject” (2006:606-607).

Whilst its focus is in part on the taking-place of everyday urban experiences, paying greater attention to the relations between bodies and objects (see Bennett, 2004, 2005, 2010; Whatmore, 2002), the methods developed through this research are also committed to understanding the governing and securing of particular contexts and sites. Studies of urban security have tended to involve the mapping of an emerging security apparatus in the city, presenting understandings of the geographies and geopolitics of urban security through talk of technologies, techniques, processes, architectures and disciplined territorialities. Whilst such work is necessary and the ‘view from on high’ (de Certeau, 1984) important, it is argued here that these debates have been rather circumscribed and must be

supplemented through considerations of the constitution and practices of security, of the variegated spatialities and of dispositifs of security, and how the materialities that make up these processes are encountered as they become part of lived urban life. As such, and following Rabinow and Rose, who draw on Foucault's methodological approach, this proposes a form of empiricism that is "attentive to peculiarities, to small differences, to the moments when shifts in truth, authority, spatiality or ethics make a difference for today as compared to yesterday, reveals configurations that do not conform to the images provided by our philosophers" (2006:205). The methodological practices here seek to address the rationalities of the specific forms of a security apparatus that is traced through the case study within this thesis, that of the emerging urban based counter-terrorist security in cities in the UK. This involves attending to and acknowledging the differences in how this apparatus of security emerges and is enacted as it is practiced in the context of the securing of urban space. In so doing it addresses the configurations of a heterogeneous ensemble, elements of the apparatus, as well as, and significantly, the relations between them.

Rather than abandoning the more familiar toolkit of methodological skills, the methodology developed here, following Latham, works through how more traditional research methodologies can be adapted and imbued "with a sense of the creative, the practical, and being with practice-ness", experimenting with traditional methods in ways that encourage research practices that "dance a little" (2003:2000). As such this work takes inspiration from and draws on works that have considered the embodied and performative nature of practice and lived experience which, as Latham comments, "allows the researcher to address some novel questions about the cultures of everyday urban experience that more conventional, presentationally-oriented, methods fail to address adequately" (2003:1994; see also Dewsbury, 2000, 2003; Nash, 2000). These methods develop styles of empirical practice which aim to interrogate dispositifs of security and the taking-place of security as it is enacted and becomes part of urban life so as to bear witness to and describe the everyday life of security and how the everyday is secured.

#### **4.2. Research locations**

This research focuses on the securing of open, urban public spaces and so called 'crowded places' for a number of different reasons. Firstly, appreciating that counter-terrorist security practices are spatially contingent, that security responses across the UK and indeed within named cities differ and that in spite of the apparent ubiquity of security,

interventions are not evenly distributed within cities, this thesis offers a case study of a specific form of counter-terrorism through the securing and governance of public ‘crowded places’ (Home Office, 2009a). In part this is a response to recent works that have previously addressed the securing of such sites and the prevalent critiques within both academic and non-academic debates which cite the negative effects of security practice on both cities and urban life to the extent that security has come to be narrated as an instrument of ‘urbicide’ (see Campbell et al., 2007; Graham, 2003). It also responds to recent UK Government policy that has sought to further secure such areas and the claims made to establish the rationales for the increased securitising of the spaces of urban life and everyday life itself. Secondly, and related, it is a response to understandings of the city as flows and circulations, aiming to examine the relationships between security and freedom. Third, this consideration of urban public spaces discusses the securing of and security’s relations to a milieu, understood following Foucault (2007) as both an environment (surroundings) and as the space of security. The aim here is to consider how security is planned and operationalised when there are other competing interests, practices and concerns, many of which often demand precedence over security. This aims to question both how security is brought into reconciliation with cities and the UK Government’s concern for ‘appropriateness’ and ‘proportionality’. Fourthly, the rationale of public space, considers spaces where security is heightened, but still embedded in the material fabric of the city and still embedded in the ordinary everyday life of the city. Fifth, and more practically, in order to undertake the methods detailed in the following section, a longer, more sustained period of involvement with spaces of security was required to carry out the research.

It is essential that the artificiality of the sites is acknowledged, this is an imposed demarcation – security is understood to be centrifugal and the spatialities security produces are complex. For the purposes of this research, the two sites are the Victoria Line of the London Underground (see Figure 4.1), and the Southbank and Bankside area along the southern bank of the River Thames between Westminster Bridge, including the ‘riverside area’ of the South Bank, and a portion of the ‘Bankside’ area up to the Millennium Bridge, including the Tate Modern Bankside area (see Figure 4.2)<sup>16</sup>. Preliminary research for this thesis, involving periods of intense observant participation was conducted over a one-month period at a number of different potential sites in London.

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<sup>16</sup> Pilot research was conducted during the summer of 2007 as part of an MA in Research Methods. The study that formed the basis of the MA dissertation was undertaken in order to develop a variety of experimental qualitative research methods that could be used to examine the everyday life of security. The research was conducted daily over a one month period in Parliament Square, London.




Figure 4.1 Schematic maps showing the Victoria Line of the London Underground. Adapted from *TfL* schematic map.




Figure 4.2 Schematic map showing the Southbank and Bankside research areas. Adapted from *Film London* schematic map.

The Victoria Line of the London Underground and the Southbank and Bankside area of the Southbank were selected as they raise the issue of the relationship between freedom and circulation, and freedom and security, increasingly central to the UK Government's approach to securing the spaces of urban life. The Victoria Line and the South Bank sites allow this thesis to examine how new ways of securing public space function when the aim is to foster circulations and freedom. As such, it can then attend to questions of 'proportionality' and the emergent concern with sensitive and site specific security practices which are 'appropriate' to the conditions of particular urban areas. The Victoria Line and the South Bank sites were taken as the areas of study precisely on the basis of them being open sites of circulation, but managed circulations, composed of different forms and styles of movements which are secured through different practices of security involving a range of different spatialities. The two sites both raise interesting questions of how the life to be secured is both the life that harbours the danger and harbours the freedom.

The Victoria line is a deep-level London Underground line that links Walthamstow, in north east London, with Brixton in south London, covering 21 km (13.25 miles), serving sixteen stations (see Figure 4.1). It is the only line on the London Underground, except for Waterloo and City, that is entirely below ground: the only above ground section is from Seven Sisters to the Northumberland Park depot. The line opened between 1968 and 1971 equipped with an Automatic Train Operation system: the train operator closes the train doors and presses the start buttons, if the track is clear the train runs automatically to the next station, responding to coded impulses transmitted through the track (TfL, 2011). There are forty-three trains, of which thirty-seven of eight carriages are required to run in each direction, every two minutes, for scheduled peak period service. The original fleet, known as 1967 tube stock, was designed for the opening of the line, these were refurbished between 1991 and 1995. A new fleet, part of a £90m upgrade of the Victoria Line, began operating from July 2009 (see TfL, 2009). Trains travel at speeds of up to 50 mph, carrying an estimated 630,000 passengers a day, and 183 million passengers each year (footfall differs markedly station to station), making the Victoria Line the fourth most heavily used line on the Underground network in absolute figures, in terms of the average number of journeys per mile it is considered the most intensely used (see Metazone, 2011; TfL, 2011).

No two stations on the Victoria Line are alike. The majority of stations are interchanges for other London Underground and overland lines (see Figure 4.1), Pimlico is the exception where there is no form of interchange. At each of the sixteen stations there are different numbers of booking halls, ticketing counters, self-service machines, cash points, stairways, escalators, lifts, concourses, lights, dot-matrix, CCTV cameras, London

Underground staff, etcetera. The proximate environment, the area around the entrance | exit points, are considered part of a station. The walls of the booking halls, concourses and platforms are adorned with an assortment of posters and advertisements as well as London Underground maps, TfL information notices and policing statements. In addition, there are signs on the walls indicating the presence of CCTV, cameras of various shapes and sizes are positioned throughout stations. Regular announcements acknowledge the presence of CCTV, as well as issuing security warnings and providing service updates – these do not have a set format and so differ in each of the sixteen stations. Signs featuring the name of a station run along the platform-side walls, along with arrows indicating the exit and routes to other London Underground lines. On the track-side wall, at regular intervals, the station name is featured within the London Underground symbol. Light blue colour codes the Victoria line, representing it on the Tube Map and features prominently in the platform and train design. All Victoria line platforms were originally tiled in blue and grey, each decorated with tiled motifs in seating recesses to give an individual character and help identify the station. Smooth paving covers the platforms with blister/tactile paving toward the edge, part of this is painted yellow to designate a safety line, a further white painted line highlights the very edge (see Metazone, 2011; TfL, 2011).

Travelling from one end of the Victoria Line to the other, an approximation of the journey time, not factoring in interchange times and times when the train is stopped:

*thirty-five minutes* <sup>\*TfL (2011)</sup> suggest an average journey time of thirty-two minutes.

Walthamstow Central	Start
Blackhorse Road	2 minutes
Tottenham Hale	4 minutes
Seven Sisters	7 minutes
Finsbury Park	11 minutes
Highbury and Islington	13 minutes
King's Cross St. Pancras	17 minutes
Euston	19 minutes
Warren Street	20 minutes
Oxford Circus	22 minutes
Green Park	24 minutes
Victoria	26 minutes
Pimlico	29 minutes
Vauxhall	30 minutes
Stockwell	33 minutes
Brixton	35 minutes

(Observant participation, Victoria Line, 24.11.08)

The Southbank research site runs along the riverside footpath, Queens Walk, from Westminster Bridge, including the 'riverside area' of the South Bank, and a portion of the 'Bankside' area immediately adjacent to the River Thames, up to the London Millennium



Footbridge, including the Tate Modern Bankside area (see Figure 4.2) (see Farrell, 2009; SOUTHBANKLONDON, 2011, SBEG, 2011). The site forms a long section of ongoing riverside development that is within the London borough of Lambeth and partly in the London borough Southwark, however, many parts of the Southbank are divided up by the private organisations and agencies that own and manage the land. Within the site, a series of central London bridges connect the southern bank to the northern bank of the River Thames, which is used as a means of transport, with piers situated at the London Eye, Royal Festival Hall and Bankside. This research site is an eclectic area that includes residential locations, commercial office buildings, businesses, art, media and entertainment organisations, tourist attractions and two open green spaces, Jubilee Gardens and Bernie Spain Gardens. One of the most prominent sites in the area is the Southbank Centre, comprising the Royal Festival Hall, the Queen Elizabeth Hall and the Hayward Gallery. Part of the South Bank Centre, an architectural 'dead spot' known as the under-croft, is used by skateboarders and bikers, the under-croft is a designated graffiti space. The Royal National Theatre and the BFI Southbank are located adjacent to the Southbank Centre, but are not a part of it. Near the southern end of the London Millennium Footbridge, the Tate Modern is housed in the former Bankside Power Station. Close to Westminster bridge, County Hall is no longer used by the London County Council and has been converted for use as a hotel, also housing the London Sea Life Aquarium, the London Film Museum, the London Eye offices and a series of eateries. Additional businesses are located along the walkway, as are a number of shops, for example the boutiques situated in the OXO Tower and those in Gabriel's Wharf. In addition, there are numerous cafés, bars and restaurants as well as further tourist attractions, the most prominent of which is the London Eye. Along sections of the tree lined footpath, most notably the stretch of Queens Walk adjacent to Jubilee Gardens, there are normally a miscellany of street performers. Situated beneath Waterloo Bridge on the riverside walk by BFI Southbank is the South Bank centre book market, an established open air second hand, antique and vintage book market. There are a number of annual and other more infrequent events, performances and exhibitions hosted across the site.

The Victoria Line and the South Bank sites provide a case study of a particular security apparatus and provide a distinct and in many ways a deliberately artificial spatial formation, a milieu. The milieu, as Foucault (2007) explains, is understood as both a distinct environment and as the space of security. As with Perce's texts, this case study, the reflections of participant's through their involvement and my own observant participation are accounts of everyday life and lived experiences which are themselves exceptional: "the

residue of a singular expérience” (Sheringham, 2006:265). The case, as it enables thinking and presenting the singularity of dispositifs of security and of everyday life, is an appropriate means of thinking the constellations of different things which come together in any dispositif in and through the taking-place of everyday experience. As Flyvbjerg writes, the case study is not always appropriate or relevant as a research method, it “should always depend on the problem under study and its circumstances” (2001:75). The recent double issue of *Critical Inquiry* (2007), ‘Making the case’, investigates the epistemology of the case study. In volume one, authors consider how cases work within a variety of disciplines with a legacy of utilising ‘the case’. Through examples of ‘metacases’ authors discuss how certain norms of making a case came to be in a given domain of expertise. The second volume, ‘Missing persons’, considers how through case studies certain cases of ‘singled out personhood’ are made, focusing on “on what happens when the substance of caseness is provided by the ‘person’ - an idea of a person, a kind of person, a norm of personhood” (Berlant, 2007b:2).

The method assemblage and the case approach animate judgment, which “unavoidably produces not only truths and non-truths, realities and non-realities, presences and absences, but also arrangements with political implications. It crafts arrangements and gatherings of things – and accounts of the arrangements of those things – that could have been otherwise” (Law, 2004:143). The case acknowledges the processes of ‘crafting’ and ‘bundling’, proposed in the notion of method assemblage. These ‘cases’ are not intended to be representative, they present a ‘problem-event’ that animates a set of judgements and are examples and not exemplars, shaped by the practice or expression of a particular method assemblage. Nor should they be read as completed and closed accounts – these cases are events which are hoped, following Berlant, to do more: “it disturbs, creates a louder noise that opens up a field of debate about expertise, modes of description, narration, evaluation, argument, and judgment” (2007a:671). Whilst the thesis emphasises the singularity of the case, it remains committed to offering critical accounts that highlight relations to the wider context of urban security and the securing of the everyday life of the city.

#### **4.3. Methodological strategy**

The research involved a series of qualitative research methods which experiment with and develop more traditional methods. These methods are practiced and work together in ways that inform each other in order to intervene in and engage with the dispositifs and processes of securing, and to consider how security is enacted and experienced through the messiness of everyday practices. The following sets of methods together form the

method assemblage which intends to “wrap the representational, haptic, emotional and discursive around each other” (Crang, 2005:231). Following Dewsbury, (2009) this is about questioning how we configure the world, and in particular, how our methodological choices have implications for the management of meaning that we are making.

This responds to the call to be more sensitive than we have been to the partial-ness and moment-ness of the accounts we present (Latham, 2004). As Law states, method assemblages “detect, resonate with, and amplify particular patterns of relations in the excessive and overwhelming fluxes of the real” (2004:14). A method assemblage includes “not only what is present in the form of texts and their production, but also their hinterlands and hidden supports” (Law, 2004:144), whilst some elements are foregrounded and present within this chapter and this thesis, other “relations, processes and contexts that are necessary to presence” (Law, 2004:54) are necessarily excluded. Method assemblages are generative and performative practices, which take place in and through a number of interconnected empirical encounters, these not only offer different *perspectives*, but also produce different and particular *realities*.

#### **4.3.1. Dispositifs of security**

The first set of methods engage most explicitly with the processes of securitising the city, as well as the urbanisation of security. In so doing these methods are tailored to address the rationalities for the specific counter-terrorist security apparatuses that now operates within cities in the UK, London as a named example and within the two research sites. As well as investigating the presence of security and surveillance interventions within cities and the two research sites, these methods also address the enactment of terrorism as a named threat. As such they move to question the ways in which the city and everyday urban life have become a ‘referent object’ of security.

##### **4.3.1.1. Discourse analysis**

The research involved discourse analysis of relevant security documents as well as the assertions and claims made regarding the existence of different enactments of threat and danger, as well as security responses, in publicly available security strategy documents. Discourse analysis was conducted of UK government policy documents along (e.g. Cabinet Office, 2008a, 2008b, 2009a, 2010; CPNI 2010a, 2010b, 2011; HM Government, 2006, 2009a, 2009b, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2010d, 2010e, 2010f, 2010g,

2010h, 2011a; Home Office, 2009a, 2009b) with policies specific to London (e.g. London Emergency Services Liaison Panel, 2007; London Resilience, 2011; Metropolitan Police, 2011) and other documentation specific to the two research sites (e.g. BTP, 2011a, 2011b; House of Commons, 2005, 2006; SBEG, 2011; TfL, 2010, 2011). In addition to public statements made by politicians and security professionals, and other relevant information from drawn from newspaper and website sources collected and analysed throughout the research, the areas focused on include: central government acts; government policy documents; documents produced by particular government related departments; security documents produced by the local authorities responsible for specific sites; security documents produced by private land owners; specific threat assessments. Acknowledging the complex and changing nature of security landscapes, these documents were collected and analysed throughout the duration of the research.

The analysis of these documents provided a means of establishing the relations between security processes, techniques and technologies, as well as the more instrumental and technical issues regarding distinct security practices operating within the research sites. Discourse analysis also focussed on examining the emergence of named threats and dangers, as well as specific practices intended to manage and secure named events. This is a focus on how defined threats and dangers are identified, comprehended, and described and how they perform specific imaginative geographies. This helps to identify how the city is understood as threatened, as well addressing the different enactments of threat and danger specific to the two research sites. Discourse analysis explores the rationale for embedding security techniques and technologies into the everyday life of cities, to follow Foucault, the establishment of a *dispositif* of security and how a milieu is then imagined, planned and ultimately practiced. Questions of scale are significant here and formed a focus within the discourse analysis itself. This is a move to consider how the different enactments of threat or danger are imagined and governed with respects to the UK context, an identified city, here London, to account for the ways in which general securitisation of urban public spaces are imagined and governed through the metaframing of urban space as a problem of governance. And also to particular sites or cases within the city, in order to establish and examine local governance and security architectures. Examining these security discourses offers insight into the types of everyday practices and experiences that are intended to be engineered, stimulated and avoided, and explanations of how such affective and emotive management and engineering is practiced through the instrumental design of space and security practices, architectures and technologies.

#### **4.3.1.2. Semi-structured and walking interviews**

The research also involved in-depth interviews with those identified as being involved in the practices and processes of securing the two research sites, as well as additional interviews with institutions who provided an insight into wider urban security practices and impacts (see Appendix A. for complete list). Identifying such actors utilised the information generated through the discourse analysis, this was limited to some extent by those who were contacted but opted not to be involved. After initial contact had been made, a detailed overview of the research was provided via email and assurances made regarding confidentiality and sensitivity given the nature of the research.

The interviews took two forms, semi-structured interviews and walking interviews. For each interview a set of specific questions were prepared and emailed to interviewees in advance. These questions were conditioned and informed by the document analysis and by the observant participation. Rather than allowing these to act as a strict order to dictate the interview, interviewees were able to focus on particular questions and themes for more extended discussion.

The interviews provided the opportunity to discuss and interrogate how discourses of security are practiced and the different security architectures and governance practices that operate within either of the two sites. These provide insight into how the threats performed through the documents are perceived and responded to by those groups responsible for implementing the strategies for securing specific sites. The interviews also helped to identify and to map the range of techniques that embed various security measures into the everyday life of cities, identifying and addressing site specific processes of security – the walking interviews were invaluable in this regard. As the Crime Prevention Design Advisor (CPDA) for Lambeth remarked, “it’s probably best and easiest if I show you some of the things that we do and then we can talk about them”. The interviews are also utilised in order to question how the everyday city (as a site of flows, encounters etcetera) is known and imagined by security professionals, urban design specialists as well as those directly responsible for the more day-to-day processes of securing, such as police officers and private security personnel. Additionally, the interviews addressed issues concerning the practice of security through techniques and processes which are required to reconcile security with other interests, some of which take precedence over security. This directly addresses issues of ‘appropriateness’ and ‘proportionality’ with respects to site specificity. Importantly the interviews also provided a space in which to discuss how everyday practices and experiences are or are not accounted for. This addressed how everyday encounters

and experience were accounted for in the processes of securing the two sites. As well as questioning expectations regarding how security interventions were or might be encountered, issues regarding attention, distraction and (in)visibility, it was also possible to discuss the types of affective and emotive reactions that are intended to be stimulated and avoided, questioning how such management and engineering is designed and practiced.

#### **4.3.2. Everyday life**

The research also involved carrying out periods of observant participation within the two research sites and a set of participatory methods. Participants were recruited who regularly used either of the two research sites, based on the snowballing approach whereby contacts were made with people known by colleagues, family members and friends. In total forty-seven participants were involved in this study – fifteen of whom frequent the South Bank and thirty-two who travel regularly on the Victoria Line (see Appendix B. for complete list). Given the aims and objectives of the research, it did not attempt to recruit a cross section of individuals. The thesis is interested with the presence and practice of a specific form of counter-terrorist security apparatus, and then the nature and conditions of the specific encounters between participants as they enact the form of counter-terrorist security that is present within either research site. Whilst acknowledging that an attention to, race, ethnicity, age and so on is important with respects to debates concerning counter-terrorist and other security practices, this thesis is an attempt to attend to moments when difference emerged as important or as problematic in and through an encounter, without prejudging what these differences may be.

Prior to committing to taking part, participants were provided with an overview of the research and assurances were made about confidentiality and anonymity, they were also told that they could withdraw from the research at any time. With regards the work carried out with participants, as Latham observes, “each of the different elements of the method is designed to lead us into the world of the [participant] in different and broadly complementary ways, while not claiming to fully capture or exhaust the meaning of that world” (2004:127). As such, the researcher “appears not as an individual creative scholar, a knowing subject who discovers, but more as a material body through whom a narrative structure unfolds” (Bruner, cited in Finlay, 2002:211).

Central to the participatory work and the periods of observant participation is a consideration of the method strategies that are understood, following Percec, grasp the everyday in its ceaseless *émergence* (emergence): “it’s not always clear where you are, nor

where you are going and, sometimes, not even when you are” (Battista et al., 2005:431). These methods were explicitly concerned with the presence of security within urban spaces and how a variety of interventions are encountered and enacted through the day-to-day use of the two research sites. Importantly these methods, like Perec’s (2008a) ‘practical exercises’, are self-conscious, artificial and experimental. The methods aim to cultivate encounters through obsessive forms of attention, immersion, processes of exploration and chance encounters, as well as through those more formal and stylistic events.

#### **4.3.2.1. Observant participation**

The use of observant participation follows from a recognition within this research, of the need for a move towards describing the practice of the world through an engagement with and a theorising of the enactment of the everyday that also attends to the circulations, flows and encounters within urban space and security. This method allows an interrogation of the researcher, of the researcher’s experience:

A way of marking out my space, a slightly oblique approach to my everyday activities ... an attempt to grasp something that belongs to my own experience, not at the level of its distant reflections, but at the core of its ongoing emergence (Perec, 1985:23, in Sheringham, 2006:263)

This, as Dewsbury rightly suggests, “comes with the side-effect of making us more vulnerable and self-reflexive” (2009:326). As Dewsbury explains, the idea is to get embroiled in the site and allow ourselves to be “infected by the effort, investment, and craze of the particular practice or experience being investigated” (2009:326). This is a practice of immersing ourselves in the space, to acknowledge its ongoing emergence, whilst gathering a “portfolio of ethnographic ‘exposures’” that can act as “lightening rods for thought” (Dewsbury, 2009:327). Dewsbury suggests that it is in those key ‘times out’ as we set upon “generating inventive ways of addressing and intervening in that which is happening, and has happened, as an academic, that such a method produces its data: a series of testimonies to practice” (2009:327). Following Thrift (2000a), this is of course the flipping over of ‘participant observation’ where the witness becomes involved in ‘observant participation’ in order to emphasise the serious empirical involvement involved in non-representational theory’s engagement with practices, embodiment and materiality: “You must be in it” (Thrift, 2000a:556).

Observant participation took place over a period of six months, visiting the sites daily, at different times of the day to account for differing practices, and changes in security processes. The observant participation began with work that reflected Perec's enumerative investigations identifying, inventorying, classifying, mapping and then describing security presences. Then a method of 'thick description' was used to document the practices of my encounters, as well as paying particular attention to the diversity of those practices through which other people engaged with security either passively or more actively, and their bodily comportments – practices of interacting and reacting, practices of attending and of being attentive (where possible distractions), descriptions of practices of looking, descriptions of practices of hearing, descriptions of the practices of security professionals, descriptions of how these processes of securing, are habitually (or otherwise) encountered by people using these spaces. The focus of this method is not therefore on specific bodies, instead it aims to describe bodily practices and experiences as people move through and interact with the materially present security processes within the research sites. This method also provides a means of focusing on encounters with security materialities, on how certain security practices and technologies become taken for granted. Following Perec's example, this method sought to describe without, for the most part, analysis.

Through periods of observant participation a similar approach was adopted to that developed by Stewart (2007), the action of "listening-in, of observing, of passing-by, and taking-part" inquisitive practices which are "aphoristic, descriptive, and evocative" (Highmore2010:6, 5). Inspired also by Perec (1985, 2008a, 2010), these were more artistic, playful and experimental encounters which involved modes of witnessing, interrogation, inventorying, and describing. Some were attempts to describe the 'rest instead', emphasising the infra-ordinary background, of practices and encounters that would normally go without saying. At other times these were more directed, involving focusing on particular facets of security apparatus, particular practices and encounters capturing these in as much detail as possible; standing and sitting for a duration, or moving with purpose, to witness practice as the everyday unfolds. Experimental styles of writing were at times adopted and adapted, inspired by Perec these included lists, catalogues, diagrams and vignettes ranging in length from an isolated word or two, a few sentences to three or four pages. Interspersed with rudimentary sketched schematic maps and diagrams of security practices and locations. Notes were composed in two separate notebooks and at times on a mobile phone, later transcribed in full. These were supplemented with photographs, newspaper cuttings and other information prudent to the task. Learning from Perec, and in keeping with practices of ethnography more generally, it was important to reflect on the practices of



observation; the diaries became a record of the research as well as an experiment in witnessing, observing and describing the everyday life of security in these two sites.

#### **4.3.2.2. Participatory diaries**

Each participant was invited to produce a diary, detailing their daily experiences of security over the course of two consecutive weeks (more if they chose). Twenty-three participants provided diaries (see Appendix B. for complete list), others gave assurances that they had completed a diary but they did not make these available and due to time constraints I proceeded with these interviews. As with Latham's (2003, 2004; see also Meth, 2003; Zimmerman and Wieder, 1977) 'diary-interview' methods, the aim of the diaries, which are then discussed in an interview, is to provide detailed account of the writers daily routines, practices and experiences in public, here with a specific focus on security. As Latham notes, what is important is that it is not the role of the researcher to corroborate reflection, as if the diary were an unproblematic representation, but to "create a framework in which my research subjects could indeed meditate on - or at least be more actively aware of - the routine and ordinary events of their day" (2003:2002).

Participants were provided with a series of questions or guidelines that were intended to act as a starting point. These prompts, following Battista et al. are understood as "activating a certain way of looking", this involves "asking the participants to pursue object(s) or information through clues ... a tactic for mobilizing them, pushing them into unfamiliar terrain or terrain that becomes unfamiliar through searching" (2005:448; see also Bassett, 2004; Fenton, 2005; Pile, 2005; Pinder, 2005). The participant's varied in how they approached their diaries, some stated that they had set themselves questions or had developed tasks and games through which to focus and then compose their descriptions and reflections. Some made daily entries, others less frequently, one participant admitted to scribbling notes on "receipts and tickets, whatever I had" and then posing a more thorough and thought through series of accounts which were emailed to me. Through the process of undertaking the diary, participants were asked to observe security and their encounters and reflect on these. Firstly participants were asked to locate and describe the various forms of security present within the research site they move through. Participants were then asked to provide detailed descriptions of their everyday practices and enactments as they encountered security presences through their day-to-day activities. Diarists were asked to describe such encounters, their thoughts, feelings and how these encounters were experienced, also to reflect on how their attentions were enrolled. As such the diary-method

is explicitly performative as it encourages participants to consider security in ways that they would perhaps not normally. It is also a method that is deliberately designed to encourage the breaking of habits and asked participants to try where possible to reflect on what happens when their habituated practices and ways of not noticing are broken, in those moments, and how this changes the dynamics of how they engaged with a space and with security. As Latham observes, the reframing of the research process as a performance allows for a “more experimental and flexible attitude towards both the production and interpretation of research evidence”, providing a means of engaging “with how individuals and groups inhabit their worlds through practical action” (2003:1993).

The participatory diary method aimed to provide the research with a focus on the movements and experiences of participants in and through the two research sites. The diary offered a technique which was designed to allow participants a means of presenting their daily encounters with security interventions and to describe how the various security measures are enacted and experienced as background and more intensified presences. The diary intended to slow people down and was designed to provide a space of reflection where participants could describe everyday practices, embodied perceptions and experiences of place and security. At the same time the method was intended to question styles of attention and the formation and the disruption of awareness. The aim of the composition of the diaries by participants is to attempt to encourage reflection on their everyday practices and undo the ways that security becomes taken for granted, acknowledging that the efficacy of many, but not all, processes of securing is dependent on either the secrecy of techniques or the invisibility of materialities. Encounters with forms of embedded security are often performances of absence whereby security processes, securitisation spaces have already happened, already becoming part of bodies. The infra-ordinariness is built through everyday encounters, practices and relations, until an event, incident or happening redresses the relationship. The diary artificially manufactures engagement and events, inviting, encouraging and making available forms of attention and ways of orientating ourselves, that actually produce the conditions necessary for engaging with security. This of course foregrounds the security measure, and importantly the experience, rather than being a background experience, the experience itself is considered.

#### **4.3.2.3. Semi-structured interviews**

Semi-structured interviews were conducted with each of the forty-seven participants. The interviews took place away from the research site and were arranged at the

convenience of the participants. It was hoped that interviews would proceed soon after receiving diaries, or notification from participants that they had undertaken their own observant participation, in some cases this was not possible and as a result some of the interviews took weeks and months to arrange. If participants had completed and provided me with diaries, these were annotated and questions were then developed from their reflections and then used at different points through an interview as prompts. This allowed the interviews to be, in part, organised around the participants own narratives about their experiences of security. As Latham writes, this bricolage of text and talk “opens up a wide range of possibilities for narrative people’s movements through time-space and something of the sensation, style and productiveness of that movement” (2004:126).

Following Rapley, the methodological rationale of using semi-structured interviews is that they allow “rich, deep and textured pictures ... through the ‘simple’ method of producing topic-initiating and follow-up questions” (2001:315). These interviews are understood to be collaborative and, following Latham (2003), a kind of performance between interviewees and interviewer, which are co-fabricated and where “interview participants do not entirely know what they are doing and neither do interviewers” (Sinding and Aronson, 2003:111). An interview does not lead to a “single unified truth”, it is a presentation, “an account in the making” (Latham, 2003:2005). In this context, semi-structured interviews offer a space for further reflection on everyday experiences and on the presence of security as both a part of the infra-ordinary background and through encounters as a range of more intense presences.

The semi-structured interviews were based around a series of questions that were intended to discuss the presence, or indeed absence, of security and then more explicitly on participant’s experiences of the various security interventions. Whilst the interview utilised information generated through the diary method, discussion revolved around a series of prepared questions, which were organised thematically and uniform for each participant. As Dewsbury acknowledges, a set of well conceived research questions can be “effective at capturing the tension of the performing body, as witnessed by the body of the interviewee” (2009:325). Each of the questions was intended to elicit how security interventions were encountered and enacted in order to provide descriptions of how the mechanisms that are present within the two sites and experienced as both a background as a more intensified presence. The interview is seen as providing a structured context in which to discuss and revisit events described within a diary as well as other emergent themes, in the context of the interview these can be discussed in more detail. Through the interviews the interviewees were allowed to dictate the length of their responses, and to reiterate Law’s

point, this includes gatherings that are manifestly “allegorical, ambiguous, indefinite, unclear or tacit” (2004:145). Each interview was recorded, using a digital voice recorder, permission to record was always requested beforehand and participants were free to ask for this to be switched off at any time. The interviews were transcribed in full at the earliest possible convenience.

#### **4.3.2.4. Go-alongs**

The go-along method worked in a similar way to the diaries, following a similar rationale, but provided the opportunity to prompt as a participant passed through a site. This method involves the researcher accompanying a participant and “actively explore their subjects’ stream of experiences and social environment” (Kusenbach, 2003:463). This approach potentially allows for a more active engagement with the site, and one encouraging the participant to reflect as they go, on practices, emphasising chance encounters and events as they happen, getting at that moment when a form of security is encountered and what this means, does, or perhaps where security is passed by, encountered and enacted as part of the background through distraction. It is important to try and get at the moment of engaging, how dramatic or ordinary that is, how intense it is, which is something that the diaries and the interviews can only partially explore. With the go-along the moment is there, it happens and is experienced and can then be reflected on, and the relative conditions of that. It had been hoped that a greater number of participants could be encouraged to take part in a go-along, however due to reluctance, timings and a variety of other issues only four were agreed. Rather than forcing the issue, and at the risk of losing or discouraging participants, four go-alongs took place with those who expressed an interest in doing so. These were conducted at the convenience of the participants and were followed directly by the semi-structured interview. The go-alongs and the interview were recorded using a digital recording device and brief notes were made which, along with the diaries, were used during follow up interviews – each of which took place immediately after the go-along.

This method provides a means of intervening in and describing what is directly felt and experienced both by participants and myself, as the knowledge, the experience of the space and of security is produced in a “collage of collaboration: an unstructured dialogue where all actors participate in a conversational, geographical and informational pathway creation” (Anderson, J. 2004:260). As Kusenbach suggests, the go-along permits the researcher to “take a more active stance towards capturing their informants actions and

interpretations” (2003:463), practices and encounters are witnessed and described as they take-place. The go-alongs also provided a context in which to discuss and revisit events described in the diaries, discussing the presence, or not, of security measures as well as encounters with the materially present techniques of securing. Anderson suggests that the go-along, or what he describes as ‘talking whilst walking’ can be utilised in order to “harness place as an active trigger to prompt knowledge recollection and production” (2004:254). As with the diaries, this method encourages disruptions, and considers attentions and the ways in which security is encountered and enacted. The aim is to focus on practices as they happen, the ways of engaging and encounters with the space, with a specific focus on their own encounters with the techniques and technologies of security, these were used as prompts for conversation. There are problems with the diary and the interview with getting at the immediacy, the taking-place of practices, at that moment, how something, an encounter is happening, and what is involved in that, the go-along provides a means of trying to address these issues.

## **Conclusion**

To write: to try meticulously to retain something, to cause something to survive; to wrest a few precise scraps from the void as it grows, to leave somewhere a furrow, a trace, a mark or a few signs (Perec, 2008a:91-92)

As Dewsbury (2009) acknowledges, as academics we mediate most things in text, and so is the case here. These modes of presenting are made in mediation and are, as Law reminds us, “condensed at best with difficulty into textual or pictorial form” (2004:147). As with Perec’s experimental writings, and the texts of non-representational geographies (see Anderson and Harrison, 2010a), this acknowledges that when apprehending, interpreting and presenting empirical material, “we need to be more sensitive to the partial-ness and moment-ness of accounts offered”, our methodological interventions do not provide “a definitive account of an event, place or individual” (Latham, 2003:2005). The point is now, as Dewsbury observes, to engage in the research and move towards creating “presentations of the experience that we encounter and create” (2009:328), before the rush and compulsion to explanation. Perec’s work is invaluable as an example of the patience, skilfulness and the struggle of description as well as for the author’s recognition that his texts document witnessing and the task of description as a “process rather than a static ‘snapshot’ of objects in space” (James, 2009:207). This is attuned with the involvement in

the processuality of the urban and the excess of the everyday for as Highmore writes, the everyday is “a field of experience constantly in flux” (2010:1). These are not abstract discussions, borrowing from Highmore, they provide understandings of practical action, “the material actuality of everyday life as it is lived out” (2010:17), practices in the making.

How then to respond, to write, a furrow, a trace, a mark or a few signs? This is to accept that whilst it is true that “experience doesn’t need to be coded to be appreciated and understood, it needs to be presented and treated as being just what it is” (Dewsbury, 2009:325), these re-presented events will importantly “sound differently” in the presentations than in the “experiencing of them” (Phelan, 1997:12):

Representations do not have a message; rather they are transformers, not causes or outcomes of action but actions themselves. Not examples but exemplary. In this sense representation is perhaps most usefully thought of as incessant presentation, continually assembling and disassembling, timing and spacing; worlding (Dewsbury et. al, 2002:438)

At the same time, as Law notes, many realities craft themselves into “materials other than – or as well as – the linguistic” (2004:147). He suggests that at times some other approach a more allegorical mode might be better, re-presented through “Some other kind of gathering. One that stutters and stops, that is more generous, that is quieter and less verbal” (Law, 2004:147). Perec’s approaches acknowledge and embrace the fact that they are incomplete, the ‘void’ becomes an important theme and stylistic device throughout Perec’s oeuvre. The world does not add up. As Dewsbury explains, “it is not a transparent representation that we are after, nor is it about the representation being a true reflection of the empirical experience or event being investigated” (2009:332), it is a modest attempt at articulation, to present just some of this complexity. The question becomes, following Law (2004:110) how best to bundle this together and create a story?

The following three empirical chapters present a story of how security moves from being a set of mechanisms to something lived, and how everyday life shifts from being an object of security to that within which security lives. In Chapter 5 I examine how cities and everyday urban life become the referent object of security and in particular counter-terrorist security. This chapter begins to extend the analysis of urban security to develop an account that is more concerned with the relations between security and everyday urban life. Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 then describe and bear witness to security as it is lived, in order to further develop understandings of the urban geographies of security.

## 5. The Everyday City as a Referent Object of Security

### Introduction

This chapter situates specific forms of counter-terrorist security practices and a distinct apparatus of security in the context of the securing public spaces and ‘crowded places’ within cities in the UK in response to the threats of terrorism (see Cabinet Office, 2008, 2009a; HM Government, 2006, 2009a, 2009b, 2010a, 2010b, 2011a; Home Office, 2009a)<sup>17</sup>. This chapter will discuss how a form of counter-terrorist security apparatus is emerging in the UK that is increasingly guided by rationalities that aim to ensure ‘proportionate’ protection whilst at the same time being ‘appropriate’ to urban spaces in the context of biopolitical aims: enabling, promoting and regulating circulations and protecting different but coexisting problematisations of life.

It is contended here that debates concerning this shift in processes of counter-terror security within the UK have so far been rather circumscribed, as such through this chapter I discuss the complex urban geographies of security that are emerging and in particular the rationalities that have given rise to a particular form of counter-terrorist security in the UK and its translation into practice within urban spaces. This is a form of security apparatus which is designed and embedded into the infra-ordinary spaces and happenings of everyday life, where the processes of security and the interventions through which they are enacted are primed to occur in the event of an event. The interventions of this apparatus involve geographies of absence and presence, organised in certain and very specific ways through the ordering processes of what is referred to here as ‘invisible security’ (see Briggs, 2005). Anticipating Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, where I discuss the conditions of everyday encounters in greater depth, it is essential that this chapter provide an account of the rationales for this specific form of security apparatus as well as the interventions that populate the two research sites where the aim is to ‘govern terror’ (Dillon, 2007). This chapter provides an examination of an urban security project that aims to “achieve more

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<sup>17</sup> Whilst the focus of this chapter rests with counter-terrorist security, I acknowledge that security inevitably, and importantly in the context of securing the everyday city, overlaps, interacts, communicates, and so on, where practices to secure a specific named threat may in fact secure against different threats. In this way, whilst the thesis is concerned with the threat of terrorism and counter-terrorist security practices, it understands there to be degrees of relational resonance between various forms of security and different enactments of threat. Rather than there being distinct forms of counter-terrorist security, often these become more complicated, blending and multiplying relations.

secure cities ... in a more livable fashion” (Dudley, 2007: no pagination) and asks how such a project is enacted where the aims of security are biopolitical. It does so via an account of the turn to site specificity and a consideration of the different ways that security becomes present within the spaces of urban life.

The chapter begins by introducing the NSS of the UK (Cabinet Office, 2008, 2009a), the UK’s strategy for countering international terrorism, known as CONTEST (HM Government, 2006, 2009b, 2011) and related documents, informed by a series of interviews. Here I examine counter-terrorist security strategies within cities in the UK, with reference to London as a named example. I am less concerned with the UK’s security policy as a whole, and more interested with the ways it finds expression in securing cities and given an increasing focus on site specificity, particular named urban spaces. This section will consider the ‘event of terror’ as a specific enactment of threat which poses the problem of the aleatory, where a future becomes the cause for action in the present. It also explores how forms of life are constituted in biopolitical security practices, as well as how security interacts with forms of urbanism through the planning and staging of milieus, thinking cities as means of movement and circulations. The second and third sections of this chapter then move to explore how counter-terrorist security practices have been translated into action, and the material implications in the context of the two research sites, the Victoria Line of the London Underground and the South Bank and Bank Side area of the South Bank. The second section demonstrates the application of CONTEST strategies in urban spaces. This examines questions of how counter-terrorism might be ‘appropriately’ and ‘proportionately’ incorporated in the spaces of urban life, describing the role of context and site specificity. The third section is divided into two parts, focusing on the two research sites, to consider how, in relation to the particular problematics identified in the first two sections of this chapter, security becomes present within specific urban spaces.

### **5.1. CONTEST: Security in the United Kingdom and the urban problem**

In early 2003 the UK Government developed its first comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy. It was described as “an attempt to coordinate the pan-Governmental response to the emerging terrorist threat in the aftermath of the attacks on New York and Washington, DC, in September 2001” (House of Commons, 2009a:4). This strategy cited a nascent and emergent threat, whose methods and tactics are “novel, innovative and increasingly focused on mass casualty strikes” (Coaffee et al., 2008:104). It warned that events of terror are ‘inevitable’ and, in the words of the former UK prime minister Gordon Brown, could take



place “*anywhere* and from *any place*” (cited in Cleland, 2007: no pagination, my emphasis). As the UK government has noted, the “current international terrorist threat is quite different from the terrorist threats we faced in the past”, many “[c]ontemporary terrorist groups ... seek mass civilian casualties and are prepared to use unconventional techniques (including chemical or radiological weapons); they conduct attacks without warning” (HM Government, 2009a:11). As a response to this, the city and the spaces of urban life have been redefined, drawn into discourses of threat and counter threat in a situation where the everyday city, the spaces of civil life and urban life itself are increasingly becoming a ‘referent object’ of security (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2008):

The threat level to the UK is currently assessed as ‘Severe’. This means that a terrorist attack is highly likely and could take place without warning. Crowded places remain the preferred target for international terrorists and the most likely target for an attack is a crowded place which is easily accessible, regularly available and offers the prospect for an impact beyond loss of life (HM Government, 2010f: no pagination)

The threat posed by terrorism to the spaces of urban life has established significant new challenges for how we understand security and the very means by which it can be provided (Dillon, 2005b). Since 2003 the UK Government has begun to implement its long-term strategy for countering international terrorism, known as CONTEST (HM Government, 2006; 2009a; 2011a). In March 2008, the Government published the UK’s inaugural National Security Strategy (NSS) (Cabinet Office, 2008a; updated 2009a; HM Government 2010a), to set out how it would:

address and manage [the] diverse though interconnected set of security challenges and underlying drivers, both immediately and in the longer term, to safeguard the nation, its citizens, *our prosperity* and *our way of life* (Cabinet Office, 2008a:3, my emphasis)

The fundamental objective of national security as stated in the NSS is “Protecting our people’s freedoms” (Cabinet Office, 2009:27). This is retained in the most recent edition of the NSS, entitled *A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty* (HM Government, 2010a), where the new coalition Government state, “Our security, prosperity and freedom are interconnected and mutually supportive. They constitute our national interest” (HM Government, 2010a:22).

National security had been reconfigured and broadened to include a set of new security challenges, including “threats to *individual citizens* and to *our way of life*, as well as to the interests and integrity of the state” (Cabinet Office, 2008:3-4, my emphasis). In light of the publication of the inaugural NSS, the UK Government announced its intention to ‘refresh’ CONTEST to reflect the changing security situation at home and abroad:

The terrorist threat and the risks we face are always changing. We have updated our strategy to take account of this changing threat, the lessons we have learned and the new challenges which we face” (HM Government, 2009b:4)<sup>18</sup>

In March 2009, an updated version of the Government’s counter-terrorism strategy was published, “based on principles that reflect our core values, the lessons we and others have drawn from experiences of terrorism to date, and the broader security principles set out in the National Security Strategy” (HM Government, 2009a:10-11). The revised and updated CONTEST II, *Pursue Prevent Protect Prepare: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism* (HM Government, 2009a), aimed to build on the existing policy “to reduce the risk to the UK and to its interests overseas from international terrorism, so that people can go about their lives *freely* and with *confidence*” (HM Government, 2009a:6, my emphasis). The latest iteration of CONTEST is focused around four ‘strands’, the four ‘Ps’:

- Pursue: to stop terrorist attacks;
- Prevent: to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting violent extremism;
- Protect: to strengthen our protection against terrorist attacks;
- Prepare: where an attack cannot be stopped, to mitigate its impact (HM Government, 2009a:10-15; 51-125)

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<sup>18</sup> The last decade has seen comprehensive changes to the way that the UK Government approaches counter-terrorism. Including, but not limited to the reorganisation of the Home Office since 2007 to focus on policing, security, and counter-terrorism. In March 2007, various elements of the Government’s counter-terrorism apparatus were consolidated in the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OCST) (House of Commons, 2009a:5-11). OCST is responsible for: exercising the UK’s response to a terrorist incident; developing legislation on terrorism here and overseas; providing security measures and protection packages for public figures; ensuring that the UK’s critical national infrastructure is protected from attack (including electronic attack); ensuring the UK is prepared to deal with a chemical, biological, or nuclear release; and liaising with government and emergency services during terrorist incidents or counter-terrorism operations. Ministerial oversight of CONTEST rests with the Home Secretary and the National Security and International Relations and Development Committee. Official oversight of delivery rests with the CONTEST board chaired by the Director-General of the OCST which supports the Home Secretary and other Ministers in developing, directing, implementing and evaluating counter-terrorist strategy across Government; delivering aspects of the counter-terrorism strategy directly; and facilitating oversight of Security Service and police counter-terrorist operations (Home Office, 2009a; HM Government, 2009a:59-60; House of Commons, 2009a:EV63-67). Responsibilities in CONTEST are summarised at ‘Annex A. Departmental Roles and Responsibilities in CONTEST’ (HM Government, 2011a).

Each of these strands has a series of related objectives and supporting programmes reflecting the aims and principles of the UK's strategy for countering terrorism. Through their interlinking, CONTEST is intended to provide a comprehensive strategy for countering-terrorism, where "work on Pursue and Prevent reduces the threat from terrorism; work on *Protect* and *Prepare* reduces the UK's vulnerability to attack" (HM Government, 2009a:11, original emphasis). What distinguishes the new security problematic is the foregrounding of the preoccupation with global and local circulation and the protection of the 'freedoms' of liberal-democratic life. Freedom is a fundamental objective to the Government's broadened national security, for national security this includes "protecting people's freedoms" and "vital elements of our way of life" (Cabinet Office, 2009a:27). Freedom is also central to Government's "wider vision" which aims for the protection of the "liberal, market-oriented vision of a free society championed by the UK and our key allies" (Cabinet Office, 2009a:5):

to create a strong, fair, prosperous and secure society, in which everyone has the opportunity to live their lives and make the most of their abilities, with fair chances for all, and governed by fair rules (Cabinet Office, 2009a:27)

In the UK, as elsewhere, a new security problematic is emerging concerned with enabling and governing unfolding circulations. As Anderson states, security functions to "*enable* the circulations that define the personal and commercial 'freedoms' of liberal-democratic life" (2011:7, original emphasis). In this context, as Dillon contends, circulation "means every conceivable kind of circulation or flow of peoples and things", for "in a systemically interdependent world everything is connected or, in principle, is able to be connected, to everything else" (2005b:2). The key issue has become how to differentiate between good and bad circulation, for "[n]o system of circulation is free of the possibility of being employed for means other than those for which it may have been initially or primarily intended" (Dillon, 2005c: no pagination).

Increasingly the threat posed by the 'event of terror' is characterised as dynamic, low probability/non-probabilistic, high consequence and 'inevitable'. Notwithstanding the differences in the contested concept of 'the event', as Anderson notes, "the relation between security and 'the event' has for the main been posed in a particular way; the assumption is that to think 'the event' is to think an open future that cannot be secured" (2010a:228). In this context, security discourses in UK counter-terror policy emphasise uncertainty (the

aleatory), resilience and an ability to adapt to an ever changing security environment<sup>19</sup>. The aim of security is increasingly that of protection and mitigation, capable of “ensuring a secure and resilient UK” (HM Government, 2010a:11) and “prepared to respond effectively to any attack and to mitigate its consequences” (HM Government, 2009a:56)<sup>20</sup>. The NSS demands work to improve resilience at national, regional and local level to ensure measures are in place “for a terrorist attack and able to mitigate its consequences and return to normal life as quickly as possible”, this aims “to absorb whatever harm does occur and then return to normality as soon as possible” (Cabinet Office, 2008a:26, 15). Little, citing the events of September 11<sup>th</sup> 2001, notes that a context has arisen for security where there are some scenarios for which “direct defence is neither practical nor realistic and that it is difficult, if not impossible, to prevent destructive acts by persons unconcerned with their own safety or survival” (2004:57).

Security, in the context of the UK Government’s response to counter-terrorism, has become a project that seeks to act on ‘the future’ in the present (see Anderson, 2007, 2010a, 2010b; Aradau, 2010b; Aradau and Van Munster, 2007, 2008; Lakoff, 2007, Massumi, 2005a, 2005b, 2007; Rice, 2010). What are required are anticipatory logics that allow security to open onto futures that are “not exactly controllable, not precisely measured or measurable” (Foucault, 2007:20). In the UK, anticipatory logics emphasise the reduction of vulnerabilities and the mitigation of threat, “to an acceptable and proportionate level” (HM Government, 2011a:82). Here a security apparatus and the deployment of the technologies of security take place within a context marked by the impossibility of eliminating insecurity altogether (see de Larrinaga and Doucet, 2010; de Goede and Randalls, 2009), due to the indeterminate and incalculable nature of the threat of terrorism and the ‘event of terror’, there can be no proportionate response. This is said to give rise to “a state of alertness, without foreseeable end” (Cooper, 2006:120). In this context, where security is required to open onto and act on futures, the ‘event of terror’ revolves around the problem of the aleatory (Foucault, 2007) and radical contingency (Dillon, 2008), “problematized as

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<sup>19</sup> Note the criticisms of The House of Commons Home Affairs Committee in their report on The Home Office’s Response to Terrorist Attacks. The committee are critical of the Home Office’s reluctance to change and to adapt to meet ever-changing threats, contra to the claims of the Government, the report condemns an unwillingness to be future orientated: “those involved in counter-terrorism may be willing to settle for existing sub-optimal solutions rather than proactively reforming to meet ever-changing threats ... While the structures that we now have in place may be suitable for combating the terrorist threat as currently constituted, but we are not confident that government institutions have the desire to constantly adapt to meet ever-changing threats” (House of Commons, 2010a:25; see also Edwards, 2007a, 2007b). This is refuted by the Government in their reply to the Sixth Report from the Home Affairs Committee Session: “We welcome the Committee’s conclusions that the structures now in place are suitable to address the current terrorist threat. However, we strongly dispute the suggestion that they are unable to adapt as that threat evolves in future” (House of Commons, 2010b:21).

<sup>20</sup> The passing of the Civil Contingencies Act in 2004 (Home Office, 2004b) was intended to “deliver a single framework for civil protection in the United Kingdom capable of meeting the challenges of the twenty first century” (Cabinet Office, 2006: no pagination).

unpredictable in occurrence, characteristics, and effects” (Anderson, 2010a:228). As a consequence, the future ‘event of terror’ will always exceed attempts to predict it.

The future problematised as uncertain or indeterminate has been met with attempts to render anticipatory action possible, with the aim of securing unknown and often the ultimately unknowable futures. These logics seek to convert future uncertainties into possibilities for action in the present, opening up futures in order to govern and secure on the basis of possible or potential futures that threaten some form of disruption to an existing social-spatial order. In the UK’s counter-terrorism strategy, threat is increasingly assessed and governed via calculations of risk. Indeed, since 2005, the Government has carried out a classified assessment of the risks facing the UK: this is the National Risk Assessment (NRA), and it is the basis for the public National Risk Register (NRR) (Chatham House, 2010). Aradau and Van Munster suggest that governing terrorism through risk “involves a permanent adjustment of traditional forms of risk management in light of the double infinity of catastrophic consequences and the incalculability of the risk of terrorism” (2007:90). Aradau and Van Munster argue that it is precautionary risk which has emerged in the governing of terrorism: “the precautionary principle does not target all risk situations but only those marked by two principal features: a context of scientific uncertainty on the one hand and the possibility of serious and irreversible damage on the other” (Ewald, 2002:283-284). As Ewald explains, precautionary logic “applies to what is *uncertain* – that is, to what one can apprehend without being able to assess” (2002:286, my emphasis). The ‘event of terror’, Dillon suggests, presents an ‘intended catastrophe’ which sees the return of Descartes’ ‘evil demon’, signalling the limits of calculable knowledge, wrecking “the best risk calculations of probability that promise us a way of governing security” and “in the face of whose machinations”, he concludes, “you have to imagine the very worst” (2005a:3). As the UK Government concedes:

Since September 2001 there has been a significant shift of Government resources into the business of gathering and analysing information on the threat and configuring departments and agencies in the most effective way to address it ... our understanding of the threat still remains inevitably imperfect (HM Government, 2006:16)

The question of calculability is not so straightforward, for whilst it is claimed that the threat of terrorism is low probability/non-probabilistic and at the edge of calculable knowledge, there remain intense efforts to assess and to render them calculable, to ‘expect

the unexpected' and to 'know the unknown', often the 'unknowable'. In 2008 the UK Government published its first NRR, setting out the Government's "assessment of the likelihood and potential impact of a range of different risks that may directly affect the United Kingdom, and the safety and well-being of its citizens" (Cabinet Office, 2008a:43). The 2010 update stated that the NRR and NRA are intended to:

[C]apture the range of emergencies that might have a major impact on all, or significant parts of, the UK ... events which could result in significant harm to human welfare: casualties, damage to property, essential services and disruption to everyday life (Cabinet Office, 2010:2-3)

Risks are assessed on the basis of probability and impact, via a three stage analytics: "identification of risks; assessment of the likelihood of the risks occurring and their impact if they do; and comparison of the risks" (Cabinet Office, 2008a:43). These are mapped onto a risk matrix, to provide a broad indication of the relative likelihood, and the relative impact, of each of the main groups of risks in the UK (risks will differ in likelihood and impact within the country). The stated aim is that of calculability, rendering the future actionable in the present: "Once their likelihood and impacts are assessed, the risks may then be prioritised, which enables the government to establish an effective response strategy" (Chatham House, 2010:4). These efforts to calculate threat are intended to then allow action via the enactment of prevention, protection and resilience strategies commensurate with the calculated risk and in accordance with the risk matrix:

Putting a lot of effort into preparing for risks that are either very unlikely to happen, or are likely to cause relatively minor damage, is unlikely to be the best use of the time available to prepare. Priority is instead given to high risks: risks that are both relatively likely and could have a serious impact (Cabinet Office, 2008b:44)

International terrorism has been identified as the principal immediate security threat facing the UK (HM Government, 2010a). Furthermore, the UK Government's risk assessment is stated as reflecting the "*types of terrorism attack we judge to be most likely in this country*" (HM Government, 2009a:14, my emphasis). The relative likelihood and relative impact of 'Malicious Attacks' (attacks on crowded places and attacks on transport),

are stated by the Government as high (Cabinet Office, 2010:26-35) (see Figure 5.1)<sup>21</sup>. The matrix suggests that impact in the case of the ‘Malicious Attacks’, is not assessed in terms of loss of life or injury (statistics on deaths and injury would place major transport accidents and attacks on critical infrastructure differently on such a matrix). Instead, impact is measured in terms of the biopolitical aims to protect confidence, freedom and the governing of circulations and interdependencies, in keeping with the stated aims of the NSS and CONTEST.




Figure 5.1 Illustration of the high consequence risks facing the United Kingdom (Cabinet Office, 2010:5).

The Government assesses the likelihood of terrorist and other malicious attacks more subjectively than other risks: “The willingness of individuals or groups to carry out attacks is balanced against an objective assessment of their capacity – now and, as far as possible, over the next five years – and the vulnerability of their intended targets” (Cabinet Office, 2010:54). Briggs (2005) suggests that the complexity posed by a threat such as terrorism,

<sup>21</sup> It is stated that impact is assessed by taking account of the following effects: the number of fatalities directly attributable to the emergency; human illness or injury over a period following the onset of an emergency; social disruption – the disruption to people’s daily lives (an inability to gain access to healthcare or schools to interruptions in supplies of essential services like electricity or water and to the need for evacuation of individuals from an area); economic damage – the effect on the economy overall, rather than the cost of repairs; and psychological impact emergencies may have, including widespread changes to patterns of behaviour or anxiety, loss of confidence or outrage as a result of an emergency (Cabinet Office, 2010:54-55).

and attempts to render anticipatory action possible, involve styles of foresight based on judgements rather than probabilistic measurements and prediction. The aim of judgement is to develop a better understanding of a future threat precisely at the edge of calculable knowledge in order to render it actionable. As Briggs contends, whilst these threats may be beyond measure, “information is a means to an end – better and more confident judgement” (Briggs, 2005:57; see also Adey and Anderson, 2011). It results in what Aradau and van Munster call “an insatiable quest for knowledge” in the form of, for example, “profiling populations, surveillance intelligence, knowledge about catastrophe management, prevention, etc” (2007:91). These judgements, as well as forms of calculative knowledge, are understood as attempts to ‘expect the unexpected’, as such they form a somewhat paradoxical relation to the future. The future is characterised by uncertainty, yet the desire is to negotiate, to govern and to secure in the face of perceived radical uncertainty, it is thus an indefinite future tense: “what may yet come” (Massumi, 2005b:4). Security maintains its efforts to render the unknown (often ultimately unknowable) future known and actionable with the ultimate aim of asserting control over the aleatory, and so to control and manage the future, ensuring that an event does not come to pass (Anderson, 2010a; Aradau, 2010b).

The threat posed by aleatory terrorism, and the problem of the aleatory ‘event of terror’ have become the UK Government’s stated priority. It has been assumed and indeed then asserted by the Government that preparing for the event of terror, imagined as the worst case scenario, is key to other forms of future disruption: “If your plan enables you to cope with a worst-case scenario, it will also help you deal more easily with lower impact incidents” (NaCTSO, 2003:11). In this way, it is understood that there will be degrees of relational resonance between various forms of security, preparedness planning and resilience. Rather than identifying and isolating particular and distinct forms of threat, they become more complicated, blending and multiplying relations. As is explained in the NSS:

[T]he overall objective of this National Security Strategy is to anticipate and address a diverse range of threats and risks to our security ... [These threats and risks] are real, and also more diverse, complex, and interdependent than in the past. The policy responses ... are, therefore, not only individually vital to our future security and prosperity, but also wide-ranging, complex, and, crucially, interdependent. They reflect an integrated approach to developing policy and building capability, intended to deliver results against a number of linked objectives (Cabinet Office, 2008a:55)



In this context, as Evans contends, “[r]easonable strategic commonality can be established” (2010: no pagination). As such, according to these rationalities of security and governance, it does not really matter whether one is confronting a terrorist attack, a natural disaster, or an accident, these events all hold the potential to unsettle normal circulations and freedoms of liberal-democratic life.

The Royal Institute of British Architects (RIBA) (2009) are dissatisfied with such an approach, reminding the Government that ‘proportionality’ to risk and therefore to threat can only be judged as that which is “appropriate when taken as a whole alongside other risks of a scheme that need to be met, such as flooding or fire ... other risks to their businesses, which may occur more frequently than a terrorist attack” (RIBA, 2009: no pagination). These concerns are echoed by the Royal Town Planning Institute (RTPI), who argue that the risk assessment process should “be broadened and layered to consider risks/vulnerabilities/key usage attributes which it is important to protect”, they maintain “the key is in proportionate balance between risks, vulnerability and usage attributes” (2009: no pagination). These are attempts to draw attention to those things that fall away when attention is focused on the threat of terrorism. Rather than the unknown unknown of terror, RIBA and the RTPI indicate the necessity of thinking about other events, higher frequency events such as fire or flood, as well as thinking more in terms of how the life of everyday urban spaces is lived.

Traditional counter-terrorist strategies were rethought in light of the newly emergent threat posed by new and unpredictable styles of attack that are “tactically aimed at soft targets such as hospitals, schools, shopping promenades, and more generally crowded places” (Home Office, 2009a:11). The landscapes of threat and counter-threat have changed, as a member of NaCTSO explained in an interview:

Well what we do know is that they’re interested in crowded places because they’re intent on mass casualty attacks ... there was a real paradigm shift in the way that we had to deal with these types of attacks post 9/11 and it was a real challenge about how do we protect now this wide range of potential targets.

Protective security in urban spaces has become an increasingly important part of CONTEST, delivered through the Protect and Prepare strands. The strategy is holistic, both in how it is conceived and implemented. Practically, the inseparability of the ‘Protect’ and ‘Prepare’ strands of CONTEST is understood to be “vital to ensuring a more integrated counter-terrorism strategy that encompasses both a range of ‘hard’ engineering and design solutions and ‘soft’ governance and management arrangements” (Coaffee: 2010:950).

CONTEST stresses the importance of enacting ‘holistic security’, acknowledging and responding to the interdependence of physical measures with other electronic and procedural security measures to ensure that overall security is enhanced rather than compromised. In 2007, Lord West, parliamentary under-secretary of state for security and counter-terrorism, was tasked with undertaking a review of how the government could best protect ‘soft targets’, “crowded places, transport infrastructure and critical national infrastructure from terrorist attack” (Smith, 2007)<sup>22</sup>. CONTEST II aims to secure and protect civil spaces figured as ‘vulnerable’, ‘preferred’, ‘likely’ and ‘high profile’ targets for terrorist attacks (HM Government, 2009a:16-17), including “*places where people live and work*” (HM Government, 2009a:56, my emphasis):

Crowded places will remain an attractive target for international terrorists, who have demonstrated that they are likely to target places which are easily accessible, regularly available and which offer the prospect for an impact beyond the loss of life alone (for example serious disruption, or a particular economic/political impact). While there have been attacks against well protected targets around the world, the trend is for terrorists to attack crowded public places, which represent targets with little or no protective security (Home Office, 2009c:3)

The review was completed in November 2007, and highlighted the need to protect and improve the resilience of “strategic national infrastructure (stations, ports and airports) and other *crowded places*” (Brown, 2007a, my emphasis)<sup>23</sup>. It is conceded that the working definition of ‘crowded places’ is widely drawn, however, these spaces are defined by the Home Office as a “location or environment to which members of the public have access that, on the basis of intelligence, credible threat or terrorist methodology, may be considered potentially liable to terrorist attack by virtue of their crowd density” (HM Government,

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<sup>22</sup> On 25<sup>th</sup> July 2007 then Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, asked Lord West (Home Office Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Security and Counter-Terrorism) to review how best to protect crowded places (and transport infrastructure and critical national infrastructure) from terrorist attack (Brown, 2007a; 2007b; Smith, 2007). The results of the review identified that new efforts to ‘design in’ counter-terrorism protective security were required. These included publishing, after further consultation, guidance on a new strategic national framework to encourage greater partnerships at the local level and doing more to protect buildings and urban spaces from terrorism. The documents: *Working Together to Protect Crowded Places and Safer Places: a Counter-Terrorism Supplement* were published for public consultation on 20<sup>th</sup> April 2009, setting out the Government’s approach to reducing the vulnerability of crowded places to terrorist attack. The consultation ran for 12 weeks and concluded on 10<sup>th</sup> July 2009. For results of the consultation see *Crowded Places: A Response to the Consultation* (HM Government, 2010g), the full list of consultation questions is provided in Annex A of the same document. The three documents, *Working together to protect crowded places* (HM Government, 2010c), *Crowded places: the planning system and counterterrorism* (HM Government, 2010d), and *Protecting crowded places: design and technical issues* (HM Government, 2010e), were published as a result.

<sup>23</sup> NaCTSO have produced and distributed tailored guidance on counter-terrorism protective security for the sites listed and state that crowded places can include the public realm (HM Government, 2010e:4). Specialist programmes have been developed for the transport network (land, aviation, maritime, and rail – including underground systems) (NaCTSO, 2010c).

2010e:4). 'Crowded places' can include the public realm (HM Government, 2010e:4), transport networks (land, aviation, maritime, and rail – including underground systems) (NaCTSO, 2010c), and the following 'sectors': sporting venues; shopping centres/high streets; bars and clubs; stadia and arenas; visitor attractions; cinemas and theatres; hotels and restaurants; major events; commercial centres; higher and further education institutions; healthcare sites; religious sites/places of worship (NaCTSO, 2010a; CPNI, 2010a). There are concerns regarding definition and the ambiguity of the 'crowded place' as the referent object in this context. RIBA warn that confusion risks adequately setting out the nature of the threat and explaining why counter-terrorism measures are needed. They suggest that greater clarity as to what a 'crowded place' is and is not would "go some way to address Counter Terrorism 'creep' scepticism over the extent to which counter-terrorism measures are needed and will be implemented" (2009: no pagination). However, and in contrast to this, a member of NaCTSO warned of the dangers of 'over defining' what is a complicated and multifaceted problem:

If you over engineer a definition of what a crowded place is, you're in danger of defining out potential targets, so there is a real danger of over engineering a definition, so the definition of what a site is, that's the first thing.

Whilst 'crowded places' share certain characteristics, each site is different and approaches to securing urban spaces and particular sites must therefore be spatially contingent and therefore in many respects unique. As the member of NaCTSO continued to explain:

What is a crowded place? Absolutely fascinating question, it seems so simple on the surface, but beneath that it's full of complexities ... Not all crowded places are the same, or subject to the same level of risk – 'crowded places' serves as a means of describing at risk sites which share certain characteristics, but they should not all be treated the same ... just because somewhere is a public space, a crowded place, it doesn't mean that automatically it's a target, because there are other factors that make it attractive as a target to terrorists, not just the fact that it is a crowded place. This is the other thing that we have to get away from, is that there is this misconception that because somewhere is crowded, it's automatically going to be a target, it's not.

A 'crowded place' presents an object of security, an 'insecure' and 'threatened' space which is rendered governable and where security can be enacted. It is definable and thus the threat to such a site and the distinct vulnerabilities can be rendered actionable. In contrast, the 'urban' is too broad an analytic and presents a problem which is almost always impossible to capture, it will always exceed any attempt to render it a place. These spaces of urban life are incredibly difficult to capture through an actionable definition, and so here security cannot specify what it attempts to secure<sup>24</sup>. As the member of NaCTSO concedes:

You need to apply the elephant test, and the elephant test is, you know one when you see one, and that's what we've got crowded places at the other end, we all instinctively know what a crowded place is, you know and I know what a crowded place is, we can imagine it in our minds, try and define that and it's very difficult, especially when you think you've got a crowd, you have a geography, infrastructure, vehicles and they interact and it's a very complex matter then, these things aren't independent of each other, and it's very dangerous to treat a crowded place as if it's people and environment, and separate the two.

This vagueness and ambiguity is arguably necessary for the counter-terrorist security guidance. It then follows that more acute, bespoke and site specific security is emphasised in the context of particular enactments of threat in distinct urban cases. Guidance is more an attempt at shaping conduct, a device for the conduct of conduct that marks out the limit points and sets out what is possible. At the same time guidance evokes a future state, an ideal that will stand apart from and pre-exists any actual case (see Anderson, 2010b). Where policy makers and security services perceive protection against attacks on crowded public places as one of their key priorities, this has not been written in the statute, for whilst "local planning authorities must have regard to this guidance when preparing local development documents", and where Government guidance is "capable of being a material

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<sup>24</sup> RIBA (2009) insist on the importance of further differentiation and suggest distinguishing between a series of distinct typologies of crowded places. Otherwise, they write, "there is risk of scepticism towards the risk being unidentifiable and therefore counter-terrorist threats in general are not worth responding to". RIBA maintain that guidance could be considered both by "occupancy (ranging from several hundred in a place of worship or small music venue, up to several hundred thousand at an outdoor festival or multiple sports event)" and also "density (where the activity/focus encourages close proximity of significant numbers of people)". They suggest this could be sub-divided via two categories of physical attributes "Permanent places of assembly, including but not limited to - Outdoor venues (stadia, racecourses, racetracks, spectator sports complexes) Indoor venues (arenas, theatres, cinemas, concert halls, exhibition and convention centres, shopping centres, nightclubs, places of worship)"; and "Temporary places of assembly – generally short duration outdoor events overlaid to otherwise public domain or private land, including but not limited to - Temporary ticketed event venues: festivals (Glastonbury), annual shows (Chelsea Flower Show), exhibition events (Red Bull air race), golf competitions, trade shows and exhibitions. Temporary open access event venues: parades (Lord Mayor's Show), road races (London marathon), exhibition events (Red Bull air race). These types of events may have localised ticketed facilities for particular groups, but otherwise attract a transient audience". RIBA also contend that the broad outlines should distinguish between "public (all the above) and private crowded places (for example offices)" (2009: no pagination).

consideration in the determination of planning applications”, it “*does not* however set out new policy or specific legal requirements” (HM Government, 2010d:3, my emphasis). In an interview, a senior advisor from CABI stated the importance of guidance not being allowed to become a diagram of power:

When you are thinking about security in public space it is about having a set of sensible principles to how you are governing and how you design, operate and manage a space, rather than having a set of rules, and there is a big difference.

Although not written into the statute, the heightened threat of terrorist attack to cities and everyday urban spaces has certainly been acted on. The results being that there are many examples of political and securitisation ideologies are materially inscribed on the urban landscape and reflected in governance and management practices throughout cities in the UK. However, importantly in the context of the UK Government’s response, and in contrast to many existing debates concerning the urbanisation of security agendas, it is explicitly stated that ‘proportional’ counter-terrorist security is to be achieved in the context of the Government strategy to create ‘World Class Places’ (HM Government, 2009c). As RIBA (2010a) maintain, and in keeping with the NSS and CONTEST, cities must reflect that “we are an open and inclusive society, and that in interpreting these new guidelines, our buildings do not convey that we are driven by security measures”. The Government states that ideally security “should contribute towards creating places ... that are well designed and maintained ... and that are sensitive to their surroundings” (HM Government, 2010d:5). It is expected that counter-terrorism security will be both ‘proportionate’ and ‘appropriate’, designed and managed against the Government’s own expectations and guidelines for good and successful public space (see HM Government, 2009c; DETR, 2000; ODPM, 2005a, 2005b).

Crucial here are the emerging rationalities of ‘proportionality’ and ‘appropriateness’, for as I have suggested, CONTEST and counter-terrorist security practices in cities function to enable the circulations that define urban life. Circulation, as Dillon contends, “is the spatial configuration that characterises the biopolitics of security” (2007a:11). Elsewhere Dillon states that circulation “appears to pose a seamless web of interdependent problems”, where systematic interdependence means everything is connected or, in principle, is able to be connected, to everything else, the “smallest perturbations or anomalies in one system of circulation have the potential to cascade rapidly into large-scale crises affecting very many other local and global systems of circulation” (2005b:2). Counter-terrorist security in the

urban landscape must find ways to reconcile security with circulations. The more traditional territorial logics of counter-terrorism and practices of 'fortress urbanism' (see Coaffee, 2003a, 2004b, 2009a) involving 'urban militarism' and the (overt) 'militarisation' (see Graham, 2002b, 2004c, 2011) of spaces are no longer appropriate, and indeed these are, in most cases, considered largely inadequate to the current enactment of threat. There are of course exceptions, as will be discussed in the next section. Announcing the completion of Lord West's review, then Home Secretary Jacqui Smith (2007) observed, "we need to ensure that individuals and businesses are free to carry on our normal social, economic and democratic activities"; although and as Smith herself concedes, "as a result, there will always be some vulnerability to terrorist attack". Whilst it is accepted that vulnerabilities are inevitable, CONTEST seeks to ensure that "risk is maintained at a tolerable level" (House of Commons, 2009a:EV59).

This raises the key issues: how to differentiate between good and bad circulation (Foucault, 2007). Security must understand how these complex urban systems of circulation operate and "how to manage them in ways that will avoid the potential for disaster stored up within them" (Dillon, 2005b:2). Security must not only reconcile the demands of cities as means of movement and encounter, but also exploit circulation in order to secure; enabling and then regulating circulation by intervening, thus securing, in and through movement. This involves "devising means of preventing bad circulation without collapsing circulation as such", a problem of regulation, of "governing too little or governing too much" (Dillon, 2005b:3): too little, and security may fail, too much, and circulations may halt. Approached thusly, the UK Government's counter-terrorism security policy ensures the overall aim of CONTEST and the NSS, to "to reduce the risk to the UK and to its interests overseas from international terrorism, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence" (HM Government, 2009a:5). This is a security strategy which targets freedom and circulation. For the NSS and for CONTEST this involves the protection of different versions of 'life', enacted within these strategies broadly in terms of human species being; a way of life; and through the very circulations and interdependencies that make up a valued life. In broadening the NSS agenda to include threats to 'individual citizens', and in recognising the vulnerability of 'crowded places', security becomes tasked with protecting the population, 'species life' itself. This is routinely figured with respects to "protecting the public", and "protecting people going about their daily lives" (HM Government, 2006:2).

The protection of species life is intimately bound with notions of 'daily life', itself threatened by terrorism, along with the everyday spaces of civil society, and a particular rendering of a 'way of life', liberal-democratic life: "Above all, we act to maintain our way of

life: to protect our people and the freedoms we have built for ourselves, and the values of our society and institutions” (HM Government, 2010a:22). However, within the NSS and CONTEST ‘species life’ and ‘our way of life’ are most frequently figured through processes of deferral, where the life of the population, the public and civil society, are supported and enabled by other things, in particular via the expression of a ‘valued life’ of circulations and interdependencies. Where this is the case, increasingly life is understood in terms of the infrastructures that support businesses, normally figured through the vocabularies of ‘critical infrastructure protection’ or ‘business continuity’ (see Cabinet Office, 2006; Home Office, 2004b). Critical national infrastructure includes “those key elements of the national infrastructure which are crucial to the continued delivery of essential services to the UK” without which “the UK could suffer serious consequences, including severe economic damage, grave social disruption, or large-scale loss of life” (CPNI, 2011:50). The emphasis is then on security mitigating the effects of an event in order to enable certain processes to continue and a valued life to be sustained. ‘Life’ as ‘species existence’ and as a distinct ‘way of life’ becomes inseparable from ‘business continuity’ and from ‘critical infrastructure protection’. The protection of life, which is central to the objectives of the NSS and to CONTEST comes to be enacted through the protection of a valued life, where “intervention aims to stop the effects of an event disrupting the circulations and interdependencies that make up a valued life” (Anderson, 2010b:791).

The threat of terrorism, and in particular the ‘event of terror’, is no longer considered as selective as was the case in the past. The threats posed by the ‘event of terror’ are considered wide and unpredictable in variety and form, posing the problem of the aleatory. Additionally, and as is highlighted through CONTEST, the threats of terrorism are always changing:

New groups emerge and terrorists continue to develop new methods and make use of new technologies, the 2008 attacks in Mumbai are a reminder that cities are vulnerable. Learning from our experience over the past few years, we have updated all aspects of our strategy to take account of this changing threat (HM Government, 2009a:7)

As the House of Commons Transport Committee’s 2007 report on UK transport security states, the nature and form of the attacks against London’s mass transit system on 7<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> July 2005 raised new concerns associated with managing and mitigating

terrorism-related risk and concomitant threat. The report states that in contrast to earlier terrorist experiences, the July 2005 attacks were launched by a 'breed of bomber' who:

- Deliberately selected target-rich environments (i.e., crowded tube trains, in tunnels, between stations) with the intention of committing mass murder.
- Was not deterred by any of the target hardening measures deployed against opportunistic attack.
- Appeared unconcerned by the prospect of capture or compromise.
- Intended to die during the attack.
- Did not issue threats (House of Commons, 2007:90)

The Government and security professionals emphasise that "malicious intent is *creative*, and will aim to circumvent known counter-terrorism measures" (RIBA, 2009: no pagination, my emphasis). The life of threat, the figure of the terrorist, is posed as a sophisticated and creative aggressor. The dynamism and manifold form of this threat, indeed the uncertainty of what is constitutive of this threat, combined with the different methods of attack so far used and predicted have meant that it has come to be characterised as difficult to detect, to prevent and to protect against (see HM Government, 2009a, 2011a; MI5, 2011). Interestingly this form of threat is in many senses invisible and will also appear as part of normal circulations, these are in many respects indeterminate dangers which are harboured within the everyday and require radical rethinking of security in cities as they have the potential to erupt with considerable consequences potentially without warning, to restate, anywhere and at any time. As the member of NaCTSO conceded:

We have the problem of the intelligent bomb, which moves into the crowded place and then can move around in there and it's very difficult to prevent.

The Government has somewhat ominously warned that for any counter-terrorist security strategy, a counter strategy will inevitably be developed, highlighting the ongoing threat posed by hostile reconnaissance, the attack planning process where potential targets are studied and reconnoitred. Accordingly, the Government has taken steps to address and mitigate, as far as possible the threats posed by hostile reconnaissance. As well as securing against hostile reconnaissance, significant work is ongoing to address the threat posed by 'radicalisation' (the process by which people become terrorists or lend support to violent extremism), a malicious and threatening life which is conceived as incubating within



the present and one which lives and indeed circulates with and amidst the life to be protected and secured (HM Government, 2009a).

Successful attacks serve to highlight the need for further flexibility to be present within counter-terrorism security strategies, so as to take into account the mutable and miscellaneous nature of the terrorist threat. Similarly, the ever advancing dynamism and sophistication of terrorist operations and the novel tactics and ever changing target selections are taken to be the hallmarks of international terrorism in the future. The threat of the future attack from chemical, biological, or radiological, or an attack similar to those in Mumbai 2008, leads to constant reassessments<sup>25</sup>: This was reinforced in an interview with the member of NaCTSO:

The other thing that we have to be very mindful of is that terrorists tactics change, they evolve, at the moment the biggest threat we face is from terrorist borne attacks, that could change very quickly, we've already seen evidence of non-suicide attacks where items are left and then detonated remotely, so that threat is still there and we have to respond to this in different ways.

However, and as Body-Gendrot has observed, whilst the potential threat posed by chemical, biological, or radiological attack remains, all the attacks so far have been performed with conventional tools on specific urban territories" (2005:5). Notwithstanding Body-Gendrot's observation, ultimately in this context the life of threat "becomes a constant and immanent threat which needs diffusing or extinguishing" (Packer, 2006:381).

Whilst the threat from terrorist operations is identified as sophisticated, wide, unpredictable in its tactics and target selections, within CONTEST, the life of threat is identified via three main figures: "person borne (suicide devices on the person) vehicle-borne (which may be suicide or non-suicide devices) or hand-delivered (non-suicide devices initiated typically by timer or remote control)" (HM Government, 2010d:5d)<sup>26</sup>. The

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<sup>25</sup> The emergence and dynamism of the threats of terrorism is demonstrated through the updated NaCTSO website where terrorist use of firearms (NaCTSO, 2010f), and warnings of the threat from chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons (NaCTSO, 2010g) have been recently added: "Contemporary terrorist organisations aspire to use chemical, biological, radiological and even nuclear weapons (CBRN). We have created 'The Model Response to CBRN Events', a classified document which sets out an ideal response to a CBR attack to guide responding agencies and the emergency services" (House of Commons, 2010b:2). NaCTSO warn of the importance of considering these and other methods of attack and. The 2010 annual report of the UK's strategy for countering international terrorism states: "We continue to absorb the lessons arising from recent terrorist attacks" (HM Government, 2010g:20). Further evidence is provided through the recently published and updated 'National Risk Register of Civil Emergencies' (Cabinet Office, 2010).

<sup>26</sup> The threat posed by the figure of the 'suicide bomber' is multifaceted. It is warned that suicide bombers "may use a lorry, plane or other kind of vehicle as a bomb or may carry or conceal explosives on their persons" ((NaCTSO, 2010d: no pagination). There is also seen to be a significant risk from improvised explosive devices (IEDs) which can be delivered to a target and then initiated by a timer or remotely detonated. Vehicle Borne Improved Explosive Devices (VBIEDs) are increasingly considered as the likeliest style of future attack. VBIEDs may be borne by a variety of vehicles "capable of

governance of mobility and circulations then needs to be understood “in terms of this new problematic, mobility as immanent threat” (Packer, 2006:381). In classifying the threat in accordance with general types, the ‘wide’ and ‘unpredictable’ threat becomes actionable. The threat remains essentially indeterminate, but the figures coalesce with other factors, such as site, risk and vulnerability assessments, etcetera, to render action possible. The ultimately unknowable future that security seeks to secure can be acted on. There have been concerns raised regarding the Government over-emphasising one type of threat and response, in particular a disproportionate emphasis on vehicle-borne attacks. For example, responses to the 2009 consultation questioned whether certain enactments of threat had been exaggerated, others stated that the Government “disproportionately focused on Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs) and that more advice should be given about other threats and their design response principles” (HM Government, 2010g). Additionally, the terrorist tactics deployed in Mumbai in November 2008 raised questions regarding whether urban areas were prepared for similar style attacks, highlighting the limited capacities to prevent and indeed protect against or to mitigate certain styles of attack.

The counter-terrorist security strategy set out above is a response to what is considered by the UK Government to be its most significant immediate security threat. CONTEST and the broader security principles set out in the NSS have altered the relationship between security, cities and everyday urban spaces, indeed urban life, in the context of the UK. This has certainly had an impact and has resulted in the increased materialising of counter-terrorist security within the spaces of civil society, however as the following two sections of this chapter will demonstrate the manner in which this has been achieved in the UK context is significantly different to how it has been previously maintained. In the next section of this chapter I move to consider how the strategies documented above and the practices advocated enact versions of life, freedom and circulation within urban spaces themselves.

## **5.2. Integrating security**

The UK Government’s stated aim for promoting counter-terrorism in cities is to “reduce both the probability of an attack” and “the impact of any attack that may occur” (HM

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delivering a large quantity of explosives to a target and can cause a great deal of damage ... the bomb can be delivered at a time of the terrorist’s choosing and with reasonable precision, depending on defences” (NaCTSO, 2010e; see also HM Government, 2010e:23-24).

Government, 2010f: no pagination). As Fidler contends, the need for protection strategies “flows from the realization that prevention will be impossible or only partially effective”, protection works “to ‘harden the target’ against such events and, thus, to mitigate the resulting damage” (2007:262). Security is to be achieved alongside the Government’s overall vision for cities and in the context of specific named sites, to “create high quality places that work for everyone” (HM Government, 2010c:5), and biopolitical concerns regarding the “ability of individuals and businesses”, and indeed cities, “to carry out their normal social, economic and democratic activities” (HM Government, 2010g:7). The objectives of this security apparatus therefore involve the ‘hardening’ of urban spaces understood as possible terrorist targets, but in ways that integrate security ‘appropriately’ and ‘proportionally’ into cities and urban life itself.

Following the Lord West review, the UK Government concluded that for cities, security should be ‘proportionate’ to the risk faced and ‘appropriate’ to differing urban contexts. In accordance with CONTEST this aims for “a greater emphasis on local delivery” (West, 2008), “for the purposes of prioritising of counter-terrorism protective security activity” (HM Government, 2010c:26). In light of recent terrorist incidents, as Coaffee and Wood have documented, “organizations have reviewed and re-evaluated their individual risk assessment” (2006b:8), however the UK Government has argued that the risk faced within ‘crowded places’ should be assessed in a standard way via a ‘risk assessment matrix’ (HM Government, 2010c:25-26)<sup>27</sup>. Briggs (2005) rightly contends that the complexity of low probability/non-probabilistic, high consequence future terrorist threats makes it difficult to predict the incidence of events of terror, and the impact that security interventions will have. Briggs has suggested that the orientation of security to the future “tends to be about intent”, as such, counter-terrorism as a project that seeks to act on ‘the future’ in the present requires “judgements rather than measurements” (Briggs, 2005:63). Where the UK Government has stated that the ‘risk assessment matrix’ is based on “the threat of terrorist attack, the vulnerability in the event of a terrorist attack and the impact if it should occur” (HM Government, 2010d:5), arguably these are judgements of futures and not in fact assessments, for assessments and measurements “cannot tell us enough about the threat to help us to predict the future” (Briggs, 2005:63).

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<sup>27</sup> The standardised ‘risk assessment matrix’ was developed through a conjunction of the Association of Chief Police Officers (Terrorism and Allied Matters), the National Counter-Terrorism Security Office, the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure, the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre and the Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies Secretariat and the Department for Communities and Local Government. It was issued by NaCTSO in 2008 to CTAs (HM Government, 2010c:18). To assist those crowded places that are not prioritised for assessment by CTAs, NaCTSO has devised a web-based Vulnerability Self-Assessment Tool (VSAT), an online assessment (HM Government, 2010c:20; NaCTSO, 2010j).

It is stated by the Government that the risk ‘assessments’ are generated in order to prioritise counter-terrorism activities, based on the severity of the risk posed to sites from a terrorist attack. However, it is worth noting that the ‘risk assessment’ approach has proved controversial in the UK, especially outside London where, and in accordance with the ‘risk assessment’ approach, “the likelihood of terror attack is deemed by many to be low” (Coaffee, 2010:952). This is a persistent trend in spite of the warnings from counter-terror specialists that attacks targeting public places could occur ‘anywhere’ and ‘at any time’. It is suggested that there is then a danger that counter-terror features in ‘crowded places’ will remain largely restricted to London. Importantly the Lord West review concluded that the work of CONTEST must “avoid being London-centric” (West, 2008); increasingly it is seen as important to build security into “the design and management of more provincial cities” (Coaffee and Wood, 2006b:7). The Government concedes that its ‘assessments’ are ‘relative’ and so “[do] not reflect a view of the chances of one particular site being targeted by terrorists” (HM Government, 2010c:18). The standardised risk assessment is applied in order to assess the attractiveness of site/threat, vulnerability and impact assessment all use a five point scale, ranging from ‘Very High’ to ‘Very Low’, which are brought together to produce one of four risk severity ratings (HM Government, 2010c:25-26) (see Figure 5.2).

<b>High</b>	<b>This risk is the one which generates the highest concern. Comprehensive action is required as a high priority to reduce vulnerability, wherever possible and proportionate.</b>
<b>Medium-High</b>	<b>The consequences of the risk materialising would be substantial. Action is required as a priority to mitigate the risk, wherever possible and proportionate.</b>
<b>Medium</b>	<b>The risk is not substantial and can be managed via contingency plans. Status of risk should be monitored regularly.</b>
<b>Low</b>	<b>The risk should be addressed if possible and contingency plans are required. This risk should be managed at local level.</b>

Figure 5.2 The four levels of risk of terrorist attack (HM Government, 2010d:5).

This forms part of the Government’s national framework for urban counter-terrorist security, with the aim of delivering a sustained and noticeable reduction in vulnerabilities within urban spaces over a number of years. The approach emphasises that counter-terrorism measures, contingency plans and monitoring arrangements should be ‘proportionate’ and ‘appropriate’, these principles are to be judged on the basis of threat assessment and other associated factors that present a range of competing demands such as cost, aesthetics, convenience and how such measures might change the nature of public

space. These necessary ‘tradeoffs’ between conflicting requirements are assessed according to priorities of the specific site and against the rationalities of ‘appropriateness’ and ‘proportionality’ in the context of the site that security is being designed for. A senior space advisor from CABI space articulated this complex in an interview:

Often the problems in public spaces are a myriad of interleaving, complex issues most of which have very small outcomes. As such you’re not talking about a bomb event or a mass suicide attack, or dramatic situation, you’re just talking about managing little incremental problems day by day and that is what public space management is about, dealing with all of the different things that arise through people using space, but a lot of it is about trying to find positive experiences for people using these spaces, and it’s a mind set, do you really think that public space is used positively?

The advice presented within the Government publications presents a somewhat idealised and artificial situation and is unlikely to be the case when security is translated to action. RIBA (2009) remain dissatisfied with this approach, suggesting that the Government should more explicitly explain that counter-terrorism is one of many issues to be considered within planning, developed in proportion to other issues, such as sustainability or inclusive design, not as a separate technical issue. In addition, although CONTEST takes the spaces of urban life and lived urban life as its referent object, it risks rendering lived experiences invisible, or present by means of deferral, supported and enabled by other things. A situation arises where life is targeted and yet forgotten, present but simultaneously absent. As the member of NaCTSO concedes:

I think a lot of the government documents don’t look at people who are in these spaces as if they are leading lives, it’s about spaces and structures, but people are often absent. They’re the elephant in the room, we talk about structures, spaces, environments, the sorts of measures we will use, how we’ll intervene, but actually we often forget that people will be leading their lives in these spaces. But actually having said that, we talk about all of that because we’re trying to protect the people and allow them to go about their daily lives, so it is right that we very rarely actually make that concrete link, but we do need to do this, from a Home Office perspective we need to do what we’re doing because we’re saving lives and protecting people and that is the core reason why we do all this, the research, the training and introducing the counter-terror security in public space and around buildings, it’s all done to protect people, we

may rarely say it explicitly, but that is absolutely the fundamental core of what we do, it's always left as an implicit assumption.

In order to develop 'proportionate' and 'appropriate' counter-terrorist security in a variety of urban settings, the Government has highlighted the importance of working collectively to reduce vulnerability: "The vulnerability of crowded places to terrorist attack can only be reduced through coordinated work by a range of organisations within a common strategic framework" (HM Government, 2010c:11)<sup>28</sup>. As well as aiming for approaches that are 'appropriate' and 'acceptable', this principle suggests that in order to enact effective counter-terrorist security, greater coordination and better relations are essential, this inevitably involves and encourages the 'responsibilising' of various actors. As Coaffee et al. suggest, the UK Government's policy for countering the terrorist threat against everyday urban spaces has involved adopting a less overtly hierarchical response, "focusing more on *governance* interaction than on *governmental* interventions" (2009:490, original emphasis). This shift has led to the 'responsibilising' of a range of non-state and civil society actors. Security and the reduction of vulnerabilities are no longer considered the exclusive responsibility of the state. The Government's 'crowded places' strategy thus seeks to draw on existing expertise within local areas to reduce vulnerability and to render security actionable (HM Government, 2010c). This is important given the shift to an approach that emphasises site specificity, 'appropriateness' and 'proportionality', it also again concedes the spatial contingency of counter-terrorist security. Local 'critical sites' to be assessed are based on the local police Counter-Terrorism Security Adviser's (CTSA) knowledge of their locality, as well as information from other sources (crime figures, details of licensed premises, reports from Special Branch and other police colleagues, members of organisations such as Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships, and local authorities) (HM Government, 2010c:25). CTSA's conduct the assessment in consultation with key local partners; conducting annual re-assessments and in-year reviews<sup>29</sup>. CTSA's, and where necessary other specialist advisers, working with key stakeholder, will recommend a range

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<sup>28</sup> Chapter two 'Roles and Responsibilities' in *Working Together to Protect Crowded Places* sets out the responsibilities of relevant national and local organisations. Chapter two of *Safer Places: The Planning System and Crime Prevention* (ODPM and Home Office, 2004) provides advice on how local planning authorities, police, local partners and developers can work together on matters of crime prevention, this advice is deemed equally relevant when considering counter-terrorism measures.

<sup>29</sup> Since 2002, NaCTSO has established, co-ordinated, trained and tasked a national network of police CTSA's. NaCTSO and CTSA's have recently been delegated responsibility by the Home Office for dealing with protective security for 'Crowded Places'. The core role of the CTSA is to identify and assess local critical sites within their force area that might be vulnerable to terrorist or extremist attack; then devise and develop appropriate protective security plans to minimise impact on that site and the surrounding community (NaCTSO, 2010h; 2010i).

of measures, contingency plans and monitoring arrangements aimed at mitigating the level of risk identified<sup>30</sup>.

In line with CONTEST, the Government has argued that urban counter-terrorist security should be adaptable and holistic, as well as appropriate to the everyday spaces and happenings of urban life. In the context of everyday urban spaces, these measures are not enforceable by law and the desirability of their inclusion presents the “challenge of blending counter-terrorism protective security measures with urban design principles” (HM Government, 2010d:9), to respect “locally distinctive places which involves ... sensitive responses” (HM Government, 2010e:9). These challenges further demonstrate the increased centrality of ‘proportionality’ and ‘acceptability’, rationalities now guiding counter-terror policy. As Coaffee et al. note, counter-terrorist security “must not only be effective but must also be acceptable to the owners, inhabitants and users of particular places, this acceptability encompasses complex financial, social and aesthetic considerations” (2008:108):

The advice that is set out is generic and cannot address the plethora of varying circumstances and degrees of risk which apply to different facilities. Consideration should first be given to the relevance of such measures and whether or not they can be appropriately achieved ... If so, the measures should be appropriate, proportionate and balanced with other relevant material considerations (Home Office, 2009c:2)

These same principles apply to ‘hard’ physical measures and ‘soft’ governance and management arrangements where it is recognised by the Government that finding a balance between discrete measures and safety is a central guiding principle (CPNI, 2010a, 2010b 2010c, 2011). This demonstrates the tension between the freedom to circulate and security as refracted through the city, keeping things moving, keeping cities circulating. As was stated in the 2009 Home Office Report on Contest, security was seen to have succeeded in its response to the events of July 2007 as “London did not come to a stop” (House of Commons, 2009a:EV4). ‘Hard’ and ‘soft’ security cannot disproportionately disrupt the circulations, interdependencies and connections of distinct spaces. Resilience

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<sup>30</sup> CTSA distinguish between those measures needed to mitigate risk in the two highest risk categories (high and medium-high) and those in the lower two categories (medium and low) (HM Government, 2010d:9). Advice for retrospective fitting and designing measures into new developments will differ, although common principles apply. Examples of good practice are provided in ‘Reducing vulnerabilities: what works?’ in Working Together to Protect Crowded Places, and in the table ‘Typical counter-terrorism protective security measures’, in Crowded Places: The Planning System and Counter-Terrorism. For examples of how projects have included such principles, see Annex C: Case studies in Protecting Crowded Places: Design and Technical Issues (HM Government, 2010f).

and planning for recovery and continuity in the event of the 'event of terror' are precisely designed to get things moving and circulating again. The Government acknowledges that avoiding disrupting the interdependencies and circulations that make up life in cities concedes vulnerability, as urban spaces can only then be "secured against *some types* of terrorist threat" (HM Government, 2010e:9, my emphasis). In short, "events with catastrophic potential will occur" (Fidler, 2007:262). Security does not seek to preclude access or to halt movements. On the contrary, security deploys movements, and needs them. Returning to Foucault's (2007) contention regarding the sifting of good and bad circulation, it is through movements and circulations that security comes to know life. In the absence of movement, security would not be able to differentiate between the life that threatens and the norm.

Security in this context takes into account the connections and circulations which make up different urban spaces, this is figured through "the needs of key stakeholders and people that live, work and visit a place or building", and in open public spaces includes "transport and pedestrian movement around an area" (Home Office, 2010c:8). As the Government have stated, "we must make it more difficult to attack crowded places, with minimal inconvenience to the public" (HM Government, 2009e: no pagination). Security is required to respond to the challenges of circumstance, again it is the tension between the freedom to circulate and security, and as the Government recognises, "different sites present unique challenges and considerations that will result in bespoke solutions", there is "no 'one size fits all' solution (HM Government, 2010e:9). Security, in this context, is required to be bespoke, so as not to undermine the normal social, economic and democratic activities of specific urban contexts, nor the interdependencies and circulations of cities. In order to avoid disruption, it is suggested that recommendations will be holistic and combine:

some standardised components, some invisibly integrated components based on conventional traffic management and streetscape designs (such as structurally enhanced bus shelters, lamp columns, benches or cycle racks) and often some elements of purpose-designed solutions, for example incorporating public art or locally important features (HM Government, 2010e:9).

The advice advocated for both 'hard' and 'soft' security, contra to many academic and popular critiques, emphasises 'proportionate' and 'appropriate' solutions, specific to the conditions of individual and distinct sites.

The everyday spaces of urban life are now, as Massumi (in Rice, 2010) observes,



increasingly primed to the possibilities of attack, to the extent that they are becoming saturated with security and surveillance mechanisms. Massumi claims that this saturation is aimed “at surprising a surprise in the making, before it has fully emerged” (in Rice, 2010:35). Whilst there is evidence of this, it is not always the case and does not account for the coalescing of different logics that enact safety and security. In the securing of the everyday city, anticipatory action and logics that seek to negotiate the unknowable future mix with logics of protection, detection, prevention, deterrence, delay, preparedness, mitigation, etcetera. It is the coalescing of these multiple logics that “deal politically, militarily or in the civil sphere with a danger which has not yet fully emerged, that is, a threat” (Massumi in Rice, 2010:34). The goal of each logic, is to enable and “to care for a valued life by neutralising threats to that life” (Anderson, 2010b:788), or to stop and mitigate the effects of a threat or event disrupting the circulations that define the personal and commercial ‘freedoms’ of liberal-democratic life. The space of urban life is itself then transformed, arranged according to a variety of different, sometimes competing security logics, techniques and technologies. Massumi explains that a security apparatus and its design are “spatial to the extent that these techniques and technologies are not simply innocent elements, dormant before they are called upon” (in Rice, 2010:35). It is then of course hoped that these interventions will come into play in the operative moment of reaction.

In terms of ‘hard’ protective security, creative practices are recommended by the Government, which are ‘appropriate’ in the context of the needs of particular sites and sympathetic to aesthetic and cosmetic considerations to avoid “bland and standardised places” (HM Government, 2010e:11), and by extension, to attempt to avoid atmospheres of insecurity. As one commentator contended, “We might live in dangerous times, but they don’t have to be ugly ones too” (Bayley, 2007, no pagination). The strategy recommends avoiding intrusive measures where possible (as with the case of US Embassy in Grosvenor Square and the Palace of Westminster):

When considering appropriate protection against terrorist attack, a challenge for designers and planners is the application of urban design principles whilst at the same time incorporating counter-terrorism protective security measures ... to retain and attract people to places, which are also safe and secured against some types of terrorist threat, will always involve a combination of approaches tailored to local conditions and special features (HM Government, 2010e:9)

Far from signifying the turn to a 'bunker mentality' (Coaffee, 2003), 'fortress urbanism' (see Coaffee, 2003a, 2004b, 2009a) and the progressive and aggressive 'militarisation' of urban space (Graham, 2002b, 2004c, 2011), this emerging counter-terrorist strategy, developed on the basis of what might, or might not, happen, encourages the reconciliation of security with the function, aesthetics and with the lived life of everyday urban life itself:

the building or place should be attractive, accessible and work for those that will use and visit it. Counter-terrorism protective security measures *should not* impose upon the overall *style* and *intention* of a place" (HM Government, 2010e:10, my emphasis).

In so doing security is integrated with the spaces of urban life and with the everyday itself, bound up with a notion of a way of life as stated in CONTEST. However, there are and will be cases where there is an imperative for demonstrable visible protection. As a member of NaCTSO explained in an interview:

One of the key features for terrorists is how successful their attack is going to be, and if you look at this building and it is attractive to you because of it's iconic status and all the rest of it, but then you think it's got barriers, and big blocks of concrete, and you can't pass Parliament without seeing them they're so obvious, whether it's effective or not isn't necessarily the issue, it's the perception, they look impressive and they look like they're going to work, they look effective which is going to discourage terrorists from selecting that building ... it deters them from targeting that location. So in those sites, it maybe their intention ... where you have those very high profile targets, that slightly more brutal looking security, that more overt, in your face security is a deliberate and effective means of deterring people, it engenders into anyone who is thinking of attacking it that this is just difficult.

Demonstrable visible protection is effected for a variety of reasons, the aims in these instances however, as is described in the above extract, remain those of protecting and promoting circulations bound up with notions of valued urban life.

In relation to the particular problems encountered within distinct urban sites, security becomes present as a range of absences and presences. Repeated concerns have been raised concerning forms of 'urban militarism', involving "the violent reorganisation of the city" (Graham, 2011:12) and the explicit militarisation through the "aggressive restructuring" (Graham, 2011:12) of urban spaces, such counter-terrorist security practices stand accused

of leading to visibly unattractive architecture and urban landscapes. These rationalities of 'securing public space' are also condemned for increasing control and access to public space, meaning "securing space from the public, rather than for it" (Vale, 2005:41). As has been demonstrated, the importance of counter-terrorist features being 'proportionate', whilst at the same time 'appropriate' and 'acceptable' has led to measures being increasingly embedded within the urban landscape, this is not without issue. Briggs, for example, has suggested that 'invisible security' may "change the relationship between counter-terrorism and the built environment. It will bring many benefits ... [but] also raises a number of challenges for urban governance" (2005:69). There are attendant concerns that the very invisibility of security means that it may become an uncontested element of political and public policy. In addition, and as the Government have acknowledged, there are associated costs to privacy: "as protective security measures become more common, they will become more normalised, and the public will accept them more readily. It can be argued that this may have an impact on public acceptance of measures affecting privacy" (HM Government, 2010f: no pagination). As will be demonstrated in the course of Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, everyday encounters and attempts to govern perceptions also contribute to the complex absences and presences of security.

In accordance with the overriding aim of CONTEST, urban counter-terrorist security should "as far as possible enable individuals and businesses to carry on with their daily lives *freely and with confidence*" (HM Government, 2010c:7, my emphasis). Whilst encouraging urbanism which rethinks urban development strategies on the basis of 'worst case scenario', this is to be practiced alongside the notions of personal and commercial 'freedoms' of liberal-democratic life and the circulations which are at the heart of CONTEST are reworked in urban contexts alongside other versions of life, centring the practices of biopolitics "to maintain the balance of security and liberty, and *above all* to maintain normal life" (Cabinet Office, 2008a:28, my emphasis). The 'crowd' emerges as a way of thinking about collective life within 'crowded places'. 'Life' is refracted and translated into terms such as the 'crowd', enacting a particular form of coexistence that is rendered actionable. This involves attempting to understand and intervene in the 'crowd', where different types of crowd are understood to behave in different ways (see Cabinet Office, 2009b, 2009c, 2009d). It is suggested that different crowd types emerge within different 'crowded places': "shoppers in a crowded mall, each with their own interests, make up a different crowd from spectators at a sports stadium" (HM Government, 2010c:22). The 'crowd' becomes a particular way of rendering life knowable and actionable. Government advice states the need to "anticipate probable behaviour and make appropriate arrangements for it" (HM

Government, 2010a:22). Security seeks to enhance capacities to intervene in, and to regulate the crowd as a particular enactment of threat, where threat and the life to be secured are copresent: “we need to identify the individuals or items of luggage that are a threat among the crowd” (HM Government, 2009e: no pagination)<sup>31</sup>.

As Dillon and Lobo-Guerra (2009) have argued, the subject of security is both that which must be secured and the source of threat, life has become both the potentially threatening subject and the object of intervention for biopolitics. There are different notions of life coexisting within the ‘crowd’, where the figure of the terrorist, suicide bomber, aggressor, hostile reconnaissance, hostile vehicle, etcetera, circulate along with the public, innocent, casualty, victim and so on. Martin has described this as a complex and problematic situation where there emerges a “deep ambiguity about the ‘securitised subject’” precisely because the “‘new’ subject of security is contingent, continually changing, and possibly becoming dangerous” (2010:19, my emphasis).

The securing of the crowd cannot be divorced from the protection of the circulations and interdependencies of urban spaces and the way of life as established through CONTEST. Security must assume that ‘crowded places’ will be places of use, and so it becomes a question of securing the sites themselves and then securing the life within them, establishing a relation with the milieu. The advisor from CABE explains the problems of integrating counter-terrorism in public spaces and into the life of urban life:

You have to look at what the public realm is there for and it’s there for the public and I think you want to have measures any measures that do end up in the public realm have to be appropriate and discrete and well designed and relevant, and in no way affecting people’s practical and psychological enjoyment of the space. There are ways and means in which you can manage and maintain space without it appearing oppressive ... People need to think much more carefully about those such measures and those sorts of very crude measures have no real place apart from on an extremely temporary basis ... You have to accept that space is used by everybody and you should as such be facilitating that rather than obstructing that, creating safe and pleasant spaces, and these will inevitably have security elements designed into them.

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<sup>31</sup> The Government provides advice for what action to take if it is suspected that hostile reconnaissance is taking place. The Government has also sought to develop and utilise understandings of the behaviours and activities of individuals involved in hostile reconnaissance or intent on suicide bombings, aiming to “develop methods and approaches that might facilitate the detection of terrorist research, reconnaissance and attack planning, or help frustrate and deter such activities”, and “improve systems and human processes to automate the detection of these indicators” (HM Government, 2010i: no pagination).

Different notions of life coexist here, extending beyond life figured purely as biological. Security within UK cities must protect these, reducing the probability of an attack and mitigating the effects if one were to take place, whilst responsive to context of different urban sites. The final section of this chapter focuses on how, in relation to the problems of reconciling security and the freedom to circulate, counter-terrorist security measures become present within the distinct spaces of the Southbank and Bankside area of the South Bank and the Victoria Line of the London Underground, the two sites that provide the case study of the specific form of counter-terror security apparatus traced through this thesis.

### **5.3. Security and urban life**

The Southbank and Bankside area of the South Bank on the River Thames and the Victoria Line of the London Underground provide examples of everyday urban environments that, through the UK Government's processes of evaluation, can be identified as examples of 'crowded places'. Figured as 'insecure' spaces of civil life these two sites are then 'target rich', difficult to protect and potentially vulnerable to terrorist attack. In both sites, security architectures become present in different ways with the same aim, that of mitigating the threat from, and limiting the damage caused by, the event of terror. In the contexts of both the South Bank and the Victoria Line sites this is a security project that must be rendered actionable in light of the biopolitical aims and rationalities that insist on the maintenance and where possible the promotion of the democratic, economic and social functioning of cities, and the circulations and interdependencies that make up urban life. In an interview the CTSA for Lambeth summed the delicate situation that is found within both sites, where freedom and security are reframed with respects to cities:

The problem you have there is you don't have many options, you can completely enclose an area and have access points, but how are we going to work as a city if we do that? It's got to be proportionate and it's got to be commensurate ... You can't shut everything down or start fencing places off because you can't then effectively work as a city, it has to be proportionate and that's they key word ... and it's got to be reasonable, we've all got to go about our lives and that's why it has to be on those levels.

There has been a shift in the rationalities of urban security, as the previous two sections of this chapter have demonstrated, in cities in the UK security and urban life are

expected to be brought into novel forms of reconciliation. Here I highlight this situation and discuss how in relation to the tensions between the circulations that define the personal and commercial ‘freedoms’ of liberal-democratic life and security, security becomes present in different ways within the two sites.

### **5.3.1. The South Bank**

The Southbank and Bankside of the southern bank of the River Thames is a patchwork of different sites, spaces and movements, described by the South Bank Employers Group’s (SBEG’s) Security Coordinator in an interview as an “aggregated crowded area”<sup>32</sup>. This mosaic produces complicated and multifaceted security architectures, as the CTSA illustrated:

It’s not just to the South Bank, it’s to the whole of Lambeth ... we’ll try to incorporate all the various aspects of crime prevention design that we can, which includes counter-terror work, and try to protect the area as a whole ... although the different areas and buildings and sites within South Bank have different requirements. Ideally we want to aggregate the whole of that area and have all the stakeholders there working together as one unit ... We work very closely with all of the security managers and stakeholders along here, and with the local police, and with the local authority, it’s very much a multi-agency approach, working together, that’s the way to achieve the success that we’re looking for.

Whilst it is important to think beyond ones site, area or location of interest, collective security responses are by no means uniform, nor are they necessarily cooperative or compatible. As the CPDA for Lambeth commented, “here we have the additional problems of competing interests and having to work with different businesses or land owners, which isn’t always a big problem, but you do have to get people to communicate and make some

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<sup>32</sup> The South Bank site is composed of a variety of sites and spaces which NaCTSO advice designate as ‘crowded places sectors’, including but not limited to: public realm; residential; restaurants, cafés and bars; business/commercial centres; retail/shopping areas and units; theatre; visitor attractions; major events; historic building. The area mixes public and privately owned and regulated sites. In close proximity to the area demarcated as the research site, in addition to further examples of the above sectors, there are: clubs; cinemas; hotels and restaurants; higher and further education institutions; healthcare sites; places of worship. The site is adjacent to Waterloo Station a major transport intersection, and is situated across the River Thames from the Government Security Zone (GSZ). The GSZ covers the majority of the UK Government Offices and consists of a linked series of projects to enhance security within the area of central London containing major government and public buildings which the metropolitan police consider obvious targets for terrorism (Unnamed source (2008) ‘House of Commons Hansard Ministerial Statement, 7 March 2008, Security: Greater London’, <http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200708/cmhansrd/cm080307/text/80307w0003.htm> [accessed 11/10/10]). In addition to the day-to-day security, temporary ‘stage-set’ security arrangements are put in place when necessary for events.

sacrifices which they're not always happy with, it's not easy to come up with a compromise that's effective and that everyone is happy to go with".

In this area, security is expected to be 'proportionate' without compromising the function and aesthetics of differing site contexts. SBEG's Security Coordinator explained the significance of acceptability and 'appropriate' responses within this area and with respects to the different concerns and interests:

We're very aware that along here there are a lot of quite open and permeable sites that the public are in and want to be able to cut about within them. What we don't want to do is lose what we think South Bank's already got, we want to enhance that, that experience ... We want to build in resilience and build in security, whether it's a building, a business space, or a public space, consumer space, visitor attraction, and keep our standard, our quality that we had before we introduced these things, so the ambience and the quality stay the same ... We want most of what we've got here to be designed in and to be less obvious ... I want to know all that, but I don't want the people living here, working here or coming here knowing that, I want people just to go about and enjoy themselves ... it is particularly challenging to get the right sorts of security, we're pretty close to it, I think we can do more, but only time will tell.

What is being produced here is an environment explicitly, emphasising openness, circulation and the protection of different enactments of life. The CTSA stated that whilst attempting to "create a hostile environment not just for terrorists to operate in, but also criminals", the most important considerations here are "the operational requirements ... to ensure that anything that you recommend or put in there is one, pedestrian permeable and friendly, two it allows the building or space to work as it would normally, and three to ensure that emergency access can still be gained from a number of different points". Operational and functional considerations, as well as concerns for aesthetics and acceptability demonstrate the tensions between the freedom to circulate and security within this area. Each of the three named concerns addresses the valued life of circulations and interdependencies within the area. As the CTSA continued, "Business continuity is essential, and allowing people to move freely and enjoy themselves in public spaces is the same, you're not going to put in anything that is going to impair the operational effectiveness of that building, or obstruct people in public spaces, they're day-to-day necessities". This is achieved at the expense of some vulnerability, as the CPDA conceded,

“There’s a risk and there’s always going to be a risk, and it’s a case of having to work with what we’ve got”.

Aesthetic considerations cannot be divorced from questions of ‘function’ and ‘operation’. As the CPDA suggests, “we need to give the impression that they do have security, but it’s got to be the fine balance that doesn’t disrupt the public or disrupt the revenue, the business here. For an embassy absolutely you can make it look like a fortress, an airport and what you’ve got there ... but you can’t do that here, so you find another way and you work with that fine line”. The CPDA explained the importance of achieving this through appropriate forms of security, compatible with the South Bank area and with respects to particular sites and contexts within the wider locale: “We have to be subtle, if it looks like a fortress then it will put people off. So we have to make it as open and welcoming as possible, or seemingly as open and accessible as possible, whilst at the same time thinking of the worst case scenarios, whether that be criminal or terrorist, or whatever and doing as much as we can to respond to that in a proportional and careful way. That balance is important, we don’t want to be too soft, and we don’t want to be too hard”. As the CTSA suggests, in this context measures “blend into the background, and they’re another part of the environment that people walk past that everyday unaware that it’s there, and that’s how it should be, that’s when we know we’ve done our job”. These are explicit attempts to manipulate perceptions and everyday encounters, the blending of security with an environment through an engineering of the infra-ordinary. This applies for both ‘hard’ security and surveillance mechanisms and ‘soft’ governance and management arrangements and as the CPDA stated, “It’s all site specific, crime prevention work and counter terror work has to be site specific. The ground differs”.

‘Hard’ engineering and design solution have been developed to protect individual sites and as part of ongoing efforts to secure the wider area. In part this is achieved through ‘better blast resistance’, where various measures are used to mitigate blast effects, such as laminated glass in strengthened frames to reduce fragmentation. It is also achieved by maximising ‘blast stand-off’. As the CPDA explained when interviewed, “One of the big things at the moment, with the crowded place work ... is stand off distance, so we try to create a barrier as far away from critical area as we can to minimise impact”. A range of hostile vehicle mitigation measures populate the South Bank. The CPDA described how these have been combined with aspirations to pedestrianise the area: “We’ve got protection from vehicles at either end, so you shouldn’t be able to get a vehicle down here ... and that’s all bollard protected with lifters and they are rated, PAS 68 and 69 rated, it forms an



external cordon”<sup>33</sup>. Within the perimeter, further layers of hostile vehicle mitigation protect individual sites, for the most part these are subtle, unobtrusive and sensitive to the particular conditions of the individual sites they protect. Such measures permit regulated circulations, however they are a form of bounding which changes the relationship between different sites and spaces within the broader area. As the CTSA explains, “you’ll find that they allow, or they should allow pedestrian access ... the whole thing is permeable, people can walk past and think nothing of it, but it stops vehicles”. Circulation extends to access requirements for authorised vehicles (emergency, delivery and utility services), as SBEG’s Security Coordinator acknowledges, “we’re dealing with loads of different types of land owners, and some people do need access ... so we’re very conscious of that and designing in the hydraulic bollards that need to be access controlled by the relevant land owner”. The CTSA suggested that ‘access control points’ can be problematic, explaining that “they should be managed”, as ‘active measures’ are known to be vulnerable to duress and deception techniques, he added “we need them to work as blockers and they need to do a job, for the continuity and operational aspect it’s got to work, and that can be a problem you can’t really get away from”.

The problems of circulation are posed as different and distinct problem given the close proximity of roads and the threat posed by VBIEDs. This raises the issue of security and controls being implemented at a range of scales and producing distinct spatialities. Here exclusion, or authorised access is not an option and so the issue becomes that of regulating movements close to the South Bank area, with the aim of providing a negligible speed reduction against vehicle-borne attacks. The CPDA explained that the application of traffic calming measures “changing the road environment, chicaning where we put angles in the roads so that you can’t get up to fifty-five, or even thirty-five [miles per hour]” would reduce the potential and effectiveness, and therefore the threat posed by a penetrative hostile vehicle accessing the area. In implementing such measures hostile vehicle security in the South Bank is put into effect on a number of geographic layers. Whilst the threat of a vehicle-borne attack is well known and documented, the threat posed by water borne vehicles poses a distinct problem in the South Bank. The River Thames is figured as a potential vulnerability, as the CPDA concedes, “there is a threat that someone could use a boat to attack”. However, and interestingly, as the CPDA continued, “in future if the threat

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<sup>33</sup> CPNI has published impact testing and installation guidance documents, in the form of British Standards Institution Publicly Available Specifications (PAS). The two documents are: “PAS 68 entitled ‘Specification for Vehicle Security Barriers’ which covers the manufacture and testing of vehicle security barriers. It is strongly recommended that all vehicle security barriers be specified to comply with PAS 68 at an appropriate performance level; and PAS 69 entitled ‘Guidance for the Selection, Installation and Use of Vehicle Security Barriers’ provides guidance on the selection and installation of vehicle security barriers” (HM Government, 2010e:27).

changes, we might look to do something about the waterfront as well”. This is an example that demonstrates the problematics of the continual extension of threat, and the continual assessment of threat and vulnerability necessitated by mutable, evolving and shifting terrorist tactics.

These ‘hard’ security measures are developed alongside a range of ‘soft’ governance and management arrangements. The CPDA stated the importance of a ‘capable guardian’, explaining, “CCTV is the predominant capable guardian here, there are police officers, PCSOs some of the businesses have their own security, and there are the patrols”. The idea of the ‘capable guardian’ acknowledges and responds to the interdependence of physical measures with electronic and procedural security producing an integrated and holistic security strategy. As with the physical measures, the ‘capable guardian’ must be ‘appropriate’ to the context of different sites, as the CPDA explained, CCTV ensures that “there is a capable guardian all the time long here, but it’s subtle and there are reasons for that, we think it can risk sending out the wrong message if we flood the place with police or with too many obvious security personnel so we try to limit that where we can”. The ‘capable-guardian’ thus entails the blending of security with environments and the engineering of the infra-ordinary in the context of security being appropriate to a sites conditions, and ‘proportionate’ to and therefore commensurate with threat.

When interviewed, SBEG’s Security Coordinator described the breadth of CCTV in the area: “each business have got their own external cameras ... they’re looking after they’re patch of land, so we identified a couple of years ago a couple of blind spots, vulnerable areas and SBEG installed sixty four of it’s own cameras around the area ... they feed into the nearest business, so at least we’ve got coverage of those areas”. Subtle in some areas, more prominent elsewhere, CCTV depicts the strategic use of regimes of visibility and the attempts to structure attention. The presence of CCTV systems is highlighted in compliance with the Data Protection Act 1998. In addition to signalling the presence of CCTV, other signage is present, although as SBEG Security Coordinator explained in an interview, this is strategic, “we’ve got to be very conscious of where we place that signage, because we don’t want to draw attention to the fact that if you come here there’s quite a bit of crime and that’s why we’ve got this signage ... we don’t want to alarm the public or put them off, but we do want the criminals to see them”. Again this is an example of balancing security requirements with the operation and aesthetics of sites and the area.

Management practices of individual sites and the presence of trained personnel is considered central to security practices. The CPDA stressed the importance of staff presence and diligent daily management, “a lot of pressure was put on to make sure that

the environment is well maintained, good housekeeping sends out the right message". The SBEG's Security Coordinator stated that many sites had personnel who had been "project Griffin trained, so we know that in the event of a critical incident, we've got people who've at least got an understanding of how to respond to a critical incident or who are trained in counter terrorism". Several sites operate private security, with an additional presence provided through the South Bank Patrol service. Policing practices, as a member of Lambeth Police Security Desk explained when interviewed, involve "playing that game between attracting people to an area because it's safe, but you don't want to risk people seeing police all over the place all the time and being put off by that". SBEG's Security Coordinator believes the approach successful: "we have the relationship with the police that we can talk with them and highlight issues, and there are certain times where you need a certain type of patrol, i.e. the high visibility ... you need to have intelligence led and targeted patrolling ... plain clothes operations ... some days they'll be out and some days they'll be sat in the control room somewhere monitoring".

The relation of personnel with the environment, and particularly the relation with the habitual were considered integral to enacting security. The member of Lambeth Police Security Desk stated the importance of 'local knowledge', "using local cops who know the area and what we do ... what we will tell to the officers who are on the South Bank all the time, you are the experts on this area ... if a box is out of place, or if a planter is on its side then they will notice it, see it and think there's something wrong, and we will encourage them to notice what is different, out of the ordinary". This sense of the habitual extends to individual and crowd behaviours, "It's about trying to spot suspicious behaviour and knowing what that is, and it is a difficult skill to master ... We're trying to look for abnormal behaviours, spot something that stands out and looks irregular and that's what we tell our officers. If you look at a crowd, then you know if something looks wrong to you, from personal experience you know what is normal in certain situations or what people do". This attention to detail and the relation with the habitual applied to private security personnel, to the South Bank patrol, and those involved in the day-to-day management of individual sites. In addition, here as elsewhere, it is anticipated that 'responsibilised' citizens will be vigilant and act on their suspicions.

### **5.3.2. The Victoria Line**

What we see in the case of the South Bank research site is the development of new rationalities of security, where counter-terrorist security and the city are drawn into novel

forms of reconciliation. Security becomes folded into the South Bank in particular ways, however there, as with the Victoria Line, the aims and how these are achieved are remarkably similar. In the following section I turn to the Victoria Line to continue this discussion of the securing of urban public spaces and further develop how the urban security project increasingly involves the negotiation of the tensions between the freedom to circulate and security as it is refracted through the city.

The Victoria Line is a line which forms part of the London Underground, which and by virtue of its size, scale and importance, is considered a vulnerable and likely terrorist target. Indeed, as the Home Affairs Committee report on CONTEST concluded, “It is so much a part of this country’s identity that I think in that respect it will never drop off the radar” (House of Commons, 2009a:EV1). Security in the context of a mass transit system such as the London Underground must be understood in terms of multiple spaces and circulations, as Nick Agnew, TfL’s Safety and Contingency Planning Manager, explained in evidence presented to the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee 2009 report on CONTEST:

Maintaining the utility of the rail services in the face of the latent threat from terrorism requires a thorough understanding of how the different aspects of mass transit rail combine to operate as a system. In the rail environment, any ‘local’ decision may affect hundreds of thousands of people and train services nationally. Precipitous action to close a station, without first considering how passengers and train movements will be affected, could lead to a number of adverse (and from the perspective of a Public Inquiry, perhaps entirely foreseeable) consequences (House of Commons, 2009a:EV61)

The London Underground presents a distinct challenge, where “the need is to have a security response that is proportionate and is not self-defeating. You have to be able to travel if the purpose is to travel” (House of Commons, 2007:Ev6). As the Home Affairs Committee’s report on CONTEST concluded, the “benefits of open mass transit rail travel are obtained only at the expense of tolerating some exposure to terrorism-related risks” (House of Commons, 2009a:EV61):

The railway, by virtue of its core-function (i.e. to move millions of people each day safely, with the minimum of impediment; but not to provide a ‘citadel’ against terrorist attack) is not a risk-free environment. The societal and individual benefits of rail travel involve exposure to a range of interrelated potential hazards; both foreseeable and

unforeseeable. With direct reference to terrorism, allowing the relatively unhindered movement of four million people each day around the iconic London Underground – without checking first their identity or belongings – is a risk. The absolute benefit (and, arguably, the primary purpose) is that because of the availability of mass transit rail travel, *London works*. The potential cost is that the population to whom the railway remains ‘open’ may, at some point, include terrorists; who may, at some point, attack it (House of Commons, 2009a:EV59, original emphasis)

The openness of the system, the same circulations and freedoms that define this system of mass transit exposes its vulnerability to this enactment of threat:

One has only to buy a ticket to secure largely unrestrained access to the public areas of the rail network – 500 trains, 270 stations on the LU network, and 115 vehicle sets and 129 stations/stops on the London Rail networks – along with millions of fellow passengers operates (House of Commons, 2009a:EV37)

As the Operational Security Manager for the London underground stated in an interview, as well as protecting the travelling crowds, security must protect the infrastructure itself:

With our security, the first thing is that it’s about people, it’s about the people of London and allowing them to move freely, and it’s about our own people ... The other side of it in terms of site security, obviously we do that around things like station design and refurbishments and so on, but also where we’ve got critical infrastructure, we’ll put additional measures in there.

The London Underground adopts a ‘layered approach’ to security, acknowledging “that no single security measure is either fool-proof, or capable of mitigating every type of threat. The aim, therefore, is to reduce the risk rather than seek to eliminate it entirely” (House of Commons, 2007:EV115). The BTP Crime Reduction Manager explained in an interview that a ‘layered approach’ involves security ‘solutions’ which are tailored to differing contexts and problems:

Using what’s available to us in terms of security and making the judgment to say well here we need this, this and this, some of that will be obvious and some of it will be

quite discrete, and it's having that knowledge, we develop layers of defence ... it's sort of an onion style principle, the outside and peel of the layers to what your problem is, or what you think the target is likely to be.

Each of the sixteen stations on the Victoria Line presents different vulnerabilities and security challenges. The design and spaces of stations on the Victoria Line and the extended system has to be taken into account, as does the design of trains and the variable passenger footfall. As the Operational Security Manager for the London underground explained, "The whole thing is trying to get this balance right really ... With a lot of the security that we use ... you basically want to make people know that they're there without it hitting them in the face", he continued, "none of that happens by mistake, that's all part of the overall design standards, and security is a part of that, ensuring we've got what we need and that it's been well designed, incorporated into our plans, either at the redesign phase, or when you're doing a new build". This approach is similar to that adopted on the South Bank, where again security must be reconciled with differing spatial contexts and with the function, aesthetics and with the lived life of the Victoria Line. The Operational Security Manager for the London underground also described efforts to design out vulnerabilities, "the idea there is good levels of lighting, not providing areas where it would be easy to conceal something, designing what are essentially flat landscapes with good site lines, make sure that any horizontal surfaces are slopes so it's very difficult to leave something and conceal it, and that whole concept is built into station design, rolling stock design". The key with security, as TfL's Crime and Disorder Partnership Manager stated, "is business continuity, and how can we make this as normal as possible for the travelling public". This is echoed by the Operational Security Manager for the London underground, "Whatever we do, we don't want to prevent or restrict people as they're moving through our stations and through the system".

As with the South Bank, in this context, target hardening as a concept, "acquires a new significance. It cannot, for example, be assumed safely that any assets deployed to reassure the public (i.e. high-visibility duties performed in crowded locations) would also fulfil a deterrent function. Nor, that any established measures would necessarily deter someone willing to take his or her own life during an attack" (House of Commons 2007:Ev92). Protective security measures are retrospectively fitted and included in upgrade works, including 'better blast resistance' in building and station design, as well on trains. Additional 'hard' security measures address vulnerable areas adjacent to, but outside underground stations, including hostile vehicle mitigation measures to provide 'stand-off'

and mitigate the threat posed by VBIEDs. As the BTP Counter-Terrorism Risk Adviser explained during an interview, ‘hard’ engineering and design solutions involves “looking at the claims of different bits of kit ... and establishing whether there is sufficient benefit to do it, or whether we are invoking the law of unintended consequences. It’s just trying to make sure that in terms of explosives and explosions as an attack, that we are doing the right things for the right reasons”.

Integrating ‘hard’ measures with ‘soft’ governance and management is central to day-to-day security practice: “CCTV and policing, together with the vigilance of our own staff, provide a controlled environment which is hostile to criminals and those planning possible terrorist attacks” (House of Commons 2009a:Ev38). CCTV is considered “vital to managing security on the Underground” (House of Commons 2009a: Ev37). More than 8,500 cameras currently operate throughout the London Underground, covering stations, ticket hall areas, walkways, platforms and some trains: “Whilst they may have a deterrent effect, CCTV cameras are primarily used for crime reduction and investigation and general operational purposes rather than as a key plank of TRANSEC’s protective security regime. We require CCTV coverage of certain locations where an item may be secreted” (2007:EV136). As is the case with the South Bank, here the figure of the ‘capable-guardian’ is considered invaluable. Again this emphasises the interplay of physical security with electronic and procedural security which here, as with the South Bank, produces a holistic security strategy.

BTP are responsible for the day-to-day policing of the Victoria Line<sup>34</sup>. As the Operational Security Manager for the London Underground explained when interviewed, “The fact that we’ve got the dedicated Policing is absolutely critical, because they know the environment, they understand the impact of taking the wrong sorts of decisions and stalling our trains in the tunnels”. He continued, “we’ve got around about seven hundred uniformed police ... I think we’ve got the balance just about right now, we’ve got enough to provide a reassurance ... if there is an incident, an assault or an unattended item that’s been declared suspicious, we know that there will be a good response to that”. The police understand the operation of the system and are familiar with the environment itself, the role of habit again considered in the enactment of security. As well as the importance of being familiar with and ‘knowing’ an environment, the BTP now use Behavioural Assessment Screening System

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<sup>34</sup> Policing services include a wide-range of ‘specialist’ policing functions unique to the requirements of the railway in addition to more generalist policing activities. Terrorism-related threats (and a range of broader safety implications associated with the fear of terrorism) are managed by BTP via a risk management based approach. In addition to intelligence-led activities, railway-specific procedures are in place to address the vulnerabilities associated with open, mass-transit, rail transport (House of Commons 2007:EV84).

(BASS), as Transport for London Crime and Disorder Partnership Manager explained, “the British Transport Police are the only force in the country that are actually training their officers in a system called the Behavioural Assessment Screening System, BASS, but what that’s about is about looking at behaviours”<sup>35</sup>. This behavioural pattern recognition aims to identify body language displayed by potential suicide bombers and those undertaking hostile reconnaissance. Explosives’ search dogs are regularly deployed, as the House of Commons Transport Committee review concluded: “The use of dogs in a reassurance role is a measure that, in comparison to some other developments (the overt use of firearms officers, for example) has been universally well received by the travelling public” (House of Commons, 2007:91).

It is the judgment of TfL that a high level of customer service improves security (TfL, 2010). The role of maintenance is recognised as important: “A clear, well maintained, with managed access points and reception facilities set in tidy grounds, presents an image of professionalism and offers less opportunity for an intruder to go unnoticed” (HM Government, 2010d:29). Every station is staffed throughout when trains are running, the majority staffed at all times. The underground network is compartmentalised, with staff dedicated to a particular zone, and safety and security practices are built into daily working practices enacting habitual knowledge. As the Operational Security Manager for the London underground explained, “our staff know the environment, that is absolutely key to part of providing what we call a controlled environment, because we’re managing that public space, it’s not just being left to it’s own devices, so that’s quite key”. As well as training to help to recognise suspicious behaviours, as the Operational Security Manager for the London underground continued, the familiarity of staff with a particular environment is enrolled in the security architecture, “they know what’s not right and they’ll deal with it and that’s key”. Staff are trained via exercises (see Anderson, 2010b) as a means of anticipating and preparing for potential terrorist incidents, exercises both virtual and ‘real time’. These range from drills involving only London Underground or TfL staff to major exercises staged with the involvement of a number of agencies (see House of Commons, 2007:108). As the Operational Security Manager for the London underground explained, “our staff regularly

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<sup>35</sup> BASS is a system whereby officers are trained to identify suspects through indicators such as behaviours, body language, expressions and signs of deception, amongst other things which may indicate involvement in terrorism or other criminality (House of Commons, 2008): “Behavioural Awareness Screening System (BASS)—Since 2005, over 1200 police officers have been trained to incorporate BASS into their daily policing duties. This has greatly assisted police activity associated with screening and stop and search of people under the provisions of the Terrorism Act” (House of Commons, 2009a:EV59).



deal with operational incidents ... they know how to do evacuations and regularly practice them is really important”<sup>36</sup>.

The crowds that circulate within the Victoria Line are enrolled in the securing of the system. As the Operational Security Manager for the London underground contends, “we’ve got three and a half million people who use the system everyday, and are everywhere, so they’re the people that will also add to this, telling us when something is out of the ordinary, when something is wrong”. Along with staff, ‘help points’, of which there are more than 1500 across the network, provide a mechanism to pass on information regarding risks, “unattended packages or suspicious activity and to summon help in emergencies” (TfL, 2010):

[W]e believe that the eyes and ears of the millions of daily users of London’s road and rail networks are a vital resource. Passengers must continue to be given every encouragement and opportunity to report suspicious objects and patterns of behaviour, and their alertness should be regularly reinforced by appropriate announcements, posters, etc. This campaign should be coupled with one reminding them of the need to ensure that they do not inadvertently cause alarms and delays through innocent actions which could be capable of misunderstanding, e.g. by leaving bags unattended (House of Commons 2007, EV93)

The London Underground is an example of an environment where the responsabilisation of citizens and vigilance to suspicions is vigorously encouraged. Regular, repeated announcements combined with a variety of posters, signs and stickers aim to raise awareness of potential threats, encouraging ‘awareness’ and ‘suspicion’. The Operational Security Manager for the London underground stated that this is achieved “through customer awareness campaigns and we try to change them regularly ... So we do take into account that it can become part of the background and we don’t want that to happen so refreshing it helps to keep the message going”. These aim to raise awareness, however the threat is not clearly defined, loose graphical images are displayed on posters, recent schemes have called for the use of all senses to be aware of anything suspicious.

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<sup>36</sup> TRANSEC circulates advice known as the ‘HOT’ Protocol, devised by the BTP in the early 1990s as a ‘mental prompt’ to assist underground and overland railway staff in evaluating the risk associated with unattended items (House of Commons, 2006). The BTP Counter-Terrorism Risk Adviser described the ‘Hot’ Protocol in an interview “what we’re saying is that if what you’ve found hasn’t been hidden (H), if it doesn’t look obviously (O) suspicious, and if it is typical (T) of what you encounter regularly, it’s lost property, deal with it. If one of those factors is different, reconsider your options, so in terms of characterising suspicion, our three factors are Hidden, Obviously suspicious, and Typical of the environment”.

## Conclusion

In summary, this chapter has situated and forwarded a discussion of a specific counter-terrorist security apparatus in the context of the securing of cities, and in particular within public spaces, in the UK, and in London as a named example. Through the course of the chapter I have discussed how the everyday city and urban life itself are increasingly becoming a 'referent object' of security in response to the enactment of emerging and shifting threats of terrorism and in particular the 'event of terror'. It has also begun to demonstrate how this specific apparatus of security moves from a set of processes and techniques that aim to counter the threats of terror to become present as a range of interventions within the spaces of urban life and as something that is lived, this will be discussed in greater depth in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7.

This chapter has demonstrated that biopolitics is central to the UK Government's NSS and CONTEST where the preoccupation with enabling and securing the circulations and 'freedoms' of liberal-democratic life are primary concerns. Attending to this claim, this chapter has demonstrated the tensions that emerge between freedom, circulation and security, within everyday urban settings and the different ways in which these problematics are then reconciled in and through the emerging geographies of everyday securing. Security in the context of urban spaces involves the securing and protection of the biological of the individual and of the population especially in relation to 'crowded places' where spaces are defined, albeit arguably poorly, in terms of population itself, that is a place defined by density, by its crowdedness. The biological cannot be separated from other expressions of life, the elements and processes which enable a valued life to be sustained, the enabling and fostering of a distinct way of life in the context of urban spaces. This is a conception of life to be secured which is supported and enabled by a whole series of processes and circulations that have come to define the personal and commercial 'freedoms' of liberal-democratic life. The combination and reconciliation of security, freedom and circulation enacts a form of security which is necessarily spatially contingent. As such, the rationales for security and the interventions deployed with the aim of countering the threats of terror are characterised by a rationality of site and case specificity. The threats posed by terrorism to the city spaces and to urban life has established significant new challenges for how we understand security and the very means by which it can be provided. These new geographies of urban security require spatially contingent interventions to ensure that the valued life of cities and distinct urban sites is fostered, maintained and ultimately secured.

The everyday spaces of urban life are, therefore, increasingly primed to the possibilities of attack, saturated with a range of security and surveillance mechanisms. In relation to this, a range of different logics of security coalesce and mix in accordance with different urban spaces and contexts, producing different environments of threat and counter-threat. In the securing of the everyday city traditional logics of security coalesce with anticipatory action, protection, detection, prevention, deterrence, delay, mitigation, etcetera. These are not stable, as Foucault (2007) contends, security is changeable, continually altering to incorporate new elements. Whilst Massumi (in Rice, 2010) is correct to state that cities spaces are primed to render anticipatory action possible, and where Dillon (2005b) is right in his assertion that contingency drives contemporary security, in the context of the everyday city and the securing of the everyday, security involves a mixing of these and other logics. At the same time, these measures are increasingly tensed to act on the future in the present. Events of terror, whilst signalling the limits of calculable knowledge are subjected to risk calculations, judgements and other anticipatory logics which seek to 'surprise the surprise', to render it actionable and so to act in order to prevent these events or to mitigate their consequences. In terms of how security is enacted and made present within cities, geographies of absence and presence are becoming central to the everyday practice of security. These new forms of security, and the examples taken from the two research sites, are primed to become part of the everyday life of urban spaces and everyday happenings in different ways, as will be discussed in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. Security is expected to move from being a set of mechanisms, understood as technical and instrumental, to become something which is itself lived and everyday life shifts from being the 'referent object; of security to that within which security itself lives.

In the context of urban security there is a need to consider how the range of security and surveillance mechanisms that saturate urban spaces, are encountered as a range of absences and presences, once they becomes part of the everyday life of cities, an everyday urban geography of security is thus imperative. As this chapter has argued, a specific apparatus of security has emerged that comes to be organised in certain and very specific ways, primed to be part of the everyday life of urban spaces through the ordering processes of 'invisible security'. In this chapter I have argued that counter-terror security interventions in public spaces within cities in the UK are increasingly primed to be a part of everyday life and primed to emerge from this background in the event of an event. This is a dynamic of invisibility and response which is central to how new ways of securing public space operate where the aim is to foster circulations and enable the enable the personal and commercial 'freedoms' of liberal-democratic life of London.

In Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 I will discuss how the measures located in the two research sites become part of urban space and urban life itself. With reference to the security interventions that populate the two research sites and through witnessing and describing the conditions of everyday encounters I will argue that there are two generic ways in which security takes place within urban life. Firstly, in Chapter 6 I discuss security as an absent presence, this questions both the design of these spaces and of security interventions of different kinds, and also the conditions of encounter where security as it is encountered as background, sunken and infra-ordinary. In Chapter 7 I then turn my focus to the ways in which counter-terrorist security changes form and emerges from this background as a heightened presence. Through these two chapters I will show how the specific mechanisms discussed here in relation to the two research sites become part of everyday life in particular ways.

## 6. The Infra-Ordinary Background of Security

### Introduction

Theresa: I think it is true, people just won't think about security most of the time, it just won't cross their mind, I don't think it really bothers people. It didn't bother me. Before I did this for you I can't think of a time when I've been aware of security, or thought about it, I just wouldn't think about it, so it just goes to show. It's taken for granted that things are there, but people just won't think about security, they certainly aren't worrying about it being there or not, wherever they are, unless there is something happening, or they need it for whatever reason, then I don't think people are that bothered about it.

In this passage, Theresa describes security as part of the 'rest instead': that which is generally not taken note of, that which is known but rarely acknowledged, that which has no importance. She describes security as a part of the infra-ordinary spaces and happenings, as set out in Chapter 5. Looking back to the previous chapter, I argued that security is increasingly being 'designed into' infra-ordinary spaces and happenings. With respects to the specific form of security apparatus discussed in Chapter 5, invisibility is central to how these new ways of securing public space function where the aim is biopolitical, is to ensure a set of 'freedoms' and to foster 'good' circulations. Bearing this in mind, what I do in this chapter is show how these security mechanisms become part of everyday life in particular ways. So, security moves from being a set of mechanisms to something lived, and everyday life shifts from being an object of security to that within which security lives. But I am not just interested in security in general. I am interested in how the specific mechanisms discussed in relation to the two research sites become part of everyday life. As such it contributes to works that focus on the imbrications of counter-terrorist security and the city, of how a particular form of security comes to be organised in certain and very specific ways, as well as questioning everyday experience with the aim of further developing accounts of the everyday life of security.

Firstly, this is a concern for the infra-ordinariness of security and in particular the ordinariness of many encounters with security interventions as these become embedded in urban spaces and take place as part of the background of urban life. Whilst little has been written about how security is encountered and enacted, work that has considered the ways

security is experienced as a part of the everyday life of cities has tended to focus on it as somehow present within urban life (see Boddy, 2008; Katz, 2007; Marcuse, 2006). I am interested in continuing the work of the previous chapter to consider how forms of security are primed to be part of the everyday life of urban spaces, the ordering processes of 'invisible security' (Briggs, 2005). Security as background, as a sunken part of that which is truly daily in our daily lives is a condition which is central to how new ways of securing public space function when the aim is to foster circulations and ensure a set of freedoms. The taken for grantedness of forms of counter-terrorist security is understood as significant in terms of both the efficacy of this security apparatus and its place in everyday urban geographies and in "the constant to and fro of movements which sustain that fabric" of urban life (Amin and Thrift, 2002:83).

Secondly and related, this chapter is concerned with attending to the familiarity and neglect that accompanies the ordinariness of the everyday. In the context of the form of security described in Chapter 5, this seeks to bear witness to and to describe how, through everyday encounters, security can come to be both significant and insignificant; foreground and background; present, but not present. At the same time, this aims to consider security as it is assembled and participates as part of background feeling and affective atmospheres. These are the problematics that this chapter addresses and my focus rests with the largely neglected everyday practices and movements through which bodies enact security as a range of presences and absences.

Thirdly, an interest in the practice of everyday life within geography has highlighted the importance of embodiment and everyday practice, which as I have contended have remained largely neglected in urban security studies. Here everyday practice is central to understanding the everyday life of security and its place as part of the infra-ordinary background. In particular it draws attention to routine movements and habitual gestures, embodied copings through which human and non-human bodies participate in active and ongoing assemblages, some of which are related to security, some of which are not. The different modes of encounter that people have with different forms of security offers an explanation of how security becomes a part of a background everydayness. For security, this forwards a concern for the ways assemblages, which are composed of elements which are present and absent, take place.

The chapter begins by developing the idea of security as a part of the infra-ordinary background of the city and the ordinary ways security is encountered and enacted through everyday practice. It is demonstrated here how security comes to be relatively free from our attentions, a largely taken for granted part of what goes without saying, absent

simultaneously. Of interest here are the ways through which people enact security as a range of presences and absences. Second, I consider the implications of this infra-ordinariness and the expectation that urban spaces will always be somehow secured. Here, a general and vague structure of expectation emerges as it is assumed that urban spaces must be secured, by default, because they are part of contemporary cities. This expectation is often, but not always, separate from actual encounters with specific security interventions. The presence of security comes to be uncertain. Third, I explore the ambiguous role of security within the everyday life of cities. Where security is often a background presence and an uncertainty, the actual forms and practices of security are often encountered ambiguously. Although security becomes increasingly normalised, the processes of normalisation make security an ambiguous presence. Fourthly, I explore the ways in which security as a background presence is experienced as a background feeling, thinking through the relations between security and affective atmospheres. This moves to examine the conditions of ‘being-secure’, where it is not so straightforward as security producing the affect that it names. Taken together, these four aspects help us to think through and to better understand the imbrications of security and the city, whilst describing how security can be experienced through daily practices, and encountered as part of the infra-ordinary background of the city.

## 6.1. Becoming background

SERVICE 10:38; **SECURITY 10:42**; SERVICE 10:48; SERVICE 10:51; SERVICE 10:55; **SECURITY 10:57**; SERVICE 10:59; SERVICE 11:03; SERVICE 11:07; SERVICE 11:11; **SECURITY 11:12**; SERVICE 11:15; SERVICE 11:19; SERVICE 11:23; **SECURITY 11:27**; SERVICE 11:31; SERVICE 11:35; SERVICE 11:39; **SECURITY 11:42**; SERVICE 11:43; SERVICE 11:47; SERVICE 11:51; SERVICE 11:55; **SECURITY 11:57**; SERVICE 11:59; **SECURITY 12:12**; **SECURITY 12:27**; SERVICE 12:34; **SECURITY 12:42**; SERVICE 12:54; **SECURITY 12:57**; SERVICE 13:04; **SECURITY 13:12**; SERVICE 13:14; SERVICE 13:24; **SECURITY 13:27**; SERVICE 13:34; SERVICE; 13:38; **SECURITY 13:42**; SERVICE 13:48; **SECURITY 13:57**; SERVICE 13:58; **SECURITY 14:12**

“Ladies and gentlemen, this is a security announcement. Please remember to keep all of your personal belongings and luggage with you at all times. Any unclaimed articles will be removed or destroyed”. Preceded by a single chime toning, the duration of a security announcement at Kings Cross St Pancras underground station is

approximately fourteen seconds. I've begun to recognise the different chimes heralding security and service calls. Security announcements take place regularly, at fifteen-minute intervals. The oration is artificial, a mechanical female voice synthetically sounding out precisely enunciated words – slowly and clearly delivered.

(Observant participation, Kings Cross St Pancras, 11.02.09)<sup>37</sup>

The security measures identified in Chapter 5 are so often part of the everydayness of cities which goes unnoticed, an argument that should be extended to security interventions found throughout cities. Drawing on Perec, in Chapter 3 I described this realm as the 'infra-ordinary', by which I meant the things that we do everyday and the spaces that we do them in without giving them so much as a moment's thought. Without an excessive attention these security and surveillance interventions become part of the infra-ordinary and are all too easily overlooked, even as they are encountered and enacted. Indeed, in an interview with a member of the BTP Crime and Disorder Partnership Unit, it was acknowledged and expected that security measures often "just become part of the wallpaper", as security and surveillance interventions after a time will become something that "people won't take notice of". Security measures, as Daniel writes in his diary, can become overlooked:

As I travel on this line regularly, I don't think about security anymore. I'm familiar with my surroundings, and the context of my exposure to relative insecurity, and this familiarity breeds complacency. I'm only on the route for 20 minutes, and nothing changes, so I just make my way to work (Self-completed diary, Daniel, 21.04.10).

To begin this section, I am interested in what Adair (2009), following Perec, has referred to as the 'quotidian invisibility' of the infra-ordinary and how security comes to be a part of the background of urban life. We might think of Daniel's reference to familiarity and complacency with respects to the manifold ways that we come into contact with security interventions as they receive our 'daily inattention' (Highmore, 2010). This movement, or change, is significant, as are the different and dynamic ways in which it occurs:

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<sup>37</sup> At different stations on the Victoria Line although the content of security announcements is essentially the same, the delivery (manual or automated), composition of the message and frequency of announcements differs. The Operational Security Manager for the London Underground offered the following explanation when interviewed, "Interestingly enough what we used to do is not legislate for it, we used to let staff make the announcements that they thought was right, but one of the things that we introduced about two years ago was a consistent message, that this is the words that we want you to say, and it's the first time we've succeeded, and now what they should do is at bigger stations it's every thirty minutes that they make announcements and at the smaller ones it should be once an hour. And the idea is that you're going to hear one of these announcements at least once on your journey, that's the concept behind it".



Marie: In some stations you can see yourself in the screen when you are being CCTV'd and I don't like that, that makes me aware that there are cameras there. But at first that really shocked me when I arrived here, I felt angry about it actually, that I didn't understand why they had them there, but over the past four years I suppose I have got used to it, I don't notice it at all, so from the shock of knowing that everything is filmed I've forgotten and now won't think about it. It's there and for a month, maybe I was annoyed but now, it's just there.

For Marie, the presence of CCTV was initially shocking, having moved to London from Grenoble, she states that she reacted angrily to its presence, and yet, over time she has grown used to it and now it is a largely unthought of background presence. A stark example of this is provided by Lene, a participant who had, at the time of the interview, worked on the South Bank for eighteen months and had walked along the South Bank to her place of work in Gabriel's Wharf daily during that time. At the beginning of the interview Lene admitted that she had forgotten about completing the diary and the prompts that I had provided. Consequently she had walked her journey as normal:

Lene: I don't think, um ... well like I say, it, it didn't make me think a lot, I mean, I have to say I didn't really think about it really, apart from when you came and spoke to us and asked me to, so I don't know how much help I can be, um I ... I don't know, um ... I have to say, err I haven't noticed anything really, but I've not necessarily been looking out for it ... I don't really pay attention to anything like that.

Admitting that she had not considered nor noticed the presence of security any more than usual, Lene stated that she remained largely unaware of the presence of security interventions, uncertain of their presence and unsure of how to begin to describe how she enacted and experienced security. The uncertainty described here by Lene is revealing and is a more acute example of the uncertainty and difficulties expressed by other participants.

Robert: It takes quite a bit of effort to think about it, it's not as easy as, well, it's not there in front of you, so it does take some effort to take the time to slow down and look around ... It is quite amazing when you do stop and realise what's there, the amount was the thing that really got me the amount actually of stickers, posters, and the cameras, the police. The cameras, I can't remember how many I wrote, but there were like twenty before I even got onto a train and I hadn't noticed them before,

because I wasn't looking or paying attention, and you don't notice them, you think, maybe they're hidden or there aren't any, or I'm not aware, then actually when I thought I don't really know I hadn't noticed them.

For this participant, the effort involved in apprehending and describing the forms of security he encounters daily through his commute on the Victoria Line is a reflection of its place as part of the infra-ordinary background and the ways in which he encounters security interventions day-to-day. What is interesting about Robert's admission in the above example is that whilst he admits that the security presences are numerous, he acknowledges that rather than security being somehow always already present, the security and surveillance interventions he now cites as plentiful are most often a part of the humdrum, the nonevents of the infra-ordinary, part of "what happens," as Perec put it, "when nothing happens" (2010:3): the rest instead. Whilst security is increasingly ubiquitous in the everyday spaces of urban life, it is certainly not omnipresent in the ways in which these spaces are lived and experienced. In the following extract, Margaret recounts this situation, describing how the security and surveillance measures she regularly encounters at Finsbury Park Underground station are a largely neglected part of the environment – in short, the background infra-ordinary fabric of everyday life that is so often unnoticed:

Margaret: you don't need to look up or think about what you're doing so you don't notice what's around. I couldn't tell you what's in the stations, I couldn't even tell you the colour of the walls in the stations I use. It's like when you go in someone's house, unless you're really observant or you're really interested in interior design [laughs], I don't know the colour of my brothers living room walls are and how many times have I been in my brothers house? I'm just not interested, and I've got other things I'm doing. A lot of the time you're switched off, there's a lot going on that you're not really aware of ... There's those things you're interested in, well, maybe not interested, but things you think about and pay attention to and the rest gets blocked out.

What Margaret describes here is security as a part of the environment which does not attract her attention, a part of the infra-ordinary "which is generally not taken note of, that which is not noticed, that which has no importance" (Perec, 2010:3). This of course does not suggest that for Margaret, nor indeed for other participants, that security is accepted, rather it reflects the form of the security apparatus described in the previous chapter, an apparatus involving practices of embedding security into the spaces and happenings of

everyday life. These security measures are primed to be part of the everyday life of cities; security becomes something which is lived. As the previous chapter demonstrated, many of the forms of security and the techniques present within both sites are required to be 'appropriate' and 'acceptable', specific to the conditions of and requirements of the two sites (for example police officers; CCTV cameras; security announcements; bollards and barriers; security posters, signs and stickers). These interventions are not as purposefully demonstrable as other styles and arrangements of security which are more visible and obvious presences (consider the security in airports, for example)<sup>38</sup>, many of these techniques are enacted in one way or another precisely with the intention that they remain largely unnoticed. The presence of security within the two research sites therefore often becomes an absence simultaneously:

Theresa: I think it goes to show how easy it is to just walk past things without noticing them, or thinking about them. The number of times I've walked along here and never noticed the cameras, but I suppose it's because I don't think about security, not just along here, I would never normally think about it. And thinking are you aware? And do you feel safe? I certainly wouldn't, normally think about that. I feel, I feel safe, but I'm not normally aware of the security that's here, I wouldn't think about it normally, no ... well, I wouldn't usually be thinking about feeling safe or whatever either.

In this passage Theresa concedes that as well as overlooking the presence of the various security interventions, she encounters daily whilst walking on the South Bank, the conditions of (in)security, and the associated positive or negative affects of such conditions, are not commonly everyday concerns. I will return to and discuss these background feelings more fully in the final section of this chapter, but for now I am interested in Theresa's example as being suggestive of the condition of 'anaesthesia', the 'dreamless sleep', as described by Perec (2008a). In this way security is enacted as an absence, or perhaps more accurately as a range of absent presences. This suggests that whilst the presence of security is already-known it is rarely acknowledged (Sheringham, 2000). The ordinariness of this form of security, and the ordinary ways through which it is encountered and enacted render it both absent and present simultaneously. It is precisely "what happens every day and recurs every day" (Perec, 2008a:210), as Perec put it, which is significant here. As such, security comes to be encountered and enacted in much the same ways as other

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<sup>38</sup> For examples of works that have discussed security in airports see Adey (2004a, 2004b 2008, 2009) and Salter (2004, 2006, 2007, 2008).

presences that constitute the infra-ordinary background of the daily life of the two research sites, and indeed other urban spaces: simultaneously absent and present:

Shanthi: It becomes part of your surroundings. I think everything slowly changes into things that you don't recognise or notice, I think then it's got to be drawn to your attention and even then you might notice, you might not ... it becomes like anything else, like you don't think why they're there or what they're doing after a while, you just walk past ... it's there but you don't know it's there [laughs]. I don't know though, like if they started to change the security, moving the cameras or whatever I don't think I'd really notice that either ... It shows how easy it is to walk past it and not realise.

Here, Shanthi has suggested that in her experience of using the Victoria Line regularly, the presence of security interventions, far from being already present, are encountered and enacted as an absence, becoming something that she does not notice. This is an example of how security has often already happened, already becoming part of bodies (for instance, passing underneath a CCTV camera). In such instances, although an encounter takes place, there is never necessarily a moment of origin, it is absent. The presence of a materially present security process may thus be an absence simultaneously, as a security presence may not necessarily ever become present to a body. Habitual practices and habitual engagements are important here. As a part of the infra-ordinary background of everyday life, security measures can be understood as being enacted and engaged with primarily through a range of everyday habitual practices (see Harrison, 2000; Thrift, 2000c):

Iain: I think it's far removed from your consciousness, it's all a bit of a blur when you're commuting isn't it, it's true of most things that are repetitive, if I drive some places literally anything could happen, after I've made a few journeys to the same place, anything could happen next to the car and I would have been blissfully ignorant, I wouldn't be able to recount a single moment of the journey and it's the same on the tube, I'd say, even if they don't change the adverts enough on the tube, I'll stop noticing them, you know even if you see, you look up and think oh I've seen all that before and you don't register anything, then if you see something new you think oh right I'll read that.

Iain travels on the Victoria Line twice a day each day of the week for work, his journey on the line beginning at Kings Cross and departing at Victoria, near to his place of work. Having made this journey for over four years he describes a situation where security is mixed with the background fabric of the different spaces he passes through. It is through various everyday practices and embodied dispositions, in particular those of routine and habit, that security becomes part of the everydayness described as infra-ordinary. The security interventions within the two research sites are importantly enacted as part of what Sheringham (2007:205), following Nancy, has referred to as the 'inappearance' of the *quotidien*, as opposed to the 'spectacle' of the event. To turn back to the concerns of the previous chapter; there I argued that a discourse of security has emerged that emphasises its appropriateness, acceptability and the way in which it is bespoke and fits into different urban conditions. Here we could say that it 'fits in' because of how it becomes one set of objects amongst others in everyday life. Perhaps security is no different to other materialities encountered everyday. However, this would be too simple. In the following section I want to emphasise the specificity of how security becomes present: through a structure of uncertainty.

## **6.2. Expecting security**

It has increasingly come to be expected that a range of security and surveillance interventions will be present within the spaces of urban life. This expectation is however often generalised and uncertain and is not reliant on actual encounters with specific security presences. We are interested in so many things above and beyond security. Where it is emphasised that counter-terrorist security must be 'appropriate' and 'acceptable' given a variety of different urban conditions, a structure of uncertainty is intimately linked to the specific form of security described in the previous empirical chapter. It is also often unclear what role security mechanisms play in the everyday life of the city and the securitisation of urban life, one amongst many other (possible) referent objects. This form of security is made present within the spaces of contemporary urban life as an uncertainty:

In general, I had expected to see more security; I had anticipated more types and incidence of security to record. I feel that I noticed only the most obvious indicators of security; cameras hanging from the ceiling, bright signs and markers, people and barriers. I don't feel that even with me searching, I saw much that I hadn't noticed before (noticed, but not taken on-board particularly, as I hadn't deemed them worth

consideration). Where I didn't see security measures, it did largely concern me. I did expect to see more security signs, particularly on the trains themselves. Their absence made me assume that they were there anyway, and that I simply couldn't see them. But their absence did make me believe that they might be hidden which was a) insidious and b) more likely to be ineffective, because if they were hidden then they would be limited in their scope. In essence, this meant that whether they were actually there or not, if I couldn't see them, then I was less comforted (Self completed diary, Daniel).

Whilst regular claims are made that security and surveillance technologies and measures are becoming ever more ubiquitous in the spaces of contemporary urban life, as Daniel notes in this diary entry, it is often difficult to identify and to describe the presences of various techniques now employed to secure the everyday city. Participants acknowledged that they were uncertain of and often unable to locate the security which they expected to be present within either of the two research sites, admitting that they were uncertain of the particular measures:

Marie: I watch people, I always watch people, but I don't really, I don't think I ever look for security, I know I don't do that. I think I watch more if I take a regular commute, I think I notice more and more also, but not really security which is strange, I think, I know there are some cameras, but I couldn't draw a map and show you where, and I think that I know the area quite well, know the stations I mean.

In spite of Marie making the same journey to and from work daily, she admits that she is uncertain of the security which is present in the spaces of her commute. Marie claims that she gives little thought to the security measures that she encounters everyday, a common admission amongst participants. Although admitting that she is uncertain of specific security presences, Marie hints at a generalised expectation that particular security measures, in this instance CCTV cameras, will be present. This structure of expectation is suggestive not only of the increasing normalisation of security measures within the everyday spaces of urban life but also the specific form of security discussed in the previous chapter. Whilst this was the case, when asked to reflect on measures that they already knew to be present, or those interventions they expected to be part of either site, participants conceded that the practical exercise was difficult:

Patrick: It does appear that security is largely forgotten about.

Robert: No, that's probably very true, you can't live in London and not expect that there's going to be a lot of police, CCTV and what have you, but you're right most people aren't really aware of it, not anymore than being able to say that it's there.

Patrick: The specifics of it.

Robert: Yeah, yeah exactly, I think that's what the diary did for me and I consider myself to be quite an observant person, or I like to think that I take an interest in my surroundings.

For this participant, there is a clear expectation that security must be somehow present, he cites examples of forms of techniques which are readily encountered within urban spaces, gesturing that he expects these and additional security interventions to be found on the Victoria Line. Even with direction, participants are uncertain about the presences, or absence, of security in different ways. Participants stated that locating the security was often challenging and as such they conceded that they remained uncertain of the presence, or not, of security within the site, and uncertain of the specific forms of security which are there:

Nilukshi: Not actually that useful necessarily, because sometimes, most of the time I thought that I couldn't find things because I'm not looking for them, like I don't notice things because I'm not looking or because I'm preoccupied. I actually went out of my way to try and find stuff though and it still wasn't that much easier ... so even though I was actively looking I didn't find anything. So I was no more aware than if I just not even noticed it. In fact I suppose I am more aware, I'm more aware of the fact that I still don't know where it is.

These are expectations that are not necessarily supported by evidence of security, they are often independent of encounters with specific security and surveillance mechanisms. They represent a far more generalised and vague structure of expectation. Andrew, for example, conceded that he remains uncertain of the particular techniques and security arrangements that may or may not be present within the South Bank:

Andrew: I wouldn't even say I was more aware, um ... probably only a bit more, only because I knew it was there anyway, now I might be looking for it more than I was so I'm seeing it more. It's usually in places like this, so it's obviously going to be there.

This and similar interview experiences are significant. Participants acknowledged that they were largely unsure of whether security is present or not. They stated that they had assumed that security would be present, without certainty of the specific measures they expected to encounter. So we have a distinction between, on the one hand, security in general and, on the other, specific mechanisms of security. Security in general is expected even in the absence of any specific security measures (this has important implications for the affects of security that I will discuss in the final section of this chapter):

Robert: When you see the police or notice a camera, the thought inevitably crosses your mind, for me it's not a serious thought or I don't start debating whether it's a good or a bad thing, but people are aware of it, I certainly knew it was there, but I'm not sure I was aware of it in the same way that you've asked me to be aware of it, and I think unless something happens to make you think about it, or you're in one of those instances where you see the police talking with someone, then I think you forget about it. If I do think about it I quickly revert.

Patrick: You knew there was security, but not in an engaged sense.

Robert: No, exactly, not in any way engaged, and I wouldn't think about it, and I have to be honest that's how I am now, well I was up until a day or so ago and I only really thought about it again because I knew I was going to be interviewed, that shows how quickly it slipped my mind. And you're moving though aren't you so you don't have the time to think about it.

For this participant, the presence and absence of particular security and surveillance interventions is again an uncertainty. Robert outlines a vague and general understanding that security is present through his journey on the Victoria Line, but was unable to recall moments of encountering specific forms. Participants stated that prior to involvement with this research, they had assumed security would be present in the two research sites, but admitted that they would not have given a great deal of thought to this, if any, citing security events as occasions when security becomes a more intensified presence (I will return to this in Chapter 7). The forms of security present within the two research sites, and the uncertainty regarding their presence on the part of participants, is in marked contrast to other forms of security techniques and arrangements found elsewhere. The spaces of the airport provide a classic example of highly visible demonstrable security. Iain, who had recently returned from holiday, compared his experiences of security as uncertain and as



largely absent on the Victoria Line with the prominence of the security apparatus he had experienced whilst in Heathrow airport:

Iain: when you're in an airport, the security you get there and, the amount of security and how intense it is ... you can't escape it there ... airports are really really security conscious and really obvious about it too but people still carry on don't they? And most people don't complain, they don't care, they're not going to stop flying because of it. I think they accept it, it's just part of travelling by air now, you expect that sort of security to be there ... I think that shows it's a normal part of it now, you expect it there and you accept that when you're in London you're going to find a lot of security, but I don't think that's a problem for most people. And you don't interact with the security in somewhere like the underground or anywhere else in London really unless you need it for some reason ... you don't have to put your bag through an x-ray and you don't get stopped and searched and that's what's going to make a difference to people I think.

Patrick: A difference to your experience?

Iain: Yeah, and to you knowing if it's there or not, if you're using the diary to get people to look for them, I thought that's because they usually don't, I don't and I think that shows something doesn't it?

As Iain admits, he would not normally consider the presence of security, and would be unable to identify or describe the various security measures that he encounters during his daily journey on the Victoria Line, although he states a generalised expectation that security will be somehow present. This is in contrast with the very obvious demonstrable form of security that he concedes has become an expected part of airports.

Whilst the presence of security within the two research sites is often expected, as the examples in this section have shown, the presence of specific security measures often remains an uncertainty. Returning to the specificity of the forms of security described in the previous chapter we can see how this uncertainty folds into the particular form of security that has been described there. Counter-terrorist security within urban spaces has sought novel ways of protecting and managing the everyday life of civic spaces where the aim is to foster circulations. These measures are primed to be a part of the infra-ordinary everydayness, a form of security that works by being embedded into the city, and in the everyday life of urban spaces within which security itself then lives. This will inevitably lead to a degree of uncertainty. However, this uncertainty must be considered in light of the

particular structure of expectation that we see emerging within contemporary cities. It is expected that urban spaces will always be somehow secured. There is an expectation that security will be present, however this expectation is often separate from actual encounters with specific security mechanisms.

### **6.3. Security as an ambiguous presence**

As the Chapter 5 demonstrated, counter-terrorist security within urban spaces has required a variety of new and specific ways of protecting and managing cities. Where the aim is to foster circulations and to ensure a set of freedoms that define liberal democratic life, these forms of security work by being embedded into the city and in the everyday life of urban spaces. Whilst it is right to contend that the spaces of everyday urban life are increasingly saturated with security and surveillance mechanisms, these interventions are considered with respects to the particular form of life which is being produced. Security, in this context, is required to be invisible, to be background, in short to become normal. As the previous section of this chapter demonstrated, there is uncertainty as to how and where security is present. As security becomes an increasingly normal part of the everyday life of the city, measures which are primed to become part of the infra-ordinary background of cities are often encountered ambiguously. As security becomes increasingly normal, this normalisation paradoxically makes security an ambiguous presence:

Owen: In terms of expectations, not with being surprised or shocked by it, it was almost what you'd expect nowadays in terms of security, so it met with what I'd expect to be there, but obviously I've not thought much of it before. But like anywhere, you'd expect a good deal of security to be there.

Patrick: So it's almost a condition of cities, to have security of whatever type present, that's a normal, expected part of city life?

Owen: Yeah, there's an, an inevitability about it, that's how it is, so I would have been more surprised if it wasn't there. I don't think anyone's unaware of it, I don't think you could be. Maybe I'm oblivious of it, I think the diary showed that I don't think about it most days or in most situations, but I'm not ignorant to it because it's part of our lives now and you know, even if you're not thinking about it, you know that it's going to be in cities. It's a fact of modern life that these things are necessary.

Owen hints to the normalisation of security and surveillance measures, suggesting that security is expected to be present in contemporary urban life. This is not security in general as such, but security and a form of counter-terrorist security apparatus which has been discussed in the previous empirical chapter. It is therefore not the normalisation of security per se, but specific apparatus in the context of securing everyday urban life and indeed the lived of the everyday. There is a passage from the confusions of uncertainty to ambiguity in the ways that security is present. Whilst there is an expectation that security of some form will be present, what we find is that actual forms or practices of security are encountered ambiguously. That is the increasing normalisation of security, paradoxically makes security an ambiguous presence, always encountered with other things, people, intensities etcetera. An encounter with security will always be an encounter with something else as well. In part, this is a function of a form of security that works by being embedded into the city. Compare with airport security which involves a defined period of time set up for security, and the crossing of a threshold (see Adey 2009b). Security in the city is different. Within security spaces, and with an encounter with any security presence, there is always more happening, people are always doing more than just encountering security, this means that it is difficult to discern quite what is happening in an interaction. There is always more than security going on:

Eat; walk (briskly, slowly); read a book, a newspaper, a magazine, a comic, a poster, a dot-matrix, a guide book, a letter, a laptop, a receipt; pause; laugh; stare; daydream; sleep; strain to drag luggage; cough; trace a route on a map; kiss; argue; talk on a phone; listen; order coffee; calm a crying child; be a child crying; wait; listen to music; remove and return the contents of a bag; complete a crossword; photograph; move sharply to avoid a bag; hug; ask a question; stumble; sort coins in a palm for correct change; smile; yawn; take a photograph; talk; run; write a list ...

(Observant participation, Victoria, 03.12.08)

Security is an ambiguous presence, and although a normal part of cities, and a normalised part of what it is to be in the everyday life of urban space, there is a degree of ambiguity regarding encounters with security. The life of security is bound up with the ambiguities, with the excesses, and with the life of everyday life. It is then understood that each encounter with security can then be interpreted in more than one mutually exclusive way. As such the role of security, and the ways in which security presences within both sites are enacted is always somewhat ambiguous. The role of security as an ambiguous

presence is complicated by the other happenings, taking place, and encountered at the same time as security:

Standing in the ticket queue, I watch the people around me as the chime sounds and the security announcement begins – repeating the message which has become all too familiar to me. Elsewhere, close to me, a discussion regarding possible routes; the faint traces of a tune seeping from the headphones of a personal music player; an indecisive customer speaks with a member of underground staff to make a decision regarding ticket type and pricing; various conversations; a shuffle forwards; the movements of people some slow, some quick; pointing and tracing a line on a map whilst discussing a route; a melody bursts from a pocket as a phone rings and is attended to; the sorting of payment and change.

(Observant participation, Kings Cross St Pancras, 11.02.09)

We see from this passage how in this situation much more is going on than just an encounter with security. This is very different to how security has been discussed in relation to everyday life previously. For example, Katz (2007) describes a situation where it is assumed that security measures are a constant presence within everyday life. Rather than being encountered and enacted as one set of objects amongst others in everyday life, Katz describes the prominence of urban security and describes a situation where it appears that security is encountered in isolation. Her account of security acting as a constant reminder of the presence of threat, oversimplifies the unstable position whereby security interventions simultaneously partake in more than one set of relations. Security measures can, as Katz contends, act like daily ‘reminders’ and ‘reinforcers’ of a war on terror, however as Rose (2002) suggests, in an overdetermined world, the objects and identities we engage with are never defined by their inherent properties. This research argues that security and surveillance measures are better understood as determined by the contexts within which they are encountered and enacted, determined by the multiplicity of overlapping of contexts. Therefore, security measures are considered through their associations and how they are enrolled in experiences, as well as the outcome of encounters. In the two research sites there is so much more happening, and happening at the same time as security more generally, that any an encounter with a particular security measure risks being overdetermined:

Helen: Whilst I walk I normally [laughs] daydream, and think of all of the things that I need to do each day and look at people and clothes and normally just kind of just, it's weird because I live in East London and in East London everybody is very interestingly dressed, lot's of different people and it's all very exciting. And then I come across here and I think it's funny because whenever you walk across Blackfriars bridge in a big petticoat or something you always get really stared at so it's really interesting and I just find this area very funny because it's very business based and then tourists, you get a lot of those two things, but not where I am it's a very different group, so that's what I do, quite often look at people and what they're wearing, daydream about and looking around at those things, and all of the people in their grey suites which you get around here a lot. But it's nice.

Security is encountered whilst people are doing a variety of other things. As Helen's example demonstrates, security is encountered in the midst of things and is therefore less somehow stable and fixed in its status as *security*. As a range of materialities, we encounter security objects as absences and presences, knowingly and unwittingly, through day-to-day practices, habitually or otherwise. It is important to consider the materialities that constitute security practices and the spaces in which they are found through a focus on objects, materials, intensities and their organisation. To continue the theme of ambiguous encounters, consider how Sam, who regularly uses the Victoria Line, explains in the passage below how he normally occupies himself whilst travelling:

Sam: I'll listen to music on my iPhone, or iPod, or I'll read the free London papers, I'll read a book if I have one.

Patrick: You're usually doing something.

Sam: I keep busy, I do something. If I don't have any media instruments at my disposal I will normally stare at other people until they look at me and then look away. Normally I'll stare at attractive women pretty much, I think we've all done it, if a hot girl gets on then that gets my attention, maybe try and flirt a bit [laughs].

As discussed above, each encounter inevitably involves security with an addition. This adds a degree of ambiguity to the situation. However, we can be more specific than this. From the point of view of the infra-ordinary, there is no such thing as security. This is intensified when we consider how the infra-ordinary is mediated through a whole range of materialities (iPods, newspapers, advertising, etcetera) that stretch out there here and now

into various elsewheres and elsewhens. Thinking back to the previous chapter, we can say that a security that attempts to enable freedom and circulations is one that will only ever be encountered whilst people are doing a variety of other things, and rarely in isolation. Consider the below example from my research diary:

A young woman is sitting with her friend on a train that has just left Green Park. She turns her head slightly to the right, staring at the window as the train departs. She uses the darkened tunnel and enhanced mirror effect to ensure that her hair is in place. Looking at her reflection I can see that her eyes are focused only centimetres from a sticker affixed onto the window of the train warning passengers against leaving luggage. When satisfied with her appearance, she turns, her eyes moving jerkily from the window before becoming fixed once again on her friend.

(Observant participation, Victoria Line, 28.01.09)

Of course, and as with all ethnographic research, there is ambiguity when witnessing and describing peoples movements. In the above example, the young woman could be observing, or engaged with and aware of the form of security described. Yet at the same time there are many alternatives, many possibilities for what she is doing in this instance. My belief is that she was using the window as mirror, although this in its self is a speculation. This, and other moments, indicate how an experience of security could be an encounter with something else entirely, attentions are as such, are overdetermined (see Crary, 2001). This is central to normalisation. It means that security becomes part of the normal, submerged within everyday spaces and everyday happenings, ceasing to exist as a fixed thing 'in itself':

Iain: You've got to think about doing this while you're thinking about whatever else is going on at the time, I think that's what was important for me, not just for your work with security but if you're thinking about your environment more generally. If you're in the tube you're going to be bustled and butted around, you've got to keep an eye out for people with bags, you've got adverts that you might want to look at and read, and that's before you've thought about your Oyster card or where you need to go, or if you've got what you need for work, or I might be making a big deal out of it.

It is significant that security has been described as an expected, indeed normal presence within the two research sites, and cities more generally. This must be understood

in the context of the form of security described in the previous chapter and a new urban normality where security measures are becoming increasingly normalised characteristics of urban spaces. The ways in which security measures are encountered day-to-day and the increased ubiquity of security measures reduces them from extraordinary features to being an expected and normal part of what it is to be in cities. As security becomes an increasingly normal part of urban landscapes and the everyday life of the city, measures that have been described as primed to become part of the infra-ordinary background of the city are often encountered ambiguously. As such, as security becomes increasingly normal, this normalisation paradoxically makes security an ambiguous presence

#### **6.4. Background feelings**

As the previous sections of this chapter have demonstrated, the spaces of urban life have required a variety of new and specific ways of protecting and managing cities where the aim is 'govern terror' at the same time as they aim to foster circulations and protect and enable the personal and commercial 'freedoms' of the liberal-democratic life of London. The security interventions that are enacted as a result of this specific form of counter-terror security apparatus work by being embedded into the city and in the everyday life of urban spaces where, as the previous sections have shown, security and surveillance mechanisms are often encountered as background, absent presences. There is a degree of uncertainty as to how and where security is present, and whilst security measures increasingly saturate the spaces of urban life, these are required to become largely invisible and as I have discussed, become normalised. Respondents were unanimous in their feeling of the potential presence of security as a vague, generalised and uncertain structure of expectation. Here, for example, I discuss with David his expectations regarding security measures on the Victoria Line:

David: Um, sort of, well there's always security everywhere, but I don't really actually consider it being there, I don't stop and think about it, I expect that there's security there, but I don't really expect, I don't really care that much, well, no not care, I don't really give it much thought, I know things are there but I don't consider it.

Patrick: You have an understanding that certain things might or will be present in London, or on the Underground.

David: Yeah, there's security all over now, so it's subconscious that it's there, but I'm not consciously aware, thinking about it. There are things, like the police if they're

there that you see, but I won't think about them or anything, but if they're there, or if you look up and there's a camera you obviously notice it, but that's it, I don't start thinking about it or anything.

In this extract David claims that he expects security to be a constant presence throughout urban space. His certainty that security will be somehow present is typical of participants and is largely independent of encounters with specific security presences. In fact, David admits that the act of reflection on the presence and absence of security is unusual. There is a generalised feeling that urban spaces must be secure, by default, because it is part of a city. This is a vague and unspecified feeling of potential presence based on a set of loosely defined and malleable expectations that presume that contemporary urban life must always be secured. David's response was not uncommon and is suggestive of what is in effect a shared background atmosphere, that is, the presence of security and its ambiguous presence within the everyday life of the city.

Feelings of being-secure are expressed as part of the background of everyday life. As Nicholas, for example, stated in an interview, "Your safety and security is just what you take for granted most of the time and you don't even think about it". Participants described background affective atmospheres of being-secure which are present yet absent simultaneously. This is significant given the ambiguous relation to security described in the previous section. We might think this with respects to the sensed, but also, and here following Amin and Thrift, "that whole realm of human life that is outside consciousness" (2002:28). This is an attunement to embodied practice or the 'unseen' in the everyday (see Harrison, 2000; Thrift, 2000c), the "reflexes and automatisms which make up the city's 'unconscious', and which account for the bulk of its activity" (Amin and Thrift, 2002:28). Following Massumi, this background feeling "belongs to perception, a bodily feeling organised environmentally before cognitive apprehension" (in Rice, 2010:35):

Andrew: Just say you were walking with someone, like anywhere, just talking to someone, you don't exactly feel unsafe or safe, because you're not thinking of being safe or unsafe are you? It's like it's unconscious, you're not even conscious of it. It's not subconscious, it is unconscious, because unconscious means it's there but it's not, it only comes into kind of life, into action when something's happening. I think subconscious would mean it's always there, but it's not really.



In this extract Andrew describes a feeling which is not quite a feeling, a shared collective background which is rarely reflected on and difficult to narrate. It is an ambiguous feeling, a background hum which is an absent presence commonly felt through something which is diffuse in its form, ambiguous in its boundaries, which surrounds everyone, but often can not really pinpoint, through 'affective atmospheres' (see Anderson, 2009a; Bissell, 2010; McCormack, 2008; Stewart, 2011):

Laura: No, normally I'm not aware of it at all, I don't think about it. It's sort of like the temperature, you never walk around thinking about the temperature, do you? And it's like that, normally you're not aware of your personal safety, not really, you know, I don't go around thinking I'm safe, I'm safe, I'm safe all the time [laughing].

Patrick: That's a nice analogy, a nice way to describe it.

Laura: I don't know how to explain it though, it's like, like how you're not aware of the temperature because it feels right, it's normal, unless you're too hot or cold, or whatever, and your personal safety's like that, so you're not aware of it, then if something changes that's when you're aware of it, because you feel nervous and you get scared, like when you think somewhere's dodgy, or someone looks at you funny.

Laura's description of a feeling that is never quite a feeling, is suggestive of an experience of an ambiguous background affective atmosphere which, as Böhme suggests, "seem[s] to fill the space with a certain tone of feeling like a haze" (1993:114; see also Böhme, 2006). The uncertain tone of Laura's description certainly resonates with a sense of an atmospheric haze which is felt yet, and at the same time, is disordered and contingent, remaining indefinite (Anderson, 2009a). McCormack provides a useful description of an affective atmosphere as being "something distributed yet palpable, a quality of environmental immersion that registers in and through sensing bodies whilst also remaining diffuse, in the air, ethereal" (2008:413). As such an affective atmosphere can be said to defy possession and description. This is significant, for as Anderson contends, "thinking affect through the ephemerality and instability of meteors reminds us that intensities may remain indefinite even as they effect" (2009a:78). Laura's final comments here are important as they hint that this background affective atmosphere is "perpetually forming and deforming" (Anderson, 2009a:79). These vague, indefinite affective atmospheres of (in)security are interesting because although they are felt, they are before cognitive apprehension and are potentially subject to so many different descriptions when they are reflected upon. The bodily feelings and the shared background affective atmospheres of being-secure may as

Anderson maintains, “be momentarily qualified in specific emotions, in which feelings of being-secure are named, reflected on and narrated” (Anderson, 2010a:228). Respondents described a variety of states through which they expressed bodily feelings of being-secure – safe, secure, comfortable, at ease, assured, to name just a few. Here I will provide three brief examples but would suggest that these represent interruptions to the ambiguous background affective atmosphere – remembering that participants were prompted and when prompted stressed that the act of reflection is somewhat artificial. Firstly, participants spoke of being-secure in the absence of threat:

Adam: In a normal day, I mean, I don’t think it bothers me really, it’s just not something that would cross my mind, unless there was a reason, like something that was obviously going to threaten my safety, something that’s obviously dangerous or made me feel intimidated, then my personal safety, um it doesn’t cross my mind, no. I know that London’s a target, but it’s not something I’m like aware of all the time, I just think I don’t think about it, it doesn’t bother me.

Consider Adam’s description, this not a positive specification of something in the future, he is describing the absence of fear that something unpleasant will happen. The feeling of being-secure is not itself necessarily specified as something which is positively felt. In the following example, Rosa speaks of a different affective state, that of being reassured:

Rosa: It is reassuring to see them around, when there’s more police, when it’s more visible I mean, having them around and seeing them anywhere really, then it is reassuring.

Patrick: The police providing a more visible presence?

Rosa: Yeah, I mean everyone recognises the police don’t they, and I think you do feel better when they’re around ... Seeing the police will always make me feel better, and I think that’s the same with most people, people know what the police can do and why they’re there so, well for me I feel better. They don’t have to be doing anything, I find them being here is reassuring.

For Rosa it is the presence of a particular security intervention which can enable and indeed support her feelings of being-secure. For other participants feelings of being-secure

are often only contingently connected to actual security measures. Take for example Samantha's account of travelling on the Victoria Line:

Samantha: I suppose it makes me feel safe ... there's something quite comforting about being packed in, a closeness to others, because, you know how some people are claustrophobic? I'm claustrophilic, as in I enjoy being in small, confined spaces, and I quite like it when lots of people cram in together, into a train ... Being taken along by the crowd, there's something I feel safe about that. I don't really think much about the train announcements or the CCTV cameras, or the police or whatever anyway, so no, it doesn't have anything to do with them.

Samantha suggests that being part of the crowd and being with others is comforting, it has a positive affect on her and can shape her experience of travelling on the Victoria Line. The absence of security as a direct referent object can thus be filled by other things. People may not need police officers, cameras and so on to ensure their feelings of being-secure. Indeed, participants were careful not to overstate the force of security and given that security has been described in this and the previous chapter as an absent presence, this is significant. However, and returning to the opening of this section, there is an expectation that security will be present within urban spaces and that security as a process will be primed to act. This is an expectation of intervention, where there is a promissory relation between processes of security and futurity in the context of everyday life:

Nilukshi: Ordinarily I would have felt safe, like I still do, but I would have assumed that there was security in place to respond to emergencies. I wouldn't have considered it because I knew that there were mechanisms, like I knew that there were security cameras there, I knew that there were police there and my feeling was that that was sufficient to prevent another terrorist attack, as an extreme example. In a way, this might sound a bit random, but like the Jean Charles de Menezes incident, in a way filled me with more security, more than it did concern, in the sense that obviously it was a dreadful mistake that the police had made, but I had assumed that the police were on that level of alertness. So they made this one dreadful mistake, because of bad intelligence or, but I thought it's because they are on this level of alertness that if they do notice anything suspicious then they'll deal with it.

In Nilukshi's example there is a sense that the securing process is primed to act over a range of future events, and an expectation that security will manage and control a future terrorist incident, security thus generates a promissory supplement to the present (see Anderson, 2010a). The bodily feelings and shared affective atmospheres of being-secure which are part of the background of quotidian experience are a response to this promise, that security will be primed to the possibilities of threatening futures. For the feelings of being-secure to recede into the background, we must be sufficiently convinced that security will be delivered and the promise actionable. This priming and the promise of security must not be thought solely in terms of its relation to threatening futures, the promise that security is primed to act enables the conditions through which the circulations and the personal and commercial 'freedoms' of liberal-democratic life of London take place. The judgement of whether or not this is successful can only be made on the basis of whether people will allow it to recede into the background and are prepared to continue their everyday lives as normal:

Robert: When I leave home in the morning I don't think I might be in a terrorist attack today, I've got too much else to worry about, I've got to get to work on time for one thing, I've got to work out what I'm doing for the rest of the day, and you inevitably have all of those stupid thoughts and worries that everyone has, but I don't think about crime or terrorism, and I don't think I've even got it subconsciously.

In this passage Robert explains how the threat of terrorism falls away from view and rarely registers. What is more prominent for Robert are more prosaic concerns which are precisely about the everyday itself, these are more immediate to him and the threat of terrorism falls away from view. Interestingly this appears to invert the Government's (HM Government, 2010a) prioritising of terrorism as the principle immediate security threat facing the UK, although it is suggestive of the Government's overall aim; to secure a way of life and to enable the circulations that define the personal and commercial 'freedoms' of liberal-democratic life so that we can continue to live it (HM Government, 2009a:5). In the following passage Helen describes the conditions of the milieu of the South Bank which produce and enable her to feel 'safe' without necessarily reflecting on this named affective state:

Helen: I am more aware of it [security], I don't really know if it makes me feel more, any safer at all because I feel pretty safe around here so it's not, I don't need to feel

safer, I think this is a nice area to be in, so I don't think that it's made me feel any safer at all.

Patrick: But not necessarily because of the security?

Helen: No, it's because of the area and reputation, and because I know people here and I know the places I can kind of trust along here, like I know the people in Eat and the shops and I know I can go to the toilet, there are people I know, it's a pretty friendly place really, and tourists are nice and friendly and make it feel a bit holidayie here, and I just think it's nice, that could just be my optimistic view of it and it might be this really big crime spot [laughs] and I haven't noticed at all.

The examples that Helen gives provides a sense of the stitching of security measures into a particular space of familiarities and into specific affective atmospheres, which as we have seen in the previous chapter, is important to the form of security discussed and to the life of everyday life. The presence and absence of security, along with other facets of respondent's experiences mesh and fold to produce the conditions where feelings of being-secure are most often experienced as a background affective atmosphere. As the previous chapter demonstrated, the forms of security present within the two research sites are primed to be a part of everyday life itself, seeking to produce secure subjects who are not necessarily aware of the conditions of being and feeling secure. The assumed affect of security does not necessarily take place, and as this section has shown, unless it is subject to explicit reflection, it is often difficult for security to have a presence in some ways, at the same time it is a part of the environment and a part of people's experiences nonetheless.

## **Conclusion**

Through an attention to the ordinariness of security and the ordinary ways in which it is encountered and enacted, I have suggested that one of the generic ways in which security is present within the everyday life of cities is as part of the infra-ordinary background of urban life. As the previous empirical chapter demonstrated, within these two research sites, the particular forms of security and the apparatus of security operating are primed to be part of the everyday city – the problem of presence and absence of security when the promise of security is precisely to secure and be absent. More specifically, security is present as an expected but overlooked part of the everyday. It has been argued here that security is becoming increasingly normalised, however and somewhat paradoxically, the processes of normalisation make security an ambiguous presence.

Security is often encountered as a background presence and the actual forms and practices of security are frequently encountered ambiguously. My question in this chapter was therefore: how is the apparatus of security encountered and how through encounters does it become part of everyday life? Security moves to be a part of the environment and of everyday happenings which is expected and yet oft accepted and taken for granted. Such a condition is the result of the design of these spaces and of security interventions of different kinds, but also the conditions of encounter – where bodies enact security as it becomes part of everyday life.

In focusing on the processes through which security is encountered and enacted, we see how it is not only that security becomes all pervasive. Rather, the geography of security is a geography of absences and presences. Far from being always already present within cities, security is often encountered and enacted as a part of the taken for granted ‘infra-ordinary’ of urban life. As Chapter 5 demonstrated, steps are taken to embed security within urban environments, at the same time security becomes a normalised, background presence. This condition seeks to enable the city to function, and to protect and foster the freedoms, circulations and interdependencies of urban life. Everyday encounters with security will often go unnoticed, the presence of security becomes a generalised expectation, and one that persists as uncertainty even in the absence of specific security measures. Indeed, so pervasive has this structure of expectation become, that for my respondents it was difficult to imagine urban spaces without security, these features which must be present somewhere, somehow, sometime, are an absence simultaneously.

Whilst there is a general expectation that security of some form will be present, what has been described in this chapter is a situation where the actual forms and practices of security are encountered ambiguously. As security becomes increasingly normal, this normalisation paradoxically makes security an ambiguous presence. The various forms of security will only ever be encountered with something else as well. In part this is a function of a form of security that works by being embedded into the city, and in the everyday life of urban spaces within which security itself then lives. It is also a situation arising from forms of security which attempt to enable the freedoms and circulations outlined in Chapter 5. This adds a degree of ambiguity to everyday encounters and is central to normalisation.

A certain background affective atmosphere has been described through the course of this chapter, where participants described a vague and indefinite feeling of being-secure. This is a condition which, in the course of this chapter, I have shown is most often a part of the background of everyday life, where participants express a feeling which is never quite a feeling, felt before it is cognitively apprehended, and rarely reflected on nor narrated. The

form of security of which this background feeling is associated attempts to avoid the ambience of insecurity of which security is oft charged with articulating, contributing to and even sustaining. Rather, this apparatus of security is an attempt to produce secure subjects who are not necessarily aware of the conditions of feeling so. The bodily feelings of being-secure have been described here as an indefinite affective atmosphere of (in)security which is, at times, momentarily named and qualified.

In this way a security apparatus designed to enable life to be lived becomes part of the everyday life of the city. However, and as I argued in Chapter 5, contemporary security apparatuses are designed to oscillate between invisibility and response to events. With this in mind the thesis moves from the infra-ordinary focus of this chapter, to explore the second generic way in which security is found within the everyday life of cities, as the mechanisms of security are encountered and enacted as a range of more intensified presences. The following chapter will thus now move to describe and discuss the tearing of the infra-ordinary, as something happens, an event takes place, and security is made present. Importantly in the context of an account that describes the everyday life of security, this something that happens, this event, need not be the traditional security event, nor the 'event of terror'. As a part of the everyday life of the city, security becomes present in different sorts of ways, through a range of encounters, transactions and events. Through this range of ways, it can change form and move from the background to the foreground. In Chapter 7 I describe how this takes place and how the forms of security described in Chapter 5 become more intensified presences.

## 7. The Intensified Presence of Security

A British transport police officer stands facing and addressing three other officers. Having ascended the escalator I was drawn by the collection of luminous glossy veneers – their fluorescent yellow high visibility jackets covering the barely visible coarse black fabric of heavy stab-vests. Their assembly takes place near to the ticket barriers but to the side, close to a wall. The swarming crowd bustles, flowing easily past them. The talking officer is closest to the wall, his back to it – they stand in an arc around him, focusing on him. I walk towards the ticket barriers, choosing the gate closest to them I feed and retrieve my ticket, slowing to an awkward pace as I pass through. I strain to hear him:

... we all know why we're here, we're doing random stop and search on people,  
because of the heightened terrorist ...

I am struck by these words and the austere tone of their delivery – mirrored in an expression which appears stern and sure. His eyes dart restlessly. A rush of excitement and a nervousness accompanied my noticing the group, it swells now as I draw closer:

His words are lost amidst a sudden rise in the disordered clamour of the station.

The din grows thicker, louder. The speed and force of the crowd surges around me, its number increasing. I cannot slow further or I will have stopped awkwardly. I

see that he pauses, brief are spoken by the assembly, he continues then. I am  
unable to hear more.

I am past them now. A cautious glance back sees the officers still assembled. I walk on. I am pulled by the movements of the crowd. Pushed by my desire not to arouse suspicion: to be enrolled in their activity, to be stopped and searched, the thought thrills and unnerves me in unequal measure.

(Observant participation, Kings Cross St Pancras 30.09.08)



## Introduction

In the example from my research diary, a form of security was momentarily present: my sense of being in the underground station changed, if only for a moment, as I encountered a group of police officers about to undertake a series of 'random' 'stop and searches'. Everyday life is full of these moments when security becomes an intensified presence. To extend the analysis of how security becomes part of the background that I set out in the previous chapter, here I will focus on the particular mechanisms through which forms of security take on a heightened presence to disrupt the life of everyday life. My aim here is to develop the analysis of Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 in order to examine how an apparatus of security which takes the everyday as its 'referent object' moves from a set of security mechanisms to something which is lived and experienced. Here my concern is with how security changes form and becomes present, this chapter also moves to consider how security interventions are encountered and enacted as more intensely present within the everyday life of urban space in different ways.

This chapter develops my account of the everyday life of security in the previous chapter through a focus on how the security interventions discussed in Chapter 5 become more intense presences within everyday life and how this affects the life of the everyday. If security is increasingly 'designed into' infra-ordinary spaces and happenings, as set out in Chapter 5, then it is important to ask what happens when events or potential events do happen? And how does the presencing of security relate to the aim of fostering 'good' circulations and a particular set of freedoms that I have argued is now central to contemporary efforts to secure urban public spaces? To address these questions, I discuss the second generic way that security becomes present within the everyday life of urban spaces, focusing on how, following Perec (2010), this infra-ordinary fabric can rip as the specific security mechanisms discussed in relation to the two sites change form and emerge as they become heightened presences. The aim here is to discuss how it is that security comes to presence, as well as the consequences of this with respects to the 'becoming-noticed' of the unnoticed of everyday life (Highmore, 2011:52). In this sense this chapter complements and extends the analysis of Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 through a focus on forms of everyday presence that follow the specific mechanisms of counter-terrorist security that this thesis is interested in.

This chapter provides a contribution to and extends the analysis of works that have sought to discuss and describe the imbrications of security and urban spaces (see Coaffee, 2003, 2004a; 2004b, 2009a; 2010 Coaffee, et al. 2008, 2009, Graham, 2004a, 2004b,

Graham, 2006; Murakami Wood, 2010; Nemeth, 2010; Nemeth et al. 2008). Where these works have focused on the presence of security interventions in cities, it has come to be assumed that security is always somehow already present within everyday life. There is a further issue, as there is a tendency to then assume the relations between security and everyday life. It has been argued, often without a sustained focus on everyday life or everyday encounters, that the presence of security pertains to a generalised, if often largely unspecified, insecurity. This situation has been variously described, for example it is asserted that security leads to the 'dangerisation' of society through the generation of "environments of risk" (Coaffee, 2004b:277) and a "foreboding atmosphere" of threat (Habermas, 2003:26). Here I develop an account of how security interventions are, or might be, encountered once they are a part of urban life, considering how they emerge as present and how security is then experienced. As such it develops work that has focused on the complex interrelations between security and lived everyday life, and in particular work engaging with affect and security (see Adey, 2008, 2009b; Anderson, 2010a, 2010c; Anderson and Adey, 2011; Massumi, 2005a, 2005b, 2007; Rice, 2010). Attention to these instantiations offers an escape from the traditional focus on security solely understood as a presence to secure, towards a fuller appreciation of the where and how of security.

In order to explore security as it changes form and becomes present within the everyday life of the city, the chapter is structured around two sections: the birth to presence; and the presence of presence. It is important to acknowledge that these divisions are artificial and do not suggest that this process follows the logic of a linear series. As such the two sections of this chapter explore the coming to presence, the presence of presence and also the movement of presence as a process and should not be thought of as isolated. Instead, the distinctions are pragmatic and designed to draw attention to differences that might otherwise be effaced. The first section of this chapter will investigate the birth to presence of security; it will discuss the rips to the fabric of the infra-ordinary as security changes form and becomes present. In so doing it will consider the focusing of attentions and moments where respondents describe becoming more aware of the presence of security. Given my argument in the previous chapter that forms of absence are central to the new ways of securing public spaces, it is vital to discuss the transactions between absence and presence. The second section describes how security can become an intensified presence and how these changes in its form are experienced (see Ophir, 2005). Here I am concerned with experiences of 'security events', when security operates explicitly as a presence to secure, as well as the often overlooked and more ordinary encounters and transactions whereby security is present as another type of thing, where encounters are

spontaneous, unplanned and unexpected (see Stewart, 2007). The section closes with a reflection on the motility of these intensified presence and in doing so it returns to Perec's work on the infra-ordinary as we witness the return of security as a background presence. Here the chapter loops back into the discussion of the infra-ordinary fabric of the everyday found in the previous chapter.

In this way this chapter will develop the analysis of the previous chapter in order to show that biopolitics of security is not only a matter of how the everyday becomes the 'referent-object' (Dillon and Lobo-Guerra, 2008) of security, but also about the living and the experiencing of security itself, and how it is that security gets woven into the fabric of the everyday as it becomes part of urban life in different ways.

### **7.1. Births to presence**

Samantha: I think you only look out for security cameras and things unintentionally, by accident, or when you want to make sure that you're safe. So yeah, when I see the security it's rarely on purpose, I'm not looking for them.

For Samantha, the security measures that I have argued are now primed to occur in the event of an event become present slightly differently: through chance, and 'rarely' although still occasionally when aiming for a specific feeling ('safety'). Someone happens to be looking in a particular direction and may notice a camera, someone else may be rushing to work and notices a huddle of police officers, for someone else a machine gun stands out amidst the ordinariness of the commute. Chance encounters are not the only way in which security is made present – I will also focus on disruptions of the ordinary; being on the lookout for security; and security events. But it is worth focusing on chance encounters to begin with as they demonstrate how security becomes present in ways that exceed the aims and intentions of the security planners and practitioners that I discussed in Chapter 5.

Outline of an inventory of accidental encounters:

- Drilling. "I'm starting to hate this thing" – two contractors work on a CCTV camera fixed onto County Hall. The camera is upright, the casing open, wires exposed
- Four security guards walk by. They wear black coats – three with 'SG' and a gold crest on the breast pocket. One talks, loudly swearing. The other three laugh. A woman walking close by turns, tuts and glares disapprovingly "foul language"

- A yellow sign, thin white boarder. The graphic of a camera. Black text: “These premises are under CCTV surveillance”. Smaller black text, same font: “Images are being recorded for the purposes of crime prevention and public safety”
- A row of eight marble effect stone hostile vehicle mitigation bollards and two metal bollards. Four stone bollards, then two metal bollards, cylinders – an ‘access control point’ – then four more stone bollards
- To the right of the footpath a security guard purchases an ice cream from a van. High visibility vest ‘HEADLINE SECURITY’ printed in black. A second is stood close by, he wears a similar fluorescent vest
- “Warning CCTV in operation” – set in the middle of Golden Jubilee Bridges information. The dirty grey, tacky remnants of a sticker, since removed, covers the writing
- The sharp glare from a lens reflecting the sun. The silhouette of a camera, black, shrouded in shadow beneath Waterloo Bridge [I know there to be three more cameras, I did not notice those on this occasion]
- Two police officers go by. Black uniforms. Both wear peaked caps trimmed with black and white squares
- A piercing siren. A police car moving speedily on the other side of the river
- A South Bank Centre Security guard stands
- Three translucent black orb shaped cameras set into greyish casings
- A black and yellow sign – the loose graphic image of a camera: “This is private property; security policies including the use of CCTV apply. This scheme is controlled by the South Bank Centre. For further details contact xxx-xxxx-xxxx”
- A police patrol boat goes by. Three officers on board. Two wave. Disturbed water marks its passage
- A CCTV camera – ‘METRO’ and a telephone number on a sticker affixed to the side
- A security guard by. Orange high visibility jacket, ‘SECURITY’ written on the back
- Seven CCTV cameras, different shapes and types, all attached to the overhang which covers the footpath

(Observant participation, South Bank, 09.12.08)

In this example from my research diary, I describe the security interventions that I encountered as I walked along the South Bank. This list is an account of a series of unplanned and unexpected incidents where security was momentarily present. The

enumeration provides a sense of the processes of attention and how “things surge up in [one’s] perceptual field” (Sheringham, 2006:269). The emergence of security through chance encounters is perhaps therefore best posed as a question of attunement and engagement involving a movement of attentions and the contingency of the everyday:

Alex: I saw two policemen today at Kings Cross actually [laughs]. Obviously I’ve seen police at Kings Cross and other stations at other times too and there’s cameras, but I don’t really look for them, just might see them when I’m going down to get a train or back out of the station.

Here Alex describes his encounters with police officers and CCTV cameras in Kings Cross St Pancras underground station. In his account Alex emphasises the contingent nature of moving through an underground station at a particular moment and encountering the police and CCTV cameras there through chance. Another example of chance encounters with CCTV cameras is offered by Nicholas whose position on the platform at Finsbury Park leads to the following reflection:

Nicholas: One of the notes I made for the diary was, I hadn’t really thought about it before, but there’s certain, there’s certain positions you can stand in at Finsbury Park and oddly enough it’s the position where I normally get on the carriage ... and you can’t see the indicator board for the CCTV and I never realised before.

Patrick: Is that that it used to obscure your view but you’d never thought about it?

Nicholas: Yeah, I must have looked at the board to check it, not been able to see it and moved so I could, but never stopped and thought it’s because of that bloody camera, and I suppose I’ve never been irritated by it before either, just automatically took a step so I could see.

Contingency is important here as at other times the police, CCTV cameras, or indeed other security presences may be present, but overlooked, or may not be present when one is moving through an urban space. As Katie concedes in relation to her commute on the Victoria Line:

Katie: I’m usually so preoccupied, listening to music and thinking about work so I don’t really pay attention. When I walk into the station in the morning there’s usually a couple of policemen standing there, sometimes I see them, sometimes I don’t. And I

really think about, like the police, you know, you just think, oh, there's a policeman, and carry on don't you? But you can't miss them especially now with their bright jackets.

In this extract Katie considers chance encounters, as she states there are times where she is aware of the presence of police officers and other times where she admits they may still be present but she has no recollection of encountering them. We might consider how security can be encountered accidentally though reference to Perec's concerns with chance and attention, in particular how it is that attention is invariably directed along specific channels, away from any sense of totality. When Perec undertakes *An Attempt at Exhausting a Place in Paris* he at times pauses to reflect on the act of noticing and attending. In the example below taken from my research diary, it is a chance happening which causes me to turn and in so doing see the presence of a police officer on the South Bank:

Shortly after leaving the covered walkway of the OXO tower, I overhear a man in front of me when he comments to the person he is walking with:

There's always police down there

I look up from the ground and glance first forward and then left where I see a police officer in black uniform turn from the footpath into Gabriel's Wharf

(Observant participation, South Bank, 11.12.08)

As Sheringham contends, in his writings on attention and everyday life Perec "is conscious of how chance determines what he may or may not see" (2000:198). This is important in the context of the form of security which has been described as increasingly 'designed into' infra-ordinary spaces and happenings. It is not necessarily that a security presence is doing anything in particular, these are chance encounters that are a part of contingent everydayness. Take for example David's description of a range of encounters with security interventions:

David: You don't walk along looking up all the time, if you saw a sign, or a plane flew over or a helicopter or something happened, like loud music from that direction, or something dropped on your head like, then you'd look up, or if it was raining, then

you'd look up. Or you might glance up for no reason one time and see one and remember it, or maybe if you're further away then you might see them because then you're looking in that direction when you're walking, like there's some that are like that.

David describes a range of moments where he has and indeed how he might encounter CCTV cameras through chance. In this passage David claims that often he will encounter CCTV cameras as a result of his attention being drawn by a range of other things. In David's descriptions we can see how these chance encounters emerge through a material arrangement and a sense that these are characterised by their fleetingness, they are rendered, fleetingly, present. It is difficult to assign a cause to these exchanges, often as David suggests they just happen, in the same way that we encounter other things within everyday life. As with the previous chapter, this raises the issue of overdetermination and ambiguity in our encounters and experience of security. These accidental encounters and chance exchanges provide examples of how paying attention to security and the movements of security from the background to the fore involve comportment in different ways (see Ingold, 2000). In particular, it highlights the turning and returning attentions. Andrew talks of how he has noticed CCTV cameras during his commute on the South Bank:

Andrew: Most cameras are right there, just above where you're walking, so if you look up then you're going to see them ... Some you see because you're looking, others you notice before by chance. Like some of them you can't, you always see them don't you? But, like others I only saw them because you got me to look for that sort of thing. I might not have thought about them much, not like I've done for this, but you can't just walk past them, they're right next to you when you're walking, or like you look up and you remember you've seen one, so I don't think you can miss them. But others aren't very obvious, like some are more hidden, I've seen more along there because of this.

In the above extracts we see the turning and returning of attention and how the coming to presence of security involves bodily movements and the comportment of bodies in different ways. These everyday births to presence are of course not received in isolation, rather, in these instances security is an everyday occurrence, one exceeding the aims and intentions of the security planners and practitioners discussed in Chapter 5.

In the below example I witness and describe a moment where a group of film makers pause from their filming on the South Bank to look up at a police helicopter:

The violent sound of the thrashing blades of a police helicopter cutting through the air distracts group of film makers. All look up but the helicopter, which had hovered for a moment, has now disappeared behind a blanket of clouds. A man holding a boom microphone continues to stare, gently scratching his earphones. A few seconds more and the helicopter reappears, he turns, his attention now on the group's discussion.

(Observant participation, South Bank, 19.12.08)

For Perec in *An Attempt at Exhausting a Place in Paris*, of great significance is the shifting the angle of his vision as he moves around the place Saint-Sulpice. These "provisional frames of attention" (Sheringham, 2006:269) involve practices of spatial orientation and bodily comportment, as attentions are drawn, fixed and redrawn. In these practices the whole body is brought together in the action of its attending (see Ingold, 2000). Whilst security is attended to here in a more engaged and connected state, these are accidental moments and I would argue are more fleeting instances, where the birth to presence does not endure. Attention reaches a threshold at which point the life of the presence breaks down (see Crary, 2001). This raises the issue of how security as an intensified presence can change and how it can move. In the above examples, whilst the encounter will change how security is related to, the rip in the everyday fabric is a more ordinary disturbance (see Stewart, 2007). In and through them we witness the reemergence of security as a background presence.

It has been suggested that the form of counter-terrorist security described here is increasingly 'designed into' infra-ordinary spaces and happenings, so as to become part of the background of urban space and urban life. In this context we witness the second form of birth to presence, where security becomes a more heightened presence through disruptions of this established ordinariness. Here, Thomas provides an example of the second birth to presence, disruptions of the ordinary where security increasingly 'designed into' infra-ordinary spaces and happenings is somehow out of place:

Typically I walk down the escalators and barely pause at the ticket barrier and being in Brixton there is generally a train sitting in platform as it's the end of the line so I must take about 90 seconds between entering the station and sitting down on a seat. It's probably more noticeable when something out of the ordinary happens, like a few months ago when there was a heavy presence of police at Brixton in the evenings (Self-completed diary, Thomas, 24.02.09).



Thomas begins and ends his commute in Brixton, in the above extract from his diary he suggests that the presence of security which he describes as being 'out of the ordinary' intrudes into his expectation of the space of the station. Contrast the above entry with one he made previously, where he reflects on the infra-ordinary "it was hard to keep consciously aware of security that I pass everyday" (Self-completed diary, Thomas, 16.02.09). Thomas's description reflects Perec's (2010) work on attention and on his belief that we tend to notice "the singular and easily nameable" (Sheringham, 2006:268) more readily, at the expense of the more featureless. When something appears 'out of the ordinary', for Perec (2010) there is a transaction between absence and presence as it 'rips' the texture of the "expected order of things" (James, 2009:205):

Owen: I've also seen the police on the escalators before and that was fairly recently as well, at Kings Cross and that did make me think because you don't generally expect to see the police anywhere on the actual underground except for at either end, um at a station when you're going through or coming out of the ticket gates. I generally don't see them, unless they're at either end waiting at the gates.

The form of security is primed to be a part of the everyday life of urban space and designed to become part of the background of the environments we inhabit, variations to security are at once changes to the rhythms of urban space and to the infra-ordinary:

Robert: I think familiarity's important, it's like if you always walk past number 42 and they've got a red post box, and then one day you walk past and they've got a blue one, you suddenly notice it. And you think, oh I never noticed that.

Here Robert reflects on the role of familiarity and how through disruptions to the infra-ordinary security interventions come to presence. Perec asks, "What difference is there between a driver who parks on the first go and another ('90') who only manages to do so after several minutes of laborious efforts? This provokes attention, irony, the participation of an audience" (2010:33). Robert speaks of being attuned to the rhythm of things, the rhythms of dailiness and then to the disruption to these rhythms caused by changes in a security apparatus. Through Robert's example we also witness the stitching of the infra-ordinary, the blue post box, or the security intervention, will itself become normal, as we get used to the new rhythm so the infra-ordinary fabric is again woven. The changes to security which throw the rhythms of security out of order are often apprehended, until a new rhythm

develops and security gradually recedes into the background. Maintaining the 'expected order' is one which Chapter 5 has shown is central to the aim of fostering 'good' circulations that I have argued is now central to contemporary efforts to secure urban public spaces. It is important that when a new form of security 'emerges as present', it can be stitched into the iterative rhythms of an urban space and so become a background presence. This demonstrates the capacities for new rhythms to come about within a security apparatus. In the following example, Iain speaks of the unruliness of security being some how out of the ordinary:

Iain: I'll definitely notice it if it's abnormal, if it's something out of the norm, if they've changed the security arrangement, I don't know how, but if they did something that changed the station to make it safer then I think I'd notice that, but otherwise I'm not interested in it or my surroundings so I don't have a reason to notice it.

In this passage Iain claims that he will notice security during his journeys on the Victoria Line if it is somehow different, if something has changed. Whilst he readily admits that he is disinterested in his surroundings, a gesture to the infra-ordinary background environment, Iain claims that he notices things that are out of the ordinary, including changes to security which he suggests that he would expect to be present but would normally overlook. Again this is suggestive of apprehending daily experience in its flow, its rhythm, and how the rhythms of the everyday and the expected presence of security interventions described in Chapter 6 can come to be become disrupted. Note the subtle difference between this claim and that of Shanthi below. Whilst both Iain and Shanthi suggest that they will notice security when it is 'out of the ordinary', Shanthi suggests that the difference must be more obvious for her to notice and so attend to it more deliberately:

Shanthi: If they started to change the security, moving the cameras or whatever I don't think I'd really notice. So I think it would have to be quite obvious. You notice when it's really different to what you're used to, if, because it stands out and it's strange if you see what I mean? If they've really changed things, you notice that, but I think it's, like even that's got to be really different and even when things do change, it doesn't make a big difference to me, it's just something there that's new.

What Shanthi and Iain share is a sense that it is not necessarily something that a security intervention is doing which means that it is considered to be out of place, rather it is

its presence as out of order with the rhythms of urban space. However it is important that in these examples security is not encountered as a presence to secure, there is something else happening. These measures may be recognised as security and it may be that they are primed to act in relation to the future event of terror, although as Shanthi tellingly observes “it’s just something there that’s new”. It is suggested that what is being disrupted here is the ordinary itself in one way or another, a disruption to the rhythm of space and the rhythm of security that participants within the two research sites have grown accustomed to. At times these disruptions of the ordinary where security is born to presence are a disruption to our lines of orientation, of our habitual ways of being in the space, or to our normal representations of what a space should be, or perhaps something else entirely. Here Michael provides two examples of security being out of the ordinary on the South Bank:

Michael: I guess we do notice them because of the infrequency of them, the police, when they do crop up I think you do notice them just because we’re not used to them being here. Even the patrol because we’re used to not seeing them if we see a couple of police officers walk past it’s almost like a bit of a novelty. And then when there are those days when there’s quite a lot of them wandering around, a massive police presence, then we’ll notice those as well, I suppose they stick in your mind more ... Every now and again we do see a policeman with a machine gun walking past, every now and again which isn’t, well it’s out of character here I think, it’s not necessary. Not so much this year, but definitely last year and the previous one we’d see them walking along here and across that bridge over there. There certainly wasn’t a direct need for them to be here, it was always a bit of a surprise. Maybe it was intelligence, but for whatever reason it was probably needed, you don’t send out armed police for no reason.

In this example it is the iterative rhythm of security that is broken. Michael suggests two examples of change, firstly the infrequent police presence and secondly the presence of armed police officers. Whilst he recognises these to be unusual, his suggestion is that these presences are short lived. This is an acknowledgement that reflects the capacities of people to live in these spaces even as security comes to presence in different ways. This is about the living and the experiencing of security, demonstrating that it is woven into the fabric of everyday life so that when a new mechanism emerges, there is a change and a new rhythm develops.

These changes bring us to the next example of a birth to presence, what I will call being on the lookout for security. At other times the transactions between absence and presence involve encounters with security where the observer is “looking at”, indeed looking for “what is there” (Becker, 2001:71). Here it is something that subjects are doing which enacts births to presence in different ways, take for example Sam’s account in the following passage:

Sam: Yeah, it’s just what I’ve become used to, it’s normal for me to notice them, I’d probably be surprised if one day I didn’t see any maybe I’m more observant than most people, I don’t know, I take an interest in what’s around me, and obviously security’s going to be part of that.

In the above example Sam claims that there is a degree of inevitability in his encountering and noticing security presences. He suggests here that in the process of being ‘more observant’, a habitual practice of being in the spaces of the Victoria Line and elsewhere, he will encounter and notice security. He claims that he has a tendency to be observant and that as a part of the environment of his commute on the Victoria Line, he will encounter and attend to various security presences. In the extract below, Tolu also describes an attentiveness to her surroundings. In this example though she explains that she makes an effort to familiarise herself with her surroundings because of the need to suppress feelings of claustrophobia whilst travelling daily from Brixton to either Kings Cross St Pancras or Euston and making the reverse journey each weekday evening:

Tolu: I’m naturally claustrophobic, I therefore have to keep busy by doing a lot of stuff, keep thinking about things so I’m not aware of where I am almost ... So I’m more vigilant and I get nervous so I will look around more looking around and doing something to take my mind off where I am and some of that will mean I see the security. I’m observant and attentive so I do just look around and security is definitely something I’ve noticed and thought about before, definitely so I will make sure that I listen out, or that I’m looking around wherever I am. It’s just my nature.

For both Sam and Tolu, being on the lookout for security for security is, in different ways, described as an inevitable effect of their practices whilst on their daily commutes. What follows is another example of how security becomes present through it becoming the

object of attentions. In this extract from my field diary I observe as a security sticker and CCTV cameras are enrolled as the subject of a group of children at play:

A child on a train leaving Green Park station noticed a sticker on the windows notifying passengers that security cameras operate on the London underground. He read the sticker out loud “security cameras”, looking around the train carriage inquisitively, suggesting to the other children that they could play “spot the camera”, exclaiming excitedly, “there’s loads”. After a short time, a younger child scowled and expressed her discontent with the game, “there aren’t any here, I can’t see any”. The game did not last long after that as each child’s attention slips to other activities. Their actions drew my attention to the stickers, this is the first time I have noticed such signs on the windows of trains on the Victoria Line.

(Observant participation, Victoria Line, 01.01.09)

The child’s game animates the security sticker, and the potential presence of cameras, in an entirely unplanned and novel way through which security comes to presence. Animated in this way, security takes on another form, as another type of presence, the object of play, of wonder and becomes radically different through this. Returning to the methodology and the practical exercises of Perec’s (2008a, 2010) own work on the everyday, security came to presence in different ways through the course of my observant participation and through the work undertaken by my participants. The aim was to undo the narrowness our habitual modes of seeing and encountering security and to move security from the background. Take for example Helen, a participant who walked to work on the South Bank daily and used different techniques to encourage look out for security:

Helen: Yeah, I do that to help to have, to give myself something to carry on looking. My mind drifts quite a lot so I have to kind of give myself a bit more of a strict kind of thing like can you remember the sign today? Did you see these ones? Have you seen the same ones again? Like those kinds of questions and quizzes that I would set myself because it would make me remember to do it, and focus me and hopefully it would mean I’d do it better than oh I must look for CCTV cameras today, or I must look for, to see if I spot a policeman, or is there anything from security that I notice.

Having considered the intensification of security through examples of different transactions between absence and presence, this section itself has built in intensity, starting

with a discussion of chance encounters it has progressed through a discussion of disruptions of the ordinary and being on the lookout for security. Now it turns its attention to the fourth example of a movement to presence, that of the security event. In the context of this thesis I am of course most interested in counter-terrorist security practices and with how security can be born to presence as it responds to real and perceived threats. In such incidents security which I have described as being primed to occur in the event of an event are born to presence as it changes form and coalesces around an event. In the following example I encounter two police officers in Victoria underground station involved in a 'stop and search' operation:

There are two police officers in conversation, stood to the side near an entrance/exit. Both are wearing all black uniforms. Both are replete with a cumbersome looking array of issue paraphernalia – stab vests, radios, handcuffs, mobile phones, etcetera. I see on their vests, on what appears to be a detachable Velcro strip, the words 'Counter Terrorism Pro-Active Unit' printed in white. Having walked past them I leave the underground station. In the overland rail station, a dispersed crowd of similarly attired police officers are undertaking a stop and search operation. I descend the steps through a different entrance/exit. The two officers have not moved. They talk, appear to share a joke whilst watching people pass through the gates.

(Observant participation, Victoria, 08.01.09)

The birth to presence through a security event is here posed as a rent in the fabric of the infra-ordinary, disrupting the life of everyday life as changes for and coalesces around an event. The form of counter-terrorist security that is primed to be part of the infra-ordinary background is thus made ready to emerge, and so to act, in the event of an event. In the bellow passage, Amira's example illustrates this situation, where she describes a security event and the evacuation of Victoria underground station:

Amira: Once ... um ... a while ago, they had to evacuate us all out, we had to go outside, outside an exit there and they never told us what happened or how long we'd have to wait, I mean I can't even remember why we were allowed to go back in, or who said that we could go back in. They announced that you had to leave, you weren't allowed to be on the platform, umm, and then we were allowed to go back in again. That's the only time there's been a bit of a security thing.

In this example there is a security event, the intensified event where the apparatus of security coalesces and defines it. In the evacuation of Victoria underground station here described by Amira, security becomes an exceptional element in and through its coming to presence. Her description of the evacuation will enrol those in Victoria underground station into the security event, where it becomes difficult not to be aware of security and its presence as a presence to secure. This is of course not to claim that everyone involved in this intensification will attend to security as a more intense presence or indeed experience it in the same way. Whilst many of the examples discussed so far in this section are moments where security is present and encountered as another type of thing, through spontaneous, unplanned and unexpected encounters, here it is security itself which defines the way that it is born to presence and provides definition to the event itself:

A cordon of temporary steel barriers has been erected, forming an area of exclusion that extends from County Hall to the Royal Festival Hall, surrounding and enclosing the footpath and Jubilee Gardens. Police officers and private security personnel are stationed at either end of the footpath where there is an entry/exit point, they permit access to police officers and private security personnel, as I watch two police dog handlers walk near me and then pass through into the gated area. Members of the public approach and are advised by police officers to find an alternate route – resulting in complaints, questions and confusions. I can see a number of police officers moving slowly about inside the cordon. It appears that their movements are coordinated and that they are conducting a search, some have sniffer dogs, others shine torches as they stoop, sift and sort. Along the rest of the South Bank footpath there are police patrolling in pairs and threes, intermittently and without any apparent order others stand and talk or quietly observe, giving the impression of alert readiness. Close to the carrousel where the fencing begins here, there are four officers in conversation, after a time two walk on in the direction of the South Bank Centre. One of the two officers still standing is holding a map and a small black book, I overhear him, “I like it when a good plan comes together” he remarks.

(Observant participation, South Bank, 31.12.08)

In the example drawn from my research diary, the structure of security on the South Bank is radically altered in response to a security event. Areas of the footpath have been closed off as part of temporary security arrangements to secure the New Year’s events that take place annually in this area of London. For a time these temporary arrangements are a

form of security presence which is unavoidable, it is a contrast with the what is usually found on the South Bank. Security can come to presence in response to a security event in ways which disrupts what is normally expected. In such instances where security responds to an event, this dynamic involves forms of security primed to be part of everyday life emerge as they respond to an event, coalescing as they become present. In these examples, security becomes present and takes on a heightened presence to disrupt the life of everyday life in relation to the event.

In this section I have focused on four examples of births to presence. In addition to the examples of security events described in the last part of the section, I have discussed chance encounters; disruptions of the ordinary; and being on the lookout for security. These are of course are not the only ways in which security can be born to presence and these will of course interact with and are intertwined with one another and may occur at different points and with different outcomes. These four examples have shown how security can be encountered as it becomes a more intense presence in the everyday life of cities. It is important to note that they follow on from the particular form of security and the security apparatus described in Chapter 5. It is the aim of this form of security to be primed to be part of the everyday life of cities. It follows that there will be moments where security interventions are encountered through chance and as a more ordinary presence, as another type of thing, different to what we would identify as being about security. There are other times where it is through a change in the security architecture, or as security changes form and coalesces around an event, that security becomes present to secure. Importantly this counteracts the tendency to assume that security is somehow always already present within urban life. Security interventions become lived as they are folded into urban space and everyday happenings, and stitched into the fabric of the everyday city so as to allow that life to live whilst also aiming to secure it.

Returning to Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, the form of security described in this thesis aims to become a part of the everyday life of urban space, for the mechanisms of security to become lived. The aim is biopolitical, to foster and protect the circulations and freedoms and for security itself to become a part of that life where security is then involved in a range of transactions between absence and presence. Whilst this is a form of security that is primed to respond in the event of an event, as this section has demonstrated, it comes to presence in different and in what are unplanned and often unexpected ways. This is further evidence of its everydayness, for whilst these interventions do indeed become present in response to security events, there are many other ordinary and often unanticipated happenings in and through which security can be born to presence. The everyday life of



security and the securing of the everyday city involve much more than merely the protection and securing of the everyday from the threats of terrorism, and more than administering a series of interventions to urban spaces. It is a question of the relations between security and urban life and the capacities for people to live in the 'secure city'.

## **7.2. The presence of presence**

The focus of this section falls on how the presence of security is experienced as it rips the fabric of the infra-ordinary and becomes a more intensified presence within the life of everyday life. We have had hints of the affective presence of security in the examples in the previous section. Here I am interested in the experience of the encounter itself and the experience of security as a range of intensified presences in which, following Ophir, "the presence of something acts upon one-who-is-present such that the encounter with that thing is shifted from background to foreground ... the presence of the encounter overshadows the presence of what is encountered" (2005:211).

Focusing on how security is encountered and enacted in everyday life and how it is then experienced as a more intensified presence requires a more specific focus on the emergence of affect and feeling in relation to the materialities of security. Elsewhere Massumi (2005a, 2005b; see also Adey, 2008, 2009b) alerts us to the possibilities of the relationship between affect and security interventions by arguing that security measures work by creating dispositions of bodies towards action, that is to say they work to circulate, and distribute, certain intensities before they produce representations. Focusing on a case study of threat assessments, and the anticipatory logic of pre-emption, Massumi (2005a; 2005b) argues that the sign of threat channels and mobilises fear, thus without necessarily all acting alike, bodies come to exhibit a 'shared central nervousness'. However, here as elsewhere, Massumi's account is for me too concerned with a generalised state of insecurity which he suggests emerges in relation to the materialities of security. In this section I will show how security presences affect and can be experienced as intensified in multiple and often contradictory ways. Taken together with the previous chapter, security interventions as intensified presences are shown to touch and resonate with bodies in different ways (see Seigworth, 1999). Through a focus on affect and on descriptions of how security is felt, this section develops the everyday life of security through a focus on how different security mechanisms within the two research sites are enacted as part of the life of everyday life. Ultimately this develops an understanding of security as lived, as living and as

lively so that it will always exceed its initial presence within urban life as a somehow always doing the work of security.

In spite of my raising concerns with works which have focused on the emergence of a generalised insecurity in relation to the presence of security, it is important not to overlook the more negative affective capacities of security interventions. As such, to begin this section consider how in the following passage Christopher describes how he is affected through encounters with security measures that I argued in the last chapter are primed to be part of the background of everyday life and to then come to presence in the event of an event:

Christopher: There is a, in a slightly strange way, almost a resentment at having the security forces around because they are an actual kind of, they are a, a sign, a kind of footprint of the fact that we have a need for them and it's that need for them that I have a resentment for. If we didn't have the terrorist threat, there'd be no need for the police officers, so the police officers in many ways index the threat. So I, in as much as to say in a rationalist sense, you can rationalise that they are there to help, or to deter, or to help by deterring ... I think if there are these things here then there must be a need for them, otherwise why would they be there? And I do resent that, and that it makes me worry about why they're there. And the reason for that is due to the indexical association made between the images of the underground and the immanent terrorist attacks that have happened and will probably occur there. Seeing the underground induces the feelings associated with terrorism, namely terror, albeit terror mediated by a need to get on with my life and therefore not become too irrational about the whole thing.

In this passage Christopher explains how encountering different security interventions is intensely felt as a range of negative affectivities. Here he describes how feelings of insecurity, the unpleasant feelings of fear, worry, terror and the apprehensions he experiences emerge through a particular set of relations between himself and the presence of a range of different security and surveillance interventions whilst he travels on the Victoria Line. He states that his encounters with these measures act as daily reminders of the threat of terrorism, and the event of terror that are present as a possible futurity posing a threat to a valued life. In these encounters the future is brought into the present affectively, as an intensified presence, it is experienced as a present condition (see Massumi, 2005b). Note though how Christopher also concedes that in spite of these feelings of insecurity he

must get on with his life, in part this suggests that these affects are mobile and that they fade and so are not always so intensely present. In the following example Emma speaks of anticipatory affects in relation to a future terrorist event, as she describes how she can be affected by the presence of what she describes here as encounters “when the police are out in force”:

Emma: Seeing the police can be quite exciting but it's more disconcerting really, I know that might sound odd. I get worried when the police are out in force, when that happens then it looks like it's something serious. It's really frightening because you just don't know do you? You never get told what's happening and inevitably, because you can't explain it, irrational thoughts get in your mind that maybe this time it's something serious again.

Patrick: So in those cases it's the presence of the police, or security, which is unsettling, alarming even?

Emma: Yeah, absolutely, it can be exciting, I have that curious streak and I get caught up in the moment, but then it's really really scary, especially when you think about the recent bombings, with that in the back of your mind it's really frightening.

Here Emma begins by suggesting that the presence of the police can be experienced as exciting, although she follows this directly by stating that it is more ‘disconcerting’. She then describes an intense affectual response, qualified here as feelings of insecurity which sees the future brought into the present, in effect, as Massumi contends, the event remains virtual “but is real and present in its effects” (2005b:8). As with Christopher, Emma’s narrative is suggestive of a relation to the future event of terror, and also to past events which have an affective life. Emma makes reference to the London bombings of July 7<sup>th</sup> 2005 and fears, admitting in the interview that she at times worries “maybe this time it’s something serious again”. In these two examples we see what Massumi describes as “the looming uncertainty of ill-defined threat”, where there is the sign of threat, “its most feared effects have already begun to materialize” (2005b:8). Emma and Christopher have described the presence and experience of encounters which intensify a series of negative affects characterised by insecurity. However and as I stated in the opening of this section, I am interested in how security presences may affect bodies in different ways and the affective outcomes that arise in encounters with various security interventions as more intensified presences. In the same interview Emma reflects on other moments where she encounters security as a more intensified presence. In the following extract, again Emma

provides an example of her encounters with the police, however note her claims that at different times she is affected in different ways:

Emma: I feel unreasonably guilty. Even though, um, even though I'm not doing anything wrong. Yeah, I, er, I do feel guilty and I noticed actually because it happened, in, um, in the two weeks of watching, over the last month, that people tend to, go, um sort of, make them equi, make themselves equidistant from all police, so that they're as far from all policeman as they can be, as they filter out of a station. And I do that, that's a conscious effort, it's because I'm feeling, I feel unreasonably guilty. It's not that I'm doing anything wrong.

Here Emma describes a compulsion to change her route through a station, so as not to pass police officers. In these different instances she suggests that she experiences the encounter through guilt. The presence of the police, and indeed other security and surveillance interventions, encountered at different times and in different situations, engender different affective responses. In another interview Thomas spoke of how at times he is aware of the affect of being captured by guilt when he encountered police officers or security officials during his daily commute on the Victoria Line:

Thomas: I'm one of those people who always feels like they're under suspicion so I suppose there's that, I just try not to look shifty and I probably just look shiftier than ever, so yeah I react in a sort of a guilty way probably [laughs]. I just always feel guilty around policemen, always feel like I've done something wrong or, I don't know why though, I don't know what it is. But apart from the Police I don't react, I don't think I really change what I would normally do. I'd just, I'm pretty nonplussed by them really, you just sort of carry on, like I say, I think it's become normal to see certain things, um certain security wherever you are. So no, I wouldn't say that I react to them specifically.

In this passage Thomas claims that he experiences encounters with police officers and other persons he associates with security through feelings of unease and guilt. He describes situations where he will actually alter his behaviour due to the intensity of the encounter. Interestingly Thomas then considers his encounters with other forms of security and suggests a continuing indifference to them, an almost but not quite, a claim to a nothing response. This is important as it again demonstrates the different ways in which the

relationship between subject and security technology is shifted and the different forms in which the shift occurs. Although in these instances a form of security is only momentarily present, I suggest that for Thomas and for Emma, their sense of being in the spaces of the underground changes, impacting on what a body can do and its capacity for being affected. Where Thomas suggests an indifferent relation to a range of security presences, in the following example Nicola suggests that the presence of security as an intensified presence can have a profoundly negative affect on her:

Nicola: I did think about how ugly a lot of it is, really unattractive and uninspiring, especially because I think of the underground, I really like the underground. How the security is designed, it doesn't make people likely to interact and why don't they want people to interact, what's wrong with interacting, they put all these adverts up and we're supposed to sit there reading about bloody terrorist bombs, whatever. And then there's all these ugly robot eyeballs looking at us when we get out, it's horrible.

Kraftl and Adey have written about this affective connection when they write about what they term 'the push' that the "particular relationship between a body and a building could bring about: an affect" (2008:216-17). In Nicola's narrative she describes a particularly intense relationship between herself and security interventions of different kinds, describing 'the push' of these presences as "horrible". The presence of what she deems "ugly" security mechanisms is unsettling, and Nicola describes an intense aversion to these features. Her dislike for the security interventions is completely at odds for her affective experience of the tube, as she stated elsewhere in the interview, "I really love the tube, it's like another world".

These examples are important as they have begun to describe a variegated affective landscape, where security interventions as intensified presences can touch or resonate with bodies in different ways. Most notably the above examples have described a range of negative affectivities qualified as anxieties, fears and insecurities, as well as guilt and unsettledness that can emerge through different encounters with security presences and in the examples to follow the place of the presence of security as reassuring is also apparent. Adey highlights this, citing Buchanan, writing that "different combinations of bodies assembled in a complex environment for Buchanan (1997:77), 'prompts us to act differently according to the object encountered'" (2008:448). For Adey these encounters "constitute relations, or manifold compositions that impact upon what a body can do, its capacity for moving, or being affected" (2008:448). These descriptions of encounters necessitate a move away from understanding of the presence of security exclusively as an aggravating

and disquieting presence which gives rise to and produces a generalised insecurity felt as a range of negative affectivities. Such accounts also go some way to disrupting the all too common claim that western societies are subject to a 'permanent anxiety' (Graham, 2006) and are dominated by a 'culture of fear' (Robin, 2002). To continue this sense of variegation, consider the following example from my research diary where I observe as interest, excitement and joy accompany the swirling blades of a hovering police helicopter on the South Bank:

Amongst a group staring towards the sky a mother points at the hovering police helicopter, 'look at the big helicopter', she crouches, her child shrieks excitedly, kicking his legs gently. His excitement grows, reaching out with an arm he extends a finger, 'oooh', looking now at his mother. His mother looks back, scrunching her nose before smiling 'yes!' Both watch as the blades thrash, the helicopter slowly slicing through the sky. The child's hand has lowered, his mother looks on, her eyes following the helicopter, but he has lost interest, still kicking he now busily looks around.

(Observant participation, South Bank 10.12.08)

Here the presence of a police helicopter attracts and enrolls attentions differently. As the mother and child watch the hovering helicopter their interest is accompanied by excitement. Witnessing the delight of both the mother and the child is a reminder of how the presence of security interventions enacted as intensified presences gives rise to all manner of different affectivities, and also significantly, how security mechanisms are enrolled in the everyday life of cities in different and unpredictable ways some of which have everything to do with security, whereas others do not. There is a sense from this example of how the police helicopter exceeds its place in urban life as a presence to secure. In another example from my research diary, as I entered Kings Cross St Pancras underground station I witnessed a group of children interacting with two police dog handlers:

Two British Transport police officers with dogs (a type of spaniel?) are stood talking to a small group of excited young school children and their teacher. The children take turns to stroke the dogs, their smiles and laughter shared by the officers. Whilst one of the officers talks with the teacher the other is photographed by the children, who then show him the photographs. The excitement only seems to grow as the children then enjoy taking turns to pose with the police officer and the dog. People stood close by

smile, talking about the happy group. Some walking slow their stride, a couple holding hands break into grins as they pass ‘awww, that’s so cute’.

(Observant participation, Kings Cross St Pancras, 03.12.08)

These two examples are significant for demonstrating the different ways that security can affect, but also how the life of security as an affective presence exceeds the presence of various mechanisms within everyday life to secure. The presence of the police helicopter is enrolled in spectatorship, a source of excitement for a child. The presence of police officers with police dogs becomes, for a moment, a source of joy for a group of children and then enrolls and affects other passengers in different ways. To consider the everyday life of security it is not nor can it ever be enough to maintain that security is always present as a presence to secure, it can and is enrolled in everyday life in so many different ways.

In the following passages we see a different range of intensities of feeling and embodied affective responses to security as an intensified presence as it changes form and becomes present in response to a ‘security event’. We should not make the mistake of thinking that when security does actually come to presence that it is just experienced through fear, or that it is simply present as security. In the following examples witness as security is born to presence as it coalesces and responds to a security event:

Amira: And even then, nobody seemed to care that ‘oh we might be blown up’, or anything, it was just we need to get home. So no one was thinking or you know, saying, what’s going on? What’s happening? It was people concerned about their own journeys.

Patrick: So rather than necessarily security or safety, it was people wanting to get going?

Amira: Yeah, definitely, people just wanted to get home. So it was an, it was irritating for me and then for other people, the thought crosses your mind, they wouldn’t make us leave if there wasn’t something wrong, but more than anything it’s annoying having to stand around and wait and you don’t know if you should get the bus, or when you’ll get home, it’s not what you want at the end of a day, maybe that’s being naïve.

Amira describes the closure and evacuation of a station as security acts, comes to presence and coalesces around an event. Note how Amira talks of this experience, she claims that in this situation her feelings of insecurity are short-lived, stating, “the thought

crosses your mind". Amira suggests that as security becomes present and coalesces around the event, security and the evacuation of the station are experienced as an annoyance, an irritating interruption. Amira recognises the distilling and transmission of affect through a palpable collective annoyance which manifests here as an edgy mood, this is then expressed differently by those assembled. Amira's account is a reminder that security is not experienced in isolation, security never comes alone it is always mediated, this changes how we receive it. This is an example of how the living and the experiencing of security is woven into the fabric of everyday life. In another interview Ling spoke of how the coming to presence of security can disrupt the circulations of urban life:

Ling: When I got to Victoria, there was just basically policemen there and I just thought something had happened and it transpired that, the next day that um that Sutton Trust guy was found on the bench [laughs], in Victoria Station, so that was a bit weird, but that did explain why the police were there ... but there wasn't an explanation, we were just told it was closed. But because there were a lot of policemen around I thought something must be happening, because it was just out of the blue, just not usual, not a usual part of my day. There were just so many, and when you see more all around, at every station, you do start to worry a bit, especially when you're told to take a detour but no one explains why. There were just so many of them so I thought, what's happened, what's wrong. I did think, as I saw them I wondered why it could be that they're there, but I was more annoyed by the inconvenience, I thought, I'm going to be late, like get out of my way I want to go to work, stop obstructing me.

The event that caused the station closures, requiring Ling and other passengers to find alternative routes, was at the time an unknown incident. In this extract Ling claims that she thought little of the potential for this to have been caused by an 'event of terror', suggesting that her most immediate response to the security presence was annoyance as it inconvenienced her and disrupted the circulations that she relies on. For both Ling and Amira the presence of security is an interruption to the circulations that security aims to foster and protect. In these instances it is this, rather than the 'event of terror', which is experienced in the presence of the encounter. When security does become present as a more heightened presence, it is not just through fear and it is not simply present as security:



Adam: I've walked past before and there were loads of police vans parked up outside the station, and like I couldn't see the police so I assumed that they were either in the underground or in the train station. It was some, um, something was happening that needed the police, but not like, I didn't think it was like a bomb, or an attack, like I didn't really give it that much thought ... it's kind of strange, like clearly there's a reason for them being there and you can't place why, like is it a training exercise, is it a raid, is there some intelligence that they've got? Like you know that something's going on.

Patrick: Yeah, so there's the norm, and then something, like that, unusual.

Adam: Yeah, it sort of confuses it. I wonder if it would stop me, I haven't been in a situation where I've not been, I was going onto the underground, like I've never been there when there's been a large amount of police for some unexplained reason, but I wonder if that happened, like if that would stop me, or make me think twice about it, how that would make me think ... I don't even know if I'd think, like you know, you'd know something's not right?

Patrick: Make the connection to a potential attack of some sort?

Adam: Yeah, or if I'd explain it another way.

Although the future event of terror can be and is brought into the present affectively, in these examples it is not present as an immediate, significant and terrifying future. It appears that for the three respondents the future which is brought into the present is non-security related. These descriptions are in contrast with Massumi's (2005a, 2005b) account of the possibilities of the relationship between affect and security interventions. Massumi (2005a; 2005b) has argued that the sign of threat channels and mobilises fear, take for example his case of the confusion of flour for anthrax at Montreal Airport in May 2005:

... quick, close the airport! The airport must be closed just in case, to assuage the fear. The closure of the air- port induces fear. Men in white decontamination suits descend. Police swarm in for crowd control. Far-flung airports with originating flights due to land are affected. The media amplify the alarm in real-time with live news bulletins. The fear of the disruption has become the disruption (Massumi, 2005b:9)

In the examples that have been presented in this section, when security is encountered, and when events or potential events do happen, the life of security exceeds its presence to secure. Security and surveillance measures as heightened presences are

enrolled in different ways in the everyday life of cities, only some of which are doing the work of security. This says much of the ways in which security can come to be so imbricated in urban space and in our everyday lives. The accounts of fear and insecurity that have come to dominate reflections on the relations between security and everyday urban life is in danger of overlooking the presence of security as it is a present condition, that of being secure:

Iain: In terms of why I would expect security on the underground, this is mainly, recently it's been around the information we see about terrorism in the media, and also on the back of the 7th July attacks. I think it's the old thing of wanting to see some high visibility policing and having that as a psychological reassurance. I appreciate that it may well be slightly simple, but a visible presence infers that one is safer on the tube network or anywhere else.

In the following set of examples, participants reflect on how security is experienced as it is intensified and produces the affect that it names. This affective condition of being-secure is expressed through a range of bodily feelings which participants have suggested emerge through their encounters with security as a more intense presence. Take for example Marie's account:

Marie: I think the only time I would look for security really is if I was scared for some reason, because that is when I need it, or think I need it, it hasn't happened but I can imagine if I was frightened then I would look for security to feel better, to feel like there was something there for me. Otherwise I wouldn't look at it, I wouldn't have a reason to.

Patrick: For the reassurance it offers, that knowledge?

Marie: Yes, exactly, you know they are there to protect you and it does make me feel better if I am scared of something it will help.

For Marie, security measures are not always experienced or qualified as intensified presences nor does she consider them to be enrolled directly in her being-secure. She claims that she will look for security to become present when aiming for a specific feeling. This is an account of being somehow protected from danger and security affecting Marie in such a way that she can then be reassured, and so more confident. Whilst it does not necessarily mean that she would be free from fear, it is a relation to security which is

expressed in the bodily feelings of being-secure. In the following diary extract Daniel reflects on the presence of different security and surveillance interventions and changes in bodily affectivity:

On balance, the physical and visible presence of human security enforcers is more comforting than any other. Even though they may not be the most efficient or effective form of security provision, they inspire a different reaction in me — and I imagine most people — from ‘robotic security’ (Self-completed diary, Daniel, 06.04.10).

Here Daniel considers how the presence of different security mechanisms have different capacities to affect him when he encounters them through his daily commute on the Victoria Line. He observes how he relates to different security presences in different ways and claims that the presence of these gives rise to different affective states in which different felt relations with security as an intensified presence emerge. In the passage below Nimali also reflects on the presence of the police, this time on the South Bank:

Nimali: I do, I always do feel better with the police, with police uniforms, not these, these South Bank Patrol ... Yeah, no I do feel safer, [laughs], I do sometimes think that maybe it was because my dad was a policeman [laughs]. It just automatically makes me feel safe, when I see a uniform, a police uniform, you know, it makes me feel safer, I have to be honest, you know it might have nothing to do with my security.

Nimali differentiates between how she relates to the presence of different security interventions and suggests that there are important differences within the presence of the encounter itself. Nimali describes how it is that she is affected by the presence of police officers. Whilst this does not necessarily specify a relation to an immediate or future threat, Nimali claims that in the encounters with police security is felt as a present condition, the condition of being protected, of feeling safe. Importantly these examples have demonstrated moments where the life of security is experienced affectively as a presence to secure in ways which security as a condition is intensely felt. These feelings of being secure are qualified in different ways by participants as they emerge through encounters with security interventions as intensified presences.

In closing this section I would like to consider how the life of these and other security presences is finite. Their duration will differ; some lasting a second, a minute, an hour,

perhaps longer. Just as everyday life is constantly ongoing, so the life of security is constantly ongoing:

In discussion, three PCSOs walk underneath Waterloo Bridge, one points and they walk to a black box used by street entertainers as a platform. The PCSO who pointed taps the box with his foot before crouching next to, gently pressing a hand against the top. He looks concerned. He stands and all three look anxiously around. One of the PCSOs asks those close by if the box belongs to them, growing louder with impatience. He attracts attention, heads turn, paces slow and a small crowd begins to gather.

Yes

A young man replies, the PCSO glares and admonishes him:

You should not leave it there unattended, it's a security concern

The man had been confused, the box is not his. Further enquiries. A larger crowd has formed now, a ripple of agitated murmurs, there is a palpable and growing sense of an uneasy tension, the exchanging of worried looks, concerns are voiced. The commotion caused by the PCSOs and the nervous exchanges of the gathered crowd alerts a man working on the carousel. He apologises to his queue, before running to the box shouting, the queue watch, the assembly quietens, the PCSOs turn. His hands raise:

Don't worry, it's one of them [entertainer], he's coming back!

He pushes the box onto its side, revealing empty space:

Should really be left like that

He returns to his booth. Different voices now, laughter and easiness distilling as they overwhelm the previous feeling of worry, the tension dissipates with the crowd. The PCSOs take their turn to quietly examine the hollow – bystanders peer around them doing the same. Two PCSOs walk slowly on, the one who had pointed, stands and

glares around, muttering to himself. A slight shake of the head, he walks briskly to join his colleagues. The box is left, now empty and on its side.

(Observant participation, South Bank, 31.12.08)

In this example we see the emergence of a potential threat, a concern which grows in its intensity, an unease and concern born, then magnified and transmitted as it passes between bodies, ultimately lost – although the PCSOs remained clearly irritated by the event as they walked away. The event is contagious, agitation and unrest emerge, those assembled are drawn in and contaminated through the direct contact between the PCSOs and others: raised voices appeal, nervous looks are exchanged, a definite sense of unease is transmitted and begins to circulate. These looks, gestures, anxious tones exchanged through this encounter come to mediate this experience explicitly. As the box is revealed to hold little mystery the unease moves, the intensification of security slipping away. This fading, for most sees the return of security as little more than a background concern. People come to be captured by the event, enrolled in different ways, highlighting different forms of motility and different processes of change, and so we witness how fears or anxieties may grow, wane and subsist for however long, being transmitted or lost, as the background atmosphere gradually returns (see Bissell, 2009b).

What this draws our attention to are the ways that security as an intensified presence can move on or change, and the dampening or fading which sees the reemergence of the vague atmospheric background described in Chapter 6. Stewart (2003:4) provides a beautiful description of this dynamic:

We go along with ways of sensing and feeling, of relating and exercising power, of suffering impacts and claiming agency. Then something happens to cull things into a form both more potent and suddenly tentative. Then things get vague and diffuse again or drop back onto a track that makes particular, unhesitating, sense of them.

What I think Stewart expresses so well here is that to begin from the life of the everyday is to focus on a dynamic between the vague and definite, the particular and general. In short, security oscillates between both background and foreground. More specifically, we could say that the movement to become background is differentiated: an intensified presence can dull or fading; movements to absence can involve transmission, dispersal and movements which lead to an eruption elsewhere; and movements to absence may involve a loss of presence or immediacy. This acknowledges and extends the account

of the 'background' given in Chapter 6. This may of course not be immediate, and so it is useful to think of this change in terms of a movement involving the dampening of the background sense of life (see Anderson, 2009a; Stern, 1998).

This section has offered a discussion of moments where security is present as an intensified presence and how the life of security as a range of more heightened presences is experienced. Importantly, the life of these presences and the ways in which they are experienced differ and are far more complex than have previously been theorised. Security presences are felt in multiple, often contradictory ways, the affective landscapes when security is present is more variegated than just a generalised insecurity. Following Adey, these encounters "summon up feelings, which in turn may interfere with one another, aggravate, supplement or supplant" (Adey, 2008:440). It is therefore important to account for complex ways the security as a range of intensified presences might affect bodies in different ways, altering their capacities to act and how security as an intense presence is experienced. These mesh with one another, interfere with one another, and resonate with one another and have consequences for what people do, which feeds back into how they engage with the space. As the final part of this section showed, these affective presences have a strange durability, they come and go, they are fleeting and they are transitory. The life of an intensified presence is mobile, and as such these presences are only more or less durable: moving on, changing, and often becoming part of the background once more. Rather than a concern for the 'life' of everyday life becoming the referent object of security, this accounts for the living and experiencing of security itself, as it becomes part of urban life.

## **Conclusion**

Through this chapter I have discussed how, through a closer attention to encounters with counter-terrorist security interventions, a form of security that I have thus far suggested is primed to be part of everyday life changes form and becomes a more intensified presence. As such it has attended to the ripping and the rips in the infra-ordinary background that was described in Chapter 6 and so addressed security as a heightened presence within the life of the two research sites. Everyday life is full of these moments, instantiations when security becomes an intensified presence and this chapter has moved from the traditional focus on understandings of security characterised exclusively as a presence to secure, towards a fuller appreciation of the where and how of security. Attention to these instantiations has sought to consider the emergence of affect in relation to the

materialities of security and the range of bodily feelings through which security encountered and enacted as a more intensified presence is experienced.

In discussing security as an intensified presence within the life of everyday life, this chapter has extended previous accounts that have presumed that the presence of security interventions leads to an incoherent background fear and the saturation of urban life with a generalised insecurity. This approach thus poses an important challenge to works which have suggested that the saturation of urban space with security mechanisms as an element of the 'security drive' "is the production of permanent anxiety around everyday urban spaces, systems and events" (Graham, 2006:261). Whilst fear, anxiety, insecurity, terror and other negative affects certainly emerge through encounters with security presences, security presences affect and are felt in multiple, often contradictory ways. This chapter has described the experience of the intensified presence of security within everyday life through safety, guilt, annoyance, confidence, excitement, fear, to name just a few. In focusing on the processes through which security is encountered and enacted, we see how it is not only 'insecurity', but a more variegated affective landscapes when security is present. The focus on encounters allows for thinking about and attending to how security interventions, of different kinds, may affect in ways not prescribed in advance.

Taken together this chapter, along with Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, have shown that the biopolitics of security is not only a matter of how the everyday becomes the 'referent-object' (Dillon and Lobo-Guerra 2008). I have demonstrated here that the urban geography of security is not about securing life, and in the biopolitical sense securing in and through life, it is about the living of security itself. Here security is understood as lived, as living and as lively so that it exceeds its initial design and its remit in urban life as a presence to secure. Often security emerges as present and is then experienced as an intensified presence in ways which are different to anything that we would identify as being about security. It is not, nor can it ever be the case that there is life and then there is security, security itself is nothing unless it is lived. This chapter, along with Chapter 6, has demonstrated how this specific form of security apparatus takes place and how it is woven into the fabric of the everyday as it becomes part of urban life in ways that will always exceed the intentions set out in Chapter 5 and always be more experienced as more than a presence to secure. In offering examples of the more nuanced everyday life of security as an intense presence, this chapter has demonstrated the complex ways that forms of biopolitical security can come to presence, and the life of these different presences. It has shown that it is not enough to assume that security is always somehow present, rather the chapter has suggested that where invisibility is central to how these new ways of securing public space

function, security apparatuses are designed to oscillate between invisibility and response to events.

The life of security as a range of intensified presences within the city is a complex, it is not enough to consider the life of security as a presence to secure, as to do so overlooks the accidental, unexpected, often ordinary ways that people can come into contact with and enliven security daily. These daily encounters, these everyday enactments give life to security, call it into being for what may only be a fleeting moment, although they may be more stubborn, enduring before moving on in ways that demonstrate the everyday life of security and a sense of the motility of affects. Importantly, and as argued in Chapter 5, contemporary security apparatuses are designed to oscillate between invisibility and response to events. For security to achieve its aims of fostering 'good' circulations and ensuring the sets of 'freedoms' that have come to define liberal-democratic life, this presencing must be finite. These movements involve a folding back into the infra-ordinary background, a loss which sees a movement to absence, and the return of the vague, indefinite background atmospheric feeling described in the previous chapter. In this chapter, as in Chapter 6, I have demonstrated the importance of exploring how security is encountered and what happens to a security presence, how these presences take on a life of their own as they emerge, intensify, cease, and otherwise move.



## 8. Conclusion

### Introduction

In this thesis I have sought to discuss the everyday life of security and to attend to how the everyday is secured. This final chapter draws together the research findings and the implications of this thesis, as well as providing a consideration of some of the possibilities that this thesis raises for future work. In this concluding chapter I offer an overview and an evaluation of the research project as a whole and detail its contribution to current debates concerning urban security, in particular through its focus on the relations between security and lived everyday urban life.

### 8.1. Summary

This thesis has developed an account of an emerging security apparatus within cities in the UK, addressing the ways in which a variety of counter-terrorist security mechanisms become present within urban spaces in order to attend to how these measures are then encountered and experienced as part of the everyday life of cities. In doing so I have thus questioned both the processes through which the everyday city is secured and have developed a more in depth account of how the various materialities that make up those processes of securing are encountered, enacted and experienced as they become part of lived urban life. To this end I have offered a conceptual vocabulary for describing the everyday life of security and how the everyday is secured.

I have argued through this thesis that in order to better understand the urban geographies of security we must move to witness and describe how security becomes part of urban life. This calls attention to both the efficacy and operation of security techniques, with regards to technical and instrumental dimensions of security practice, and addresses the life of security in greater depth. Extending existing debates, this conceives life both as that which is secured and governed as the referent object of a security apparatus, and as that which is lived and everyday. In this respect whilst it is to be accepted that where biopolitical security projects take (multiple) expressions of life as their referent object, in the securing of the everyday city and the governance of urban life itself, life will always exceed those strategies of governance in one way or another. As I have argued through this thesis, it is essential that an account of the everyday life of security and the securing of the everyday acknowledge that there can never be life and then security; security is nothing

unless it is lived. In order to attend to these concerns, the theoretical framework developed through this thesis has offered a conceptual vocabulary that necessitated the drawing together of a reading of biopolitics and specific literatures that have engaged with and theorised everyday life, most prominently the work of Georges Perec and non-representational theories.

The theoretical framework and conceptual vocabulary were used to examine the specific context of the securing of urban public spaces and the UK Government's category of 'crowded places' in order to trace the emergence of a specific counter-terrorist security apparatus and to then attend to how interventions become part of that which is lived and everyday. Through a case study of this specific security apparatus, this thesis has argued that central to the counter-terrorist security enacted in public spaces in cities in the UK are aims to secure and to enable a set of 'freedoms' and to foster 'good' circulations and interdependencies that sustain a particular form of valued life. The concerns for freedom and circulation are intimately bound with different expressions of life that then coalesce and coexist as the city and everyday urban life become the referent object of security. In the context of the securing of contemporary urban spaces, the biological life of species existence cannot be separated from other expressions of life, including the elements and processes which enable the valued life and the processes and circulations that define that liberal-democratic life to be sustained, alongside the fostering of a distinct way of life and lived everyday urban life itself. Thus, to equate the life that is to be secured with biological species-being, as some work on security does, is a mistake.

The processes of securitisation through which this form of counter-terrorist security apparatus attempts to secure public places renders a range of materialities a visible and invisible part of urban life. Whilst I am in agreement with many of the arguments that contend that the spaces of civil life are increasingly saturated with forms of security, this thesis has demonstrated that the mechanisms of security are far from somehow always already present within cities. It has been demonstrated here that in fact the geographies of urban security are complex geographies of both absence and presence. These reflect rationalities of counter-terrorist security which are centred on 'proportionality' and 'appropriateness' and the practice of security with the spaces of civil life where invisibility is central to how new ways of securing public space function. These rationalities are developed in relation to different urban contexts and as such spatial contingency is understood to be integral to the imbrications of security and cities where concerns for site specificity and bespoke solutions are embedded in the everyday in different ways.

The UK Government's CONTEST counter-terror strategy states that these arrangements should be developed and delivered through threat assessments and Chapter 5 discussed how security is then enacted with respects to a range of different and site specific considerations, *one* of which is security. The aims here are to ensure that counter-terrorism is 'appropriately' and 'proportionately' designed into the built fabric of cities and into urban life itself. The apparatus of security traced through this thesis is expected to respond to the challenges of providing security interventions that offer 'proportionate' protection, addressing sites specific vulnerabilities and mitigating the effects of an attack should one take place, 'appropriate' to site specific conditions, designed into the spaces and happenings of urban life. There emerges a situation of 'tradeoffs' between all manner of different requirements and aspirations within public spaces, these will inevitably and importantly be conditioned by specific sites and spaces and are subject to change over time. This applies as much to the 'hard' engineering and design solutions as to 'soft' governance and management arrangements, and in practical terms such an approach necessitates more holistic strategies for urban security.

Through the course of this thesis it has been demonstrated how this specific counter-terror security apparatus becomes part of and embedded in the everyday in a number of different ways, some of which are specific to this security apparatus and some of which are more generic. This specific apparatus of security and the various interventions that are deployed to counter the threats of terror are primed, in different ways, to be part of everyday life and so to have a particular mode of presence in the everyday. Importantly it has been argued that this form of security is primed to be part of everyday life so as not to disrupt the circulations and interdependencies that make up the life of the cities. It is then intended to emerge in the event of an event, primed to act and to change form as it coalesces around an event. Invisibility and submersion in the infra-ordinary background spaces and happenings of everyday life is thus central to how new ways of securing public space function when the aim is to foster circulations and to secure urban life.

Extending the discussion of how security is primed to be part of everyday life, Chapter 6 discussed how this involves a certain background expectation of security and the normalisation of security. Where security is often a background presence within urban life a situation emerges where the actual forms and practices of security are then encountered ambiguously. Although security is increasingly ubiquitous and is becoming normalised, the processes of normalisation somewhat conversely are making security an ambiguous presence. Questioning how this new normality is experienced, an account of security as a background presence experienced as a background feeling and through affective

atmospheres has been discussed. Where it is expected that security is present somehow somewhere, and where the interventions of security are enacted as an ambiguous presence, these expectations and the conditions of being-secure are described through indefinite characteristics which are close to something like an atmosphere. The thesis demonstrated that security is so often enacted as a background presence within everyday life, however this is not the only way that security is present. Through the messiness and unpredictability of everyday security will inevitably be encountered and experienced as a more intensified presence in ways that exceed its presence to secure as well as when emerge in the event of an event. Everyday life is full of moments when security becomes an intensified presence and Chapter 7 demonstrated the need to develop the traditional focus on security solely understood as part of an apparatus that is then imbricated with the city as a presence to secure, to an account which attends more fully to the where and how of security in everyday life. In discussing security as it is enacted as an intensified presence and as a part of the infra-ordinary background, this thesis has shown how security can be experienced in ways that challenge the set of assumptions regarding the presence of security interventions leads to an incoherent background fear and the saturation of urban life with a generalised insecurity. This is also a move to disrupt the common claims that western societies live in an 'age of anxiety' or are dominated by a 'culture of fear'.

Much of the emphasis on the more technical and instrumental dimensions of security in both scholarly work and with regards the practical matters overlooks the everyday and so overlooks the ways that security becomes present in everyday life as well as neglecting how security is itself lived as it secures the everyday city. Here, through attending to the ways that security is encountered and enacted as part of urban life, and so to how security is experienced, this thesis has attended to the relations between security and everyday life and has developed a better understanding of both the everyday life of security and the everyday as secured. In doing so it witnesses and describes how security becomes part of urban life in different, often unexpected ways. This has attended to security as it is lived and so better understands the urban geographies of security in ways that exceeds security simply being plans, procedures, processes, mechanisms and so on of the security apparatus, this work shows the life of it.

## **8.2. Implications and contributions**

The focus of this research on witnessing and describing the everyday life of security and investigating how the everyday is secured, raises a series of implications for

geography, for the ways security is understood and theorised, as well as for more practical matters regarding security interventions in urban environments.

This thesis, through its development of a case study of the urban geographies of counter-terrorism, extends the analyses of work within geography and elsewhere that has considered contemporary counter-terrorism post September 11<sup>th</sup> 2001. This is a substantive work on counter-terrorism in the city which argues for a more nuanced set of geographies that can be more attentive to spatial variations and more attuned to difference within the practice of counter-terrorism and security more generally. It is crucial that we reject the persistent gestures toward 'fortification' (see Coaffee, 2003a, 2004b, 2009a) or the urban 'militarism' and the 'militarisation' of urban space (see Graham, 2002b, 2004c, 2006, 2009, 2011) and appreciate that processes of urban securitisation are multifarious. Rather, for a more comprehensive discussion of the rationales for and contexts of urban security, we need to consider the specific implications of a form of security that takes up a rationale of site specificity. Additionally, and related, the form of security that has been traced through this thesis is primed to be part of everyday life in different ways, to then change form as it emerges and acts in the event of an event. Invisibility and the embedding of interventions into the spaces and happenings of everyday life is central to how these new way of securing public space function when the aim to foster circulations and to secure urban life. There are certainly cases where more overt mechanisms are enacted and so it is important to question the geographies of absence and presence and to then question how the range of security mechanisms deployed throughout cities become part of the everyday in different ways.

This thesis has demonstrated how for researching the life of security it is not enough to focus solely on the rationales for and contexts of urban security nor to conceive life exclusively as that which is secured, as the 'referent object' of security. Through this thesis I have discussed how security within everyday life moves from being a set of mechanisms to something lived, and have also attended to everyday life as it shifts from being an object of security to that within which security lives. Central to the account presented here has been the contention that as well as investigating specific expressions of 'life' as they become referent objects of security, it is essential to account for and find a means of theorising the life of the everyday. The life of security should always be recognised as exceeding security, always more than just the expression of life as an object target. It is not possible to take one without the other, it is essential that the complex relations that emerge between security and life are acknowledged and attended to. This is essential so that security does not come to be seen as somehow dominating life. Life will always exceed security in ways that are

overlooked and lost when it is expressed solely as an object target and when focus is placed exclusively on the processes and techniques of security. As such it is crucial for both understandings of the efficacy of security and the relations between security and lived experience that neither security nor life should be conceived in isolation.

There are also implications for work on everyday life itself and for security as a phenomena within everyday life. If there cannot be security and then everyday life, we also have to consider how security does become enrolled in the everyday and how it is then part of and so is inseparable from the everyday. It is crucial that greater attention is paid to the presence of security within the everyday and that it is accepted and indeed acknowledged more widely that the everyday is not a pure space where things happen, the everyday takes place through security. It is therefore important that greater attention is paid to the presence of security in everyday life and then a more thorough questioning undertaken of what this then means for topics like ambiguity, or contingency, or the aleatory in the context of work on everyday life. This then acknowledges that more sustained focus must consider how what security does, and how security is enacted, becomes enrolled in the everyday, part of the everyday and is ultimately inseparable from the everyday. This is not to suggest that the everyday is somehow structured by security, but that it happens through that security.

The work presented through this thesis goes against many of the critiques that have developed concerning security and the securing of the everyday city. As argued in Chapter 2, a set of well established accounts of security are predominantly framed in a negative manner, and whilst not wholly opposed to their conclusions, this thesis demonstrates and considers the possibilities for other critical accounts. The work of Perec is useful here and I believe can be aligned with affirmative modes of critique that are concerned with opening up new possibilities and potentialities for the future (see Anderson, 2006; Bennett, 2001; Connolly, 2002). It would be easy to assume that Perec, his practical exercises and his writings are resolutely apolitical. As Chapter 3 explained, much of Perec's work on the everyday and his modes of witnessing everyday life deliberately fashion uncritical, politically and sociologically neutral descriptions (see Adair, 2009). However, Perec (who remained faithful throughout his life to his self-definition as a socialist (Bellos, 1999:145)) was certainly politically motivated, as is demonstrated throughout his literary career through a range of critical accounts of politics, economics, society and culture. Although these positions and commitments are at times so entwined in the subtleties of his writings that they do not present a clear message (see Bellos, 1999; Walker and Virilio, 2001). In Perec's work we see the possibilities of a form of critique that begins with the acts of witnessing, attention and description. As James notes, the power of Perec's quixotic investigation, is in

its capacity to “both uncover and potentially threaten the foundations of social and cultural life” (2009:198). The most striking example of this is found in the essay *Approaches to What?* a piece that is at once a practical exercise for the infra-ordinary and a critique of politics, society and culture. Perec’s strategy in this essay is political in origin, “‘Social problems’”, he writes, “aren’t ‘a matter of concern’ when there’s a strike, they are intolerable twenty-four hours out of twenty-four, three hundred and sixty-five days a year” (2008a:209). For Perec witnessing, seeing more flatly and going about things more slowly are critical methods that draw attention to “the truly intolerable, the truly inadmissible” (2008a:209), wresting these from the dross in which they were mired so as to make change possible. In revealing his socio-political frustrations and in demanding the answers to the “questions I ask or would like to ask” (2008a:209), I feel that Perec mobilises a style of affirmative critique and an optimism that reveals the possibilities for change and the potential for opening up of new futures.

In the context of work on security and specifically in the account of the everyday life of security developed within this thesis, Perec provides a useful position to both question and offer critical accounts of the presence and work of security, its operation and its relations to lived experience. The established critique of security is overwhelmingly posed in negative terms, security is routinely demonised and unhelpfully characterised as always somehow a problem. Security is commonly condemned as intrusive and described as omnipresent in its techniques, processes and affects. A further issue, and one that I have reflected on within this thesis, is the tendency to pose security and freedom as always opposed. The very ambiguity at the heart of this thesis and its insistence that security can be reconciled with freedom demonstrates the need to consider how to undertake critical work on security that does not imply that security per se is always a problem. The approach developed through this thesis does not start with the assumption that security is good or bad, rather I propose that it is more useful to begin by thinking what and how security might be, indeed what it may become. Critical accounts must begin from such positions, not having already made conclusions. And so I propose a critical account of security and of the securing of the everyday city following Perec, one that moves more slowly in its witnessing and description, rather than rushing to question, critique and conclude. This is allied with the mobilising of a politics of potentiality that forwards a broader concern for the promises and provocations of affirmative modes of being-critical that can cultivate and open up new possibilities and potentialities for the future (see Bennett, 2001; Connolly, 2002; Foucault, 1997b).

The work of this thesis also has implications for practice and policy. In security practice the emphasis on technical and instrumental issues has occluded questioning how

the increasing urbanisation of security agendas and the securitisation of everyday life takes place within the life of the everyday. It has been argued that everyday life is central to the rationalities of the form of counter-terror security apparatus traced through this thesis, however, it has also been maintained that a troubling dimension of security practice is the lack of satisfactory means of conceiving how security will take place within lived everyday life. There emerge a series of issues here regarding the persistent bypassing of the mundane and the everyday. In addition, appeals to public vigilance assume a level of public awareness and responsibility which, as this thesis has demonstrated, are so often exceeded by the experiences and affects of boredom, confusion, hurry, and so on. Whilst absence and presence are increasingly central to the geographies of urban security practice it is never so simple as more overt or 'high visibility' interventions nor embedded security becoming part of everyday life as is planned, nor anticipated. There is a greater need to attend to the landscapes of presence and absence and regimes of (in)visibility that emerge through the everyday life of security.

Ultimately, questioning and attending to the relations between security and everyday life should be deemed as inseparable from the established and ongoing debates concerning the processes of the securitisation of cities and the urbanisation of security agendas. These different dimensions should be approached in order to understand better the multiple and complex ways the everyday is secured and the everyday life of security.

### **8.3. Future research**

As with any research project, the account of the everyday life of security presented in this thesis is by no means complete. Rather, it should be read as a modest contribution and a starting point for a focus on the securing of the everyday city and the everyday life of security. Thus, it is acknowledged that there are numerous dimensions concerning the complex processes of securing cities and the everyday life of security that are absent from this study. In this section I suggest three potentially significant avenues that this thesis opens up for future research, it is believed that these concerns can further this study directly and develop potential avenues in researching the geographies of urban security more broadly. In particular, and in keeping with this thesis, this section focuses on furthering works that are more attentive to the relations between security and everyday life.

An important area of future research would necessarily attend to the issue of difference in everyday life and within the everyday life of security, which has not been addressed directly within this research project. The question of difference runs alongside a



number of issues regarding the presence of security within cities and concerns are regularly raised regarding counter-terrorism security and policy with respects to issues of difference. It has been the subject of ongoing debates in both academic and non-academic circles, however surprisingly little work has been undertaken with respects to how difference emerges and is enacted through everyday encounters with security. Questioning difference and security, in particular the ways in which forms of security differentiate, has been the subject of ongoing debates in both academic and non-academic circles, however surprisingly little work has been undertaken with respects to how difference is emerges and is enacted through everyday encounters with security and the everyday practices of security. As such it is suggested that a focus on difference in relation to the enactment of security would form an important development of this research. In such a study, not only would race, gender and age be considered as potentially problematic, there are also interesting and significant questions concerning criminality and encounters with different forms of security apparatuses. Attending to and questioning the issue of difference in everyday life would go some way to providing an even more nuanced account of the everyday life of security and its enactment as part of lived experience. Not only would such an extension of this research be interesting with respects to the everyday life of security, it potentially has important implications regarding the violence of forms of security. Utilising the conceptual approach adopted in this thesis could offer a significant contribution to debates regarding the violence of security, in particular the ways in which forms of security differentiate between a threat and a non-threat. Different forms of security, including the counter-terrorist security apparatus that is addressed here, have been subject to widespread and longstanding critiques on the grounds that the processes of differentiation are based on forms of racial, or class, or gender codings and classifications.

This thesis offers an account of a particular security apparatus and is limited in the respect that it addresses the emergence of a distinct form of counter-terrorist security in the context of the UK and then within the two research sites in London. Acknowledging this, it would therefore be necessary and indeed interesting to extend the analysis and approach that has been developed through the course of this research in order to address how other forms of security, counter-terrorist or otherwise, are enacted and become present within urban life in particular ways and the everyday life of different apparatuses of security. This would further develop a more nuanced account of how different forms of security are experienced as part of everyday urban life. It would also further challenge the established conventions that claim the ubiquity of security, offering a more fine grained analysis attuned to multifarious security interventions and different landscapes of security. Additionally, it has

been contended that the practice of security in the context of the securing of the everyday city, invariably and importantly will involve degrees of relational resonance between different security apparatuses. Therefore, to further extend analysis of the processes through which cities are secured and how security becomes part of urban life, it would be relevant to investigate how this takes place. Such an addition to current discussions would go some way to addressing how security apparatuses respond to different, perhaps multiple, enactments of threat within urban life and how these different forms of security become part of everyday life through the blending and multiplying relations.

Throughout this thesis I have insisted on the spatial and temporal contingency of this form of counter-terror security, a conclusion that I believe should be extended to other forms of urban security. Following this it is important that calls to develop more spatially nuanced understandings of the processes of securing cities and the presence of different security interventions within a range urban contexts are heeded. As this thesis has called for a more fuller appreciation of the variation that arises within the different urban environments of named cities, continuing this investigation in different urban contexts would also seem a logical and important next stage of research. This applies as much to addressing differing counter-terrorist responses within different cities within the UK as it does to examinations of the responses to the threats of terrorism to different cases internationally. There have been repeated calls insisting on the need to investigate and address the issues of spatial contingency in urban security and such work is certainly underway, however in both research and security practice there are persistent inferences made which then go on to generalise the means of securing space and the outcomes with respects to the imbrications of security with the city and on urban life. Whilst it is accepted that extrapolating from a narrow range of cases is bad practice, it has endured. It is thus vital that these new, emerging and indeed shifting geographies of counter-terrorist security and urban security practices more generally are subject to more sustained scrutiny. Following, this and related, terrorism and counter-terrorist security responses have and will change with time. As well as a focus on past change, the anticipatory logics of security necessitate further explorations of the futural orientation, to the 'yet to come' of both security and terror. Along with an appreciation of the spatial complexity of forms of security and the threats of and vulnerabilities to terrorism, questioning how these change over time in the context of the securing of cities would provide an important addition to ongoing debates.

The approach presented here does not claim to be definitive and there are many dimensions of urban security that are not addressed here. Rather, this research represents a starting point for future works that are more concerned with witnessing and describing the

everyday life of security and how the everyday is secured. Extending discussions of urban security through more explicit attention to the everyday life of security provides a means of moving beyond exclusively conceiving security as imposed on urban spaces in relation to 'principles' of state formation. Investigating both how security takes the everyday as its 'referent object' and how security is then lived addresses debates concerned with the extent to which security has become a driving factor in contemporary urbanism. In doing so this questions the rationales for and contexts of urban security and then moves to consider how security moves from a set of interventions to something which is lived and experienced. There are then important implications for both scholarly research and practical matters concerning security interventions as they become part of urban environments and how security becomes present within everyday life in different ways. Ultimately, in order to better understand the urban geographies of security and the ways in which the everyday city is secured, it is necessary to further develop the work undertaken in this thesis, and to continue to move beyond the already established debates concerning the more technical and instrumental dimensions of security. Doing so would help to foster a broadened discussion that can better understand and bear witness to the urban geographies of security.

# Appendix A

List of interviews completed with research informants.

Association of Train Operating Companies Police and Security Liaison Officer

British Transport Police Counter-Terrorism Risk Adviser

British Transport Police Counter-Terrorism Security Adviser for the London Underground

British Transport Police Crime Reduction Manager

British Transport Police and London Underground Crime and Disorder Partnership Unit

Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure

The Commission for Architecture and the Built Environment

Lambeth Borough Counter-Terrorism Security Adviser

Lambeth Borough Crime Prevention Design Adviser

Lambeth Council Town Planning Division

Lambeth Borough Police Security Desk

London Underground Operational Security Manager

National Counter Terrorism Security Office

South Bank Employers Group Security Coordinator

Transport for London Crime and Disorder Partnership Manager

## Appendix B

List of interviews, diaries and go-alongs completed with participants. Participant's names have been changed to protect anonymity.

### Victoria Line

Carol	12/03/09	Diary	
Amira	25/03/09		
Samantha	06/04/09	Diary	
Emma	07/04/09		
Katie	09/04/09	Diary	
Emily	13/04/09	Diary	Go-along
Paul	14/04/09	Diary	
Owen	17/04/09	Diary	
Ranisha	19/04/09		
Sanath	19/04/09		
Ling	26/04/09	Diary	
Adam	27/04/09	Diary	
Mike	27/04/09	Diary	
Tolu	27/04/09		
Nicholas	27/04/09	Diary	
Daniel	29/04/10	Diary	
David	29/04/09		
Alex	30/04/09		
Thomas	30/04/09	Diary	
Nilukshi	08/05/09	Diary	Go-along
Shanthi	10/06/09		
Christopher	01/07/09	Diary	
Henry	03/07/09	Diary	
Sam	14/07/09		
Jenny	14/07/09		
Nicola	16/07/09		
Iain	22/07/09		
Marie	22/07/09		
Robert	22/07/09	Diary	
Margaret	09/09/09		
James	10/09/09		
Catherine	23/09/09		

## South Bank and Bankside

Lene	05/03/09		
Nimali	01/04/09	Diary	
Anne	01/04/09		
Sarah	07/04/09		
Allan	08/04/09		
Theresa	09/04/09	Diary	
Mary	14/04/09	Diary	Go-along
Helen	17/04/09	Diary	
Rosa	19/04/09	Diary	
Alistair	26/04/09		
Laura	02/05/09		
Andrew	07/05/09		
Michael	09/09/09	Diary	
Amy	22/09/09		
Natasha	23/09/09	Diary	Go-along

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